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Libyan Bedouin MT9

[For information on the political role of the *omda* (*umda*) as a representative of the more powerful and numerous tribal segments within an administrative district, see Category 634.]

175 with one move, the Caliph sent these Bedouins into battle in order to enforce authority in his western Berber provinces. This order set in motion the great "Hilali invasion." The tribesmen of Banu Hilal and Banu Sulaim literally slashed their way across eastern North Africa laying waste to towns and fields as they went (Ibn Khaldun 1925:29; Brockelmann 1939: 204).

175 The Arab Bedouins recruited Berbers as they went,
648 especially in Libya. Between the years 1052 and 1054, these marauding nomads sacked the rich agricultural lands of Tripolitania and Tunisia, lands which had been in production since the time of the Romans (Mahdi 1964:21). The Banu Sulaim, according to Ibn Khaldun (1925:136), concentrated their action in an area from Alexandria to Tripolitania. It was over this region, which includes Cyrenaica in eastern Libya, that they established their rule. Ibn Khaldun states that the two tribes agreed to divide the conquered territory between them, the eastern lands going to the Banu Sulaim and the western lands to the Banu
175 Hilal (1925:33-34). Such a division of territorial rights in
571 Arab Bedouin society is representative of a set of authority
182 relationships. Differentiation in the locus of authority,
*[613] whether it be horizontal or hierarchical, is a method of maintaining political order among segments of the lineage structure.

175 Evans-Pritchard states that the Cyrenaican Bedouins
114 are descendants of the Banu Sulaim and represent an admixture
619

175 114 •619 between the Bedouin and the Berbers (1954:46-47). G. W. Murray informs us that the Bedouins of the Egyptian Western Desert themselves believe this to be the case (1935:33, 247). I agree that the Cyrenaican Bedouin are the descendants of the Banu Sulaim; nevertheless, and despite what Murray says, my informants (when they knew) claimed to be descendants of the Banu Hilal. They refer to their ancestress, Sa'ada, as al-Hilaliyya, "she of the Banu Hilal."

175 167 Data concerning the Awlad 'Ali migratory history are insufficient for a satisfactory reconstruction of the process. As we have noted, there were two invasions of North Africa by the Arabs. The first, about 643 A.D., was a shock wave from the Arab conquest of Egypt in which the Arabs defeated the Luwata Berbers who were living in eastern Libya. The second invasion, in the 11th century, took place at the hands of the Banu Hilal and Banu Sulaim and penetrated into the North African countryside. As a result, the Banu Salaim tribe settled in Cyrenaica where they intermingled with the Luwata Berbers. That part of Cyrenaica which they claimed as their [103] territory they called the Jabal Akhdar (i.e. "Green Mountain"), a plateau region set back from the coast. The Bedouins of al-Qasr refer to the Jabal Akhdar as their original homeland (see Figure 1).

We hear nothing more of the Banu Salaim until the 17th century. At this time, segments of the tribe began drifting

175 167 eastward toward the Nile Valley. It is not possible to determine the exact conditions associated with this migration, but they probably parallel later movements which are connected with tribal conflicts over land and water rights. In 1689, Bedouins from Libya raided Egyptian oases in the Western Desert (Murray 1935:29). From this date on, for a period of some forty years, records show a continual movement of Bedouins out of Libya into Egypt. Some groups went as far as the Nile Valley and were eventually assimilated into the peasant population there. Tribal movements at the end of the 17th century involved whole tribes and also tribal sections and fragments. Thus in some cases, authority relations arising from territorial bonds were dissipated; but in other cases, political ties were strung across the Libyan Desert from Cyrenaica to the Nile Valley. "Today there is not a Cyrenaican tribe, or even large section, which has not some of its members in Egypt, often whole lineages" (Evans-Pritchard 1954:49-50).

175 619 726 167 [648] Evans-Pritchard's study of the Sanusi, valuable for its analysis of Italian colonial records, shows that the Awlad 'Ali were driven from Cyrenaica by its sister tribe, the Harabi, with the help of the Turkish rulers of Libya. This took place, he says, about 150 years ago. When the Awlad 'Ali arrived in Egypt, they found the Hanadi tribe already there. In a chain of conflicts, the Hanadi had displaced the Banu'Una, forcing them into the Nile Valley:

175 then came the Awlad 'Ali.

•619 Around the year 1800, the Awlad 'Ali were able to
726 defeat the Hanadi with the help of another Cyrenaican tribe
167 dwelling in the area, the Jumi'at. The Jumi'at were a vassal tribe who changed their allegiance from the Hanadi to the Awlad 'Ali after this war. The Hanadi, as the Banu'Una before them, were forced into the Nile Valley. Today, they
[131] live in Sharqiyya Province and are no longer distinguishable from the peasant population.

175 According to Evans-Pritchard, the Awlad 'Ali were still
619 in possession of eastern Cyrenaica in 1800. Then there occurred
726 "long and savagely fought" wars ending with the expulsion of
114 the Awlad 'Ali. But this time schedule seems unlikely since the Awlad 'Ali were already at war with the Hanadi when
175 Napoleon landed near Alexandria in 1798. The Bedouin war has
648 been amusingly described by the French historian Lacroix (in
181 Murray 1935:30) who accompanied the Napoleonic expedition:

> At five o'clock, the first Bedouin were seen on the flank of the army, and shortly afterwards one saw four or five hundred; it was the tribe of Henady, the fiercest Arabs of these deserts. They were almost naked, swarthy, and lean; their horses seemed wornout hacks; save for the helmet, it was Don Quixote as represented in the engravings ...if these five hundred Arabs had been Mamelukes, they would have been able to obtain a great success at this first moment, when the soldiers' imaginations were alert and ready to receive any impression, but these Arabs were as cowardly as the Mamelukes, who had charged an hour before, were brave.

175 According to Murray, on July fourth "thirty Sheikhs of the
648 Hanadi, the Awlad 'Ali, and the Beni'Una made their peace with the new power" (1935:30).

175 The version of history provided by my informants is
186 no radical departure from these facts. But there are a few
124 differing aspects which represent ethnocentric highlights on
(648) history. For instance, the Bedouins of al-Qasr have a few stories which exaggerate the fact that the Harabi needed the cooperation of the Turkish rulers to defeat the Awlad 'Ali and to force them out of Cyrenaica. Also, the Bedouins point out, the Jumi'at tribe begged the Awlad 'Ali to come and rescue them from the oppression of the Hanadi.

175 Shortly after 1800, Muhammad 'Ali, the Ottoman
619 viceroy, drove the French from Egypt and supported the Hanadi
648 against the Awlad 'Ali. The Egytian ruler felt that political control over the Awlad 'Ali would insure the security of the whole desert, and especially Egypt's western frontier with Libya. Despite the alliance between the Hanadi and Muhammed 'Ali's forces, the outcome was a temporary victory for the Awlad 'Ali. This event actually set the stage for a transformation of Bedouin tribal society.

175 After the defeat of the Hanadi and the Pasha's troops,
648 the Awlad 'Ali were given preferential treatment by Muhammed 'Ali. He wisely secured the Hanadi tribe in Sharqiyya Province. Then he granted the Awlad 'Ali, by right of usufruct, the

175 648 posts were established there, and Marsa Matruh became the capital town. The Western Desert was administered by British officers who had under their command a garrison of Egyptian soldiers. Their assignment was to secure the colonial borders. This task included keeping the Awlad 'Ali within the boundaries of Egypt. The policy of the British provincial government was to avoid interfering with the Bedouin process of law and conflict regulation unless it threatened the peace and security [124] of the desert. My informants said that the British interfered with Bedouin justice only under the threat of large-scale tribal warfare.

175 795 [619] The political relationship which the Bedouins of the Awlad 'Ali tribe had with the Sanusi Order of Islam in Libya was historically not so important compared to that of the other Cyrenaican tribes. The Sanusi Order, classified as a Sufi tariiqa ("mystic order"), was actually quite orthodox in its attitudes and practices. This is a function of the socio-religious conditions of its origin during the 18th-19th century revival of orthodoxy in Islamic Arabia (Gibb 1955: [793] 127-145). Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi founded his order, al-Sanusiyya, near Mecca around the year 1837. The Sanusi doctrine may be considered orthodox, or secularly oriented, in that it rejects the fundamental goal of Sufism, mystical union with God.

The Sanusi Order, from the very beginning, strove for a return to pure Islam. It made its greatest headway among

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
SA'ADA
JIBARNA
AQAQRA
BANI SALLAM
BARAGHUTH
'AWAQIR
'ARAIBAT
MAGHARBA
JAWAZI
FAWAYID
HARABI
AWLAD 'ALI
SHARAI'
HANADI
BAHAJA
BANI 'UNA

THE GENEALOGY OF THE CYRENAICAN BEDOUIN

FIGURE 2

131 view it, the Western Desert is the watan
•619 ("homeland") of the Awlad 'Ali tribe, and is subdivided into
631 tribal zones each referred to as a mintaqa. Mintagit al-Qasr
is part of mintaqit qabilit 'Aishaibat (i.e. "the area of
al-Qasr" is part of "the territory of the 'Aishaibat tribe").
131 Each tribal mintaqa is further broken down into contiguous
619 parcels of land belonging to lineages, and these are also
*613 referred to as mintaqa; for instance, there is mintaqa
631
[423] 'ailit Ma'fas, i.e. "the territory of the Ma'fas family."
In the al-Qasr segmentary lineage society, genealogical ties and local ties are coincidental. The boundaries of al-Qasr are defined by the agnatic lines of the 'Aishaibat tribe and include the sahil and sha'ir wi mar'a zones.

361 To the Egyptians, a qarya ("village") is a nucleated
631 cluster of permanent dwellings with some degree of social
integration: al-Qasr is a qarya for administrative matters. The Bedouins, who think in terms of kin-based residence groups, tribal boundaries, and political and economic symbiotic relations, see the Egyptian qarya as only a sector of al-Qasr. They refer to this sector as the 'izba, i.e., "farm" or "rural settlement." The 'izba is land fertile enough to support a secure and sedentary life. "The 'izba," the Bedouins say, "is the seed of the madiina" (city).

[[21]] For my own purposes, the Bedouin sense of al-Qasr is
the more useful concept. Al-Qasr is all of the territory of
[[131]] the 'Aishaibat tribe. Situated at 31°N and 27°E, al-Qasr is

History of Settlement in al-Qasr

173 The settlement of al-Qasr took place about 200 years
[166] ago when the Awlad 'Ali first came to the area from Cyrenaica.
[175] No historical documentation for this period exists. The
173 various versions which the Bedouins offer are both vague and
*613 ethnocentric with reference to lineage. A point of consensus
[712] is that the zone was first claimed by Abu Mahjuba who built
a large fort (qasr = "fort" or "castle") near the coast. The Bedouins say that Abu Mahjuba settled in the area of al-Qasr because "he knew good land when he saw it." He belonged to no one lineage, "he was 'Aishaibi only." All of the lineages of al-Qasr claim that their ancestors came with Abu Mahjuba and settled on the land at that time. Abu Mahjuba has been mythologized: he belongs to all of al-Qasr, a symbol of local group solidarity and fraternal equality.

173 Al-Qasr represents the end of nomadic life for the
361 'Aishaibat tribe. According to the Bedouins, each tribe and
[198] lineage took that part of al-Qasr which it preferred. If the
members of the segment wanted to grow vegetables, they took land on the coast; if they preferred the "old way of life," they set up their tents in the sha'ir wi mar'a area and raised sheep. "Everything was fine," they say, "there were no land registration laws--a man was free." Al-Qasr was settled
● [619] "after the wars" (with the Hanadi), and it was only then that
the Awlad 'Ali broke up into tribes. The 'Aishaibat took the

474 of the needs of their tribesmen; that, in fact, the patronage
661 system is relative to the traditional situation. Unavoidably,
474 the al-Qasr cooperative society is dominated by one tribe:
619 107 of its members are from the 'Aishaibat, while only 32 are
from other tribes. This relationship between traditional and modern structures is common throughout the Western Desert. When a new cooperative is organized within the boundaries of a certain tribal mintaqa, members of the local tribe will resign from other cooperatives to join "their own." Thus, when a new cooperative was founded in Marsa Matruh, twenty members of the Jum'iat tribe left the al-Qasr branch to join the new chapter which catered largely to the needs of the Jum'iat in the town.

474 The World Food Program of the Food and Agriculture
747 Organization (F.A.O.) of the United Nations operates through
433 the cooperative society. It has had an impact on the economy
177 of the Bedouins of al-Qasr. In 1963, this organization, with
the cooperation of the U.A.R. government, proposed to stabilize economic conditions in the Western Desert by providing 4,000 Bedouin families (20,000 persons) with enough food and fodder to help them through the three dry summer months. The program was designed to encourage mixed and settled farming through the reclamation of 20,000 acres of arid desert land, while its range improvement project was to furnish pasturage for 500,000 sheep throughout the Northwestern Coastal Zone. In al-Qasr,

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433 when planted in large quantities. The southern zone of al-Qasr is best suited for these crops, and the tractor is necessary for a successful crop.

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[427] Tractors are rented through the cooperative society. Local cooperative officers are responsible for seeing that all members share in the use of the tractor. But, in fact, officers and their closer relatives monopolize the tractors. The government has allotted to the al-Qasr cooperative five tractors. [654] They feel that it would jeopardize the whole program of economic reform if they were to dictate the way in which the tractors are to be used. Consequently, the tractor, like the rations of foodstuffs, has become a pawn in tribal power plays. In one case, not in al-Qasr, a tractor-driver who was a member of the 'Ali Abyad tribe insisted that members of the 'Ali Ahmar tribe pay him a 50 piaster "tip" to have their fields plowed. Because of situations such as these, most Bedouins prefer that cooperative membership coincide with local group membership. It is better, they say, if the 'Aishaibat of al-Qasr have their own cooperative because they know how to handle problems among themselves. The government, during this transitional period, seems to agree.

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407 One reason that tractors are monopolized by a small group is that there are not enough of the machines to handle the plowing. Of the five tractors in al-Qasr, seldom were more than two working simultaneously. Often, this was a result of

CHAPTER III

KINSHIP AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

Principles of Social Structure

*613 The division of Bedouin society into groups is
explained in terms of certain principles of organization, the
most pervasive of these being unilineality or the lineage
*613 principle. According to this structural rule, an individual
619 born into a tertiary lineage segment (see Figure 7)[1] automatically
becomes a member of each successive and more inclusive
group represented by the higher levels of segmentation. The
status, rights, and obligations of the individual with respect
to other members of the tribe are in this way determined on
the basis of kinship. An individual gains political status
in the tribe, as a societal unit, only through membership in
a tertiary group. Theoretically, group membership is based
on birth, but there are certain "legal fictions" which
represent exceptions to this rule. In al-Qasr exceptions are
rare, but a few do exist. For instance, there is one case of
[597] individual adoption, and in another case, a whole tertiary
173 segment was grafted on to a lineage stem. The latter case
*613 happened four generations ago when Taram Mighaiwiz of 'Ailit
619 Lazumi adopted Hajj 'Ali "as his brother." The Bedouins say

597 [1] [See p.77--Analyst.]

173 that in those days it was important "to have men to go to
*613 war; Hajj 'Ali came from the Sinai with many men and wrote
•619
597 his name into the books of Lazumi." Today, in the Lazumi
genealogy Hajj 'Ali's name appears as the brother of Taram,
[114] both are claimed as sons of Mighawsiz. This kind of data is
difficult to uncover and I may have missed gathering other
cases of ideological kinship ties.

*613 The specific unilinear principle which operates in
[171] al-Qasr is partrilineality, common to the Middle Eastern
culture area. A corollary principle is the corporate group.
*613 Together, these two rules structure the social world of the
571 individual and effectively define a range of social choices
for him. The individual's social relations and social roles
are relative to the rights and obligations of the people
related to him through his father. In a sense, the social
world for the individual in al-Qasr is his father's group
and its network of relationships with other similar groups;
he would not think of leaving this group of his own free
will though, in reality, he could. The Bedouins believe
[181] that a man cannot be happy if he lives with strangers, i.e.,
[829] outside his corporate group. This value holds up today to
the extent that a man will expect his son to return to the
desert even after his education as a merchant, a government
clerk, or an army officer.

Structural differentiation in al-Qasr is not solely

121 of political relations. The structural differentiation be-
*613 tween them relates to certain specifics of role differentia-
554 tion and articulation, and corporate goals. Different roles
571 function differently in different spheres of politics. This is clear when we consider that the two structural aspects of corporate group politics serve the double purpose of insuring local autonomy while promoting integration into the larger lineage segments. This I will cover more thoroughly in the next chapter. Most of the discussion here deals with social structure and, in particular, the internal elements of the corporate group.

*613 In the total societal context, the tertiary segment
•619 is pivotal for the conceptualization of two models: the Bedouin's model of his tribal system, and the observer's model of a segmentary lineage system. Both of these constructs are shown in Figure 7.[1] Both genealogical models can be completed by the addition of Figures 2, 3, and 8, extending the systems both horizontally and vertically.

Theoretically, all of the levels of the Awlad 'Ali tribal system constitute a political community, i.e., the various segments shown in Figure 3 regulate and maintain relations with each other through complementary opposition (Fallers 1963). But in fact, political action of any functional significance rarely occurs beyond the secondary lineage level. In terms of the structural principles, agnation, real or

[1] [See p. 77--Analyst]

*613
•619 fictive, has practical political consequences only at the tertiary and secondary levels of segmentation. Most political activity in al-Qasr is the result of either cooperation or conflict between corporate groups the size of Bait 'Umar or 'Ailit Ma'fas. 'Ailit Ma'fas is made up of five structurally replicated political groups such as Bait 'Umar. Toward out-
[609] siders, these five groups act as one; they represent a corporate entity before the rest of the tribe. As a member of 'Ailit
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554 Ma'fas, an individual has jural status in the whole tribe. He also has the means and the moral obligation to articulate his interests and to settle his arguments with other members of the tribe. When an individual is involved in an activity which relates to matters of power and authority, he is playing a political role in the political process. The units which make up the internal and external political systems of the 'Aishaibat tribe of al-Qasr are roles. Roles then are the
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554 analytical focus of this study. Of course, I realize that the concrete entities present in al-Qasr are human beings. I only use roles as methodological constructs in order to abstract from, and to understand, Bedouin behavior. By conceptualizing sets of roles as structures, we will be able to understand the internal and external political structures as well as the traditional and modern political structures of Bedouin society. In al-Qasr, these political roles and structures emerge from the more generalized kinship structure

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 79]

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		SA'ADA
	(1)	'AQAR
TRIBE	(2)	AWLAD 'ALI
TRIBE	(3)	'ALI AHMAR
PRIMARY	(4)	'AISHAIBAT
SECONDARY	(5)	'AILIT MA'FAS
TERTIARY	(6)	BAIT 'UMAR
	(7)	BAIT ('AIT) ABD AL-MALIK

FIGURE 7

GENERATIONS AND TERMINOLOGY OF TRIBAL STRUCTURE

121 *613 •619 554 and are related to the organizational principles mentioned above.

619 The Awlad 'Ali represent a cultural entity whose membership is defined in patrilineal terms. Cutlurally, and genealogically, they are related to the Cyrenaican Bedouin but distinct from the Egyptians of the Nile Valley. The 619 political system of the Awlad 'Ali can be extended to include 177 Cyrenaicans "as Bedouins" but it can only interact with the Egyptians "as foreigners." This means that the Awlad 'Ali possess common roles, structures, and cultural institutions which can articulate with those of the Cyrenaican Bedouin. In the case of the Egyptians, however, social interaction calls forth new cultural categories and new structural elements in Bedouin society. This is the basis of political change in al-Qasr. Role differentiation and ideological replacement are taking place vis a vis the nation-state: the traditional political structure of the Bedouins is adapting to the Egyptian political environment. In the language of the "politics of modernization," this process is referred to as "politicization" or "political socialization." We shall deal with this process in later chapters.

The principles which relate the Bedouins of al-Qasr to other Bedouins of the Western Desert and Libya are the organizational principles of kinship, residence, and contract; but the principle which relates them to the Egyptian state is

● 619 the bureaucratic principle. Here we are concerned with the
177 traditional situation.
[121]

The 'Aishaibi Bedouins of al-Qasr are a residence ●
619 group. Each sub-group of the tribe, i.e., the secondary and
*613 tertiary units, is assigned their own territory (mintaqa).
571 Kinship and residence are the primary determinants of group differentiation; agnates who dwell together represent concrete authority structures, or political groups. This follows from the fact that patterns of political action, or what we call political structures, most often deal with the exercise of legitimate authority--as opposed to power. Power relations do occur and when present complicate the situation. In al-Qasr, power relations and structures emerge when the principle of cognation or contracted alliance form groups which crosscut the effectiveness of local, agnatic political structures. But, in al-Qasr, as in most societies, political action usually takes the form of the exercise of authority (Southall 1965:120).

173 The genealogical map as an idological charter argues
114 against the formation of power relations. Genealogical re-
*613 lations represent a set of social relations each replete with
571 definite rights and obligations. Fallers (1956) has noted
the tendency in segmentary lineage societies to cast all
authority relations in a unilinear genealogical mould. The
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829 Bedouin visualize their world, extending from Alexandria to
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571

*613 Libya, as a territorially segmented one corresponding to the
829 lineage divisions of the tribe. They say that every Bedouin
173
571 knows the owner of each centimeter of this world. Not only does the genealogy represent a set of property relations, it also represents and upholds a set of authority relations. In
*613 Cyrenaica also (Peters 1960), the Bedouin genealogical map
173 corresponds to the distribution of groups on the ground.
571 Kinship relations as social relations in Bedouin society may be properly interpreted as property relations between groups. Property relations as part of the Bedouin world view are an essential premise upon which the social and political order rests, although it is not the only premise.

•619 The 'Aishaibat are identified with the al-Qasr portion
*613 of the Awlad 'Ali homeland. The 'Aishaibi segments are separate and contiguous on the ground. Figure 3a[1] shows the correspondence between the 'Aishaibi genealogical and territorial divisions at the secondary lineage level of segmentation.

121 That kinship as an organizing principle in segmentary
*613 societies cannot be considered apart from local contiguity is an old and well-known fact. Sir Henry Maine (1917:76-79) in analyzing the evolution of "political ideas" noted the interrelationship between "the principle of local contiguity" and the central principle of the "connexion in blood," how they combine to become "the condition of community in political

[1] [See p. 66--Analyst]

121 *613 functions." The political system as a structure with reference to the territorial principle and descent system is the unit which the political analyst seeks to understand. To do so, he must concentrate his attention upon the local descent group, the corporate group (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940:11; Leach 1954:128). Structural analysis in terms of functional group differentiation is preliminary to political content and political role analysis (Smith 1966:113-129). 121 The objective of this chapter is to define the basic political unit in Bedouin society and the set of authority relations which characterize it. We are looking for, what Maine referred to as, the "Corporation" and its "Public Officer" or "Corporation sole."

[128] The rest of this chapter is a discussion of the internal domestic structure of authority and the complex of values and beliefs which the Bedouins of al-Qasr express about a desired social order in terms of their principles of organization. Associative relationships based on kinship, residence and contract are morally supportive and hence authoritative; they structure as well as reflect a world order. Such relationships validate traditional authority and contribute to a system of social control.

•619 Lineage Structure and Formal Categories

Not all residents of al-Qasr are members of the Awlad

619 'Ali tribe. There is one lineage, the Sulwatiyya shown in *[613] Figure 7a, which does not claim descent from Sa'ada and hence are no relations of the Awlad 'Ali Bedouin. Nor are any serious ideological claims for tribal membership provided by them or their Awlad 'Ali neighbors. The first social differentiation found in al-Qasr, then, is between those who belong to the Sa'adi tribes and those of the Marabit tribes. In terms of Bedouin social ideal types, the Sa'adi tribesmen are warriors, known for their courage and generosity; the Marabit tribesmen are weak and dependent on the protection [792] which the Sa'adi offers them. The Marabit tends to specialize in the role of "holy man." [171] The dichotamy here is a reflection of the structural differentiation, common to North Africa, between sacred and secular tribes, or client and protector tribes.

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539 The Sa'adi-Marabit division in al-Qasr is defined geographically, in name, and in Bedouin tradition and myth. Here is the way in which the Marabit "holy man" of al-Qasr conceives of the difference between the two types and its origin:

> They are brothers and there is no difference. The Sa'adi is always one step in front of the Marabit, he handles things for the Marabit and helps him. In political matters the Sa'adi is more advanced . . . When the Marabit is in trouble, the Sa'adi will defend him. They are two different groups because the Sa'adi are from one mother. Once Sa'ada was riding in a caravan through the desert.

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> Her riding booth struck a tree and she found herself stranded there in the tree; her camel had gone and the rest of the caravan noticed nothing and continued on. Then a Marabit passed by and saw her there. He helped her down and they later married. She already had three sons to a former husband: Ali Ahmar, Ali Abyad and Sinaina. The Marabit also had children from another marriage. He was very rich and they could afford to live together. One day thieves began to harrass the man, but when the three Sa'adi sons offered him their help he told them not to bother with the thieves, that they would go away. But they did not, and they continued to harrass the man for a long time. The three sons were still very young at this time. When they grew up they asked the Marabit for arms and horses with which to fight off the thieves. They received them and succeeded in driving off the thieves. The Marabit was very happy and offered the three sons one-half of his wealth, and he was very rich. The sons refused this generous offer saying to the Marabit that they were no different from his other sons and would take only one-tenth of his wealth.

619 The differentiation between the Sa'adi and Marabit has structural consequences only in that it defines psychological types and tends to assign them to certain roles in society. By his [181] psychological make-up, the Marabit, who is weak and retiring, is unfit for the tasks which the Sa'adi undertakes, i.e., war, trade, and politics. It is, nevertheless, expected that the Marabit will act as a support mechanism for the secular operations of the Sa'adi. Usually, this support takes the form of financial contributions.

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675 Each Marabit group is related through contractual agreement to a Sa'adi group. For instance, the Sulwatiyya lineage of al-Qasr are members of the Jumi'at tribe, a Marabit tribe; when identifying themselves they will say

●619 675 "Jumi'at, Marabtiin (plural of Marabit) of the 'Ali Ahmar."
All Marabit tribes of the Western Desert are affiliated as
*[613] clients with Sa'adi tribes. Further, since the tertiary
group of the Marabtiin functions in the same way as that of
the Sa'adi, it is this group which enters into compacts with
Sa'adi tertiary groups. Traditionally, the Marabit group's
[682] main support activity was to share in the payment of the
blood-money with its Sa'adi protector group. In return, the
Marabit group was given land in the protector's territory
and could depend upon them to contribute to any Marabit
blood debt which might come due. Also, it was considered the
[628] [682] duty of the Sa'adi to revenge the death of a member of his
client group since the Marabit "was weak and could not face a
[608] tribe." But there is no attempt to construct fictional kinship
links between Sa'adi and Marabit groups.

[672] In al-Qasr today, contractual relations between Sa'adi
and Marabit are still based upon collective responsibility in
the blood-feud. However, since this traditional means of
conflict control is an extremely rare occurrence, the mutual
obligations of the parties are expressed in different forms.
[648] In any conflict between the Bedouins and the Egyptian government,
the Marabtiin are expected to support their respective
[666] Sa'adi groups. In any modern elections which a Sa'adi might
enter, the Marabit is expected to give him his vote. A few
examples will make clear the relationship between the Sa'adi

•619 675 and the Marabit.

The Qit'an tribe, based partly in Libya and partly
*[613] in Egypt, is a tribe in the same sense that the Awlad 'Ali
is one, i.e., at the secondary level of the lineage system.
[166] [175] This tribe moved into Egypt sometime around 1900. The
Bedouins of al-Qasr estimate that "50% of the Qit'an are
with Ali Ahmar, 30% with Sinaina, and 20% with Ali Abyad."
619 675 578 In 1956, certain events occurred in Libya which brought about
a declaration of independence from Sa'adi domination by the
Qit'an in that country. The Qit'an felt that their numbers
were sufficiently large enough that they should represent
themselves in the Libyan parliament. In other words, the
Marabtiin were no longer willing to settle for the traditional
social categories and role structures allotted to them. After
these events in Libya, some members of the Qit'an came to
Egypt and informed their brothers about the formation of the
tribe as a separate entity, and convinced the Egyptian Qit'an
to do the same--which they did.

The Bedouins say that the Governor of Marsa Matruh encouraged the Qit'an tribe to increase their numbers in the area after he learned of their desire to be free from Sa'adi domination. There had been a small number of Qit'an in the town of Marsa Matruh. This number quickly grew in size and political strength so that it could challenge the power of the 'Ali Ahmar who are considered the dominant tribe in this

619 675 578 area of the Western Desert. And, according to the Governor of the province, it is the 'Aishaibat of al-Qasr who are the most powerful of the three primary segments of the 'Ali Ahmar; for example, they have succeeded in sending their 'umda (chief) to the National Assembly in Cairo. In fact, it was over the [666] election of the 'umda in 1964 that the split between the Marabit Qit'an and the Sa'adi Ali Ahmar became an open one and produced political rumblings among the tribes. This case makes explicit the relationship between the two types of tribes in the Western Desert, and gives an important instance of the operation of structural principles in defining groups and group relations.

619 675 666 578 During the national elections of 1964, it was the traditional duty of the Marabit to vote for his affiliated Sa'adi candidate. Since the Qit'an are allied in a client-protector relationship with the Ali Ahmar, all of the Marabtiin of this tribe should have given their votes to the 'umda of the 'Aishaibat who was seeking office to the National Assembly. But, instead, the Qit'an ran a candidate of their own--largely at the urging of the Governor, it is said. But, despite this Marabit opposition, the 'Aishaibat were successful in getting their 'umda elected. Furthermore, 619 675 578 626 the 'Aishaibat said that this rebellion of the Marabtiin could not go unpunished, that reprisals would be taken. The type of sanction which the 'Aishaibat directed against the

•619 Qit'an is one which is employed in both the internal and
675 the external systems of political relations: it is an or-
598 ganized sanction taken by the corporate representatives
626 against socially disapproved behavior. Against the Marabtiin,
619 it involved a closure of group affiliation and protective
675 alliance usually obtainable through affinal ties. The Qit'an
578 were prohibited from marrying into the 'Aishaibat primary
*613 segment. The sanction was tested while I was in the field.
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> In March of 1965, 'Umda Ziyad of the Qit'an contracted a marriage for his son with one of the secondary groups of the 'Aishaibat. He went through all of the marriage preliminaries and paid a brideprice of 70 E.L. (Egyptian pounds). But afterwards, the girl's family, following the advice of the 'Aishaibi corporate heads, returned the brideprice and refused his offer. The 'Umda of the Qit'an then went to talk to the brothers of the girl (for her father was dead) and told them that he would pay a brideprice of 1000 E.L. "but I want the girl." He paid them part of the brideprice (for they had agreed in the face of this unusual offer) and sent a car to pick up the girl. The arrangement did not succeed, for the paternal cousin of the girl who, according to Bedouin custom and tradition, had a prior claim on her, stopped the car at gunpoint. The corporate heads had told the cousin that this was his right, and in this case, his duty. Then the corporate heads of the 'Aishaibat called a council, and the members met with the brothers of the girl. They told the brothers: "You know what happened at the time of the election. 'Umda Ziyad is 'Ali Ahmar and he should have voted for our _'umda_, but he tricked us." The brothers refused to be persuaded by the tribal leaders. They said that if anyone from the 'Aishaibat would pay them more than 1000 E.L., they would give their sister to him. The leaders warned the brothers that if they went through with this marriage they would each be fined 200 E.L. Finally, and after this meeting, the leaders went to 'Umda Ziyad himself with the threat, that were he to go through with this marriage "all of the 'Aishaibat will begin to fight you." The _'umda_

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> could not afford to risk such large scale conflict and so he withdrew his offer of marriage to the brothers. After this, as a display of authority and an attempt to maintain something of the alliance between their group and the Qit'an, the 'Aishaibi leaders made the public announcement that the girl could marry anyone else, but not the son of 'Umda Ziyad.

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The various sets of authority relations operative in the al-Qasr area are obvious from this account, but they will be better defined as the discussion proceeds. Here, I only wanted to make clear that the relationship between Sa'adi and Marabit is one based upon contract and local contiguity, and reinforced by cognation. There is no unilinear basis for the relationship and no attempt to fit it into a "unilinear genealogical mould." [582] The structural differentiation between Sa'adi and Marabit seems to reflect a dominant-subjective relationship, in the sense discussed by Weber (1947) and Southall (1956), but its possible class overtones are played down by the fact that there are normally no objections to intermarrying between groups. [851] The Bedouin of al-Qasr say, "what is the difference, the children from such a marriage will be Sa'adi anyhow?"

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The Sa'adi-Marabit differentiation is relatively unimportant for a study of al-Qasr itself, since the Marabit number is so small--one lineage consisting of five brothers and their families. The contrast between Sa'adi and Marabit, secular and sacred tribes, becomes more important for a

• 619 *613 study of the whole Western Desert, or in an analysis of contemporary politics in Marsa Matruh.

The Bedouins of al-Qasr are, in this study, the 'Aishaibat of the 'Ali Ahmar of the Awlad 'Ali tribe. The [191] Bedouin tribal unit throughout the Middle East is described as a segmentary lineage system. Something of the meaning of this concept has already been made clear in our discussion of the structural principles of Bedouin society. This type [114] of society has been adequately analyzed by Evans-Pritchard (1940), Fortes (1945 and 1949), Smith (1956), Middleton and Tait (1958), and Peters (1960). My own ideas about the segmentary lineage society as it functions in al-Qasr derive from these sources.

*613 571 [642] Politically, the 'Aishaibat of al-Qasr are a stateless society; they have no centralized political institution. The lineage system is the structural framework for social and political relations. The basis of government, i.e., the regulation of authority relations, is the balanced protraction of corporate groups which support institutional uniformities in the form of similar organization, ideology and procedure (Smith 1956). Although the various groupings of the segmentary system can be analytically identified, and each grouping thinks of itself as a distinct group, in actuality, it is difficult to define the groups because of the way in which each fuses into lesser or greater differentiated units in one

*613 situation or another (Middleton and Tait 1958:11). The most
571 effective approach to understanding the segmentary society,
121 in view of this dynamic situation, is to isolate the function-
*613 ally significant unit and to analyze its social and political
571 relations (Fortes 1945). This is what I attempted to do in my study of the 'Aishaibat of al-Qasr.

*613 In al-Qasr, the secondary segment, i.e., 'Ailit Ma'fas, is the basic unit of the social structure. This statement must be qualified seeing that this unit consists of a balanced opposition of smaller tertiary segments, and action at the secondary level is a resultant of political consensus at the tertiary level. However, the ties which emerge from descent, residence, marriage, and contract are highly moral and utilitarian ones; with reference to tribal politics, we can state that corporate action is consensual and most functional at the secondary segment level. We may consider this group, in terms of two levels of corporateness, the basic unit of 'Aishaibat political structure.

*613 All of the segmentary groups of the 'Aishaibat are
●619 bound together by the same patrilineal principle; they all trace descent to 'Ali the son of Sa'ada. This principle also links them to the "noble tribes" of Cyrenaica who claim descent from this same ancestress. This principle is the genealogical and ideological basis of a man's claiming to be "Sa'adi," or "Awlad 'Ali," or "Aishaibi," etc. In theory,

● 619 *613 the segmentary system is considered by the Bedouins to be a monolithic unit: "The Awlad 'Ali are one." But, as with all other segmentary lineage systems, in al-Qasr levels of segmentation reflect degrees of corporateness.

*613 ● 178 619 Furthermore, the ideology of structural unity dissolves before the empirical evidence of fission and fusion, processes characteristic of the segmentary society in general. These processes are not common in al-Qasr during the present time. But they must have been in the past, because the segments which Murray (1935) names as making up the Ali Ahmar include only one of those which currently comprise the tribe. The [578] only admission of fission which I could obtain from my informants was that, at one time, 'Ailit Ma'fas was a tertiary [124] segment of 'Ailit Lazumi (see Figure 3). I received this information from a number of my key informants so that it can be accepted despite a denial to the contrary by some of my other informants. There is no empirical link below the secondary level to be discovered in the genealogical maps of these two groups; kinship ties have been manipulated to coincide with ideological claims. The fact that these two lineages are now the wealthiest and most powerful in the al-Qasr area may be an indication that economic and political motivations undermined the unity of 'Ailit Lazumi in the *613 178 578 past. We shall have occasion to return to this opposition between the Lazumi and the Ma'fas when we discuss political

*613 Bedouins, always a minority in Egypt, have been undergoing
178 a transition to peasantry since about 1800. Probably since
177 578 that time, Bedouin society has been, to use Easton's (1959)
emphasis, a "segmentary society" rather than a "segmenting
society."

196 Formal Bedouin categories of kinship are confusing;
depending upon the situation they use the concepts of bait,
'ait, 'aiela and qabiila interchangeably. The term bait
literally means "house," the term bait al-'Arab may mean
"the tent" or "the people of the tent." "People of the tent"
[594] may refer to either the nuclear family of one man, or the
nuclear families of a man, his brothers and his sons, and
[596] their spouses and offspring. In the latter case, the extended
[621] family is referred to as the naja'. A naja', or camp,
usually consists of three or four tents. The word bait may
196 *613 refer to the tertiary and the sub-tertiary groups, and occasionally
one might even refer to the secondary group as a
bait when he wishes to emphasize the quality of corporateness.
The term 'aiela, literally "family," is the word used most
often to designate the secondary lineage segment. The diminutive
of this word, i.e. 'ait, usually refers to the subtertiary
group but it commonly designates the secondary group
• [619] also. The term qabiila, "tribe," is the only word used for
the primary and supra-primary lineage groupings. These are
196 the general Bedouin usages and their frequency will vary not

*613 He must pay the *diiya* with the shares which he collects from
682 the others. It makes no difference if the *'aqila* must pay
554 with his own money. He is responsible for this matter before
571 the whole tribe."

*613 The collection of the *diiya* is only one aspect of the
554 process of conflict regulation, but it stands out as the fundamental
682 manifestation of the office of *'aqila*. In the course
[692] of office, an *'aqila* will spend much more time arbitrating
disputes, but it is his responsibility concerning blood-money
which defines his position and his jurisdiction as corporate
682 ones. During the present period in al-Qasr, the practice of
178 blood-revenge has all but disappeared as a mechanism of social
[626] control. Nevertheless, the possibility of its happening is
not too remote. The payment of blood-money is the alternative
[619] to blood-revenge, and blood-revenge is a condition for all-out
[721] tribal warfare--something which the Bedouins look upon with
[829] horror. One informant once likened a primary-level war between
the 'Aishaibat and the Kamailat (should it ever occur) to
*613 "the end of the world." The *'aqila* as a representative of a
682 group can prevent war by preventing reciprocal homicides: by
554 presenting his share of the blood-money he regulates conflict
578 and promotes integration. The blood-money is usually paid
over a period of from one to two years. In this case, the
[571] notion of "debt" represents a contingent, institutionalized
social relationship for the purpose of maintaining political
order.

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6. every member of the tribe who submits a complaint without first consulting his 'aqila, (i.e. who goes to the government before the 'aqila),

7. every member of the tribe shall back the members of his bait against an opponent without right,

8. every member of the tribe who has proved against him the showing of sympathy toward another tribe knowing that this tribe is antagonistic to his own tribe,

9. every member of the tribe who has proved against him that he helped a relative in payment or in a quarrel against his brother.

we signed this document and declare that these customs are valid from the date of today and everyone who disobeys them pays a dhabiiha ("lamb") and 10 L.E. without any objection if any of the items of the above items is proven against him.

Date: August 8, 1953
The 'awaaqil (signatures or stamps):
Abd al-Ruwaf (Bait Firjani)
Hussain 'Umar (Bait 'Umar)
Shi'ath Abd al-Hadi (deceased, Bait Braik)
'Atiya 'Umran (Bait Kailani)
Khalid Idris (Bait Muhammad)

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In the rawaabit, or contract, just noted the term "tribe" refers to the secondary segment ('aiela). Murray (1935:315n) has also pointed to an instance of the Bedouins' use, in a formal document, of the word qabiila ("tribe") when reference to "some smaller division, such as 'eila is clearly meant."

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Through the rawaabit norms are expressed and action is oriented with respect to them. If it is otherwise, sanctions may be brought to bear to insure conformity to norms. The minimal sanction which the 'aqila may impose is the dhabiiha

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The boundaries of the Bedouin political community may be defined so as to include all of those authority groups which operate in accordance with the recognized legal code of the Western Desert. This code is referred to as 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali, i.e. "the customs of the sons of 'Ali." The members of the Awlad 'Ali tribe identify with each other as a group. They recognize their common heritage and speak of "the Awlad 'Ali as one." But more importantly, the Awlad 'Ali represents a political community because they are "prepared to regulate their differences by means of decisions accepted as binding because they are made in accordance with shared political norm and structures" (Easton 1959:229). Recalling the discussion of familial authority and internal and external systems of authority relations, we may think of the Bedouin political community as a composite of authority or jural groups "within which there are a moral obligation and a means ultimately to settle disputes peaceably" (Middleton and Tait 1959:9).

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In al-Qasr, political order and the articulation of political relations between secondary corporate groups depend upon something besides structural and ideological uniformities. Although blood-revenge and feuding do not take place at the internal system of authority relations, they are common means of controlling the distribution of authority and power between secondary units. Though these mechanisms or sanctions are considered "the right of the Arabs," since they do threaten

*613
571 peace and security in the desert they are discouraged by
681 means of the moral and legal norms expressed in the *'awaiyid*,
628 629 or law of the Bedouins.

626 671 Conflict regulation between secondary groups is the
*613 function of the *'awaaqil* who act as legitimate representatives
571 in terms of the *rawaabit*, and as legitimate judges and decision-
578 makers in terms of the *'awaiyid*. Not all conflict in the
external political system is, in terms of our structural
levels, between secondary authority groups, but seldom is
any group larger than the secondary unit mobilized for political
*619 action. In other words, even where we note that conflict is
*613 between two primary units, i.e., the 'Aishaibat and the
571 Kamailat, there is probably, in fact, political action taking
578 place between two secondary groups within the respective primary groups. However, there always exists the very real possibility that greater conflict will be generated involving
primary and even tribal units.

128 In the next section of this chapter, I will discuss Bedouin law and sanctions within the framework of the lineage structure and the authority levels at which they operate. The following section will further illustrate the legitimacy and dynamics of authority and structure in Bedouin society.

*613 ultimately, all-out warfare: the role of *'aqila* is most
578 critical at this level. Abou-Zeid (1966:259) has suggested
182 an explanation for the delicate balance of political relations
which exists between secondary lineage groups. He thinks that

> [579] . . . in the segmentary society of the Bedouin of the Western Desert . . . honour has played, and still plays, a most vital role in the field of social control, besides providing an effective code of morality . . . A slight offence inflicted against a lineage . . . is taken as an unfavorable humiliation requiring immediate retaliation to wipe out the shame, regain honour, and restore the same relations as formerly between the groups.

682 Homicide and wounding cases, which usually develop over con-
683 flicting claims to land or water rights, are most prone to
578 lead to grand-scale conflict. Thus the *'aqila* will always
*613 mediate and adjudicate these cases whereas he will not
necessarily intervene in those cases involving tertiary groups where appeals to moral solidarity and kinship unity may succeed in restoring relations. It is difficult to muster evidence for this contention since conflict between tertiary groups is more of a private matter than it is public, and, once settled, such conflict is not likely to be discussed, or even admitted.

*613 Most of my details on conflict regulation and the
578 judicial process in al-Qasr involve political action between
•619 secondary or primary groups, eighteen of the twenty-two cases
681 in fact. Of the nine cases dealing with personal injury (eight

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cases of homicide and one case of wounding) one was at the tribal level; three at the primary level; three at the secondary level; and two at the tertiary level. Of the thirteen cases dealing with property rights over land, water, or women, none took place at the tribal level; four were at the primary level; seven at the secondary level; and one at the tertiary level. One case dealing with marriage rights took place within a tertiary segment and concerned the legitimacy of a man to claim his bint 'amm. Twelve of the twenty-two cases occurred within the 'Aishabat tribe. Of the ten cases of conflict involving units from outside the 'Aishaibat, six cases were between primary units, three cases were between secondary units, and one case involved the 'Ali Ahmar with the Harabi of Libya.

In almost every case involving primary units and tribal units, the two opposing authority groups were actually secondary groups who had the backing of their primary groupings. The case in which the 'Ali Ahmar mobilized to deal with a problem in Libya probably represents an atypical case in history. It is unlikely that tribal groups of this size [648] could mobilize in time of war or peace, and in this particular case the good international relations of Egypt and Libya were at stake.

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There is another realm of sanctions which can be invoked in cases concerning homicide, wounding, theft, and

128 68 what happened; some of them are my translations of legal docu-
[124] ments which informants permitted me to see; a few of the cases
[114] happened while I was in the field and represent my reporting
of what happened. I have arbitrarily divided the cases into those involving personal injury and those concerning property rights. In each case, I indicate at which level of the authority structure the conflict and settlement has taken place.

Legal Cases Pertaining to Personal Injury

578 Two cases of killing have been discussed previously.
681 Below are a number of cases dealing with personal injury which
occurred in the external political system at the various levels
of segmentation. The first three cases involve conflict
*[613] between secondary lineage segments of the 'Aishaibat tribe;
•[619] the next two cases take place at the primary and sub-tribal
[648] levels, but note that secondary segments are the actual function-
ing units involved; the final case, an unusual one, deals with
conflict with "foreigners" at the tribal level. Note that the
*[613] 'aqila as a corporate representative is active in these cases.
[182] The third case presented below is a translation of an actual
[778] document showing how the nazaala (discussed above) functions
as a formal mechanism of conflict regulation.

578 Hafiyan killed three members of the Zallat. This feud lasted
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682 over a period of 25 years. It happened one time that an
'aqila of 'Ailit Zallat was walking in the desert and stopped
578 for a visit at a naja', the owners of which he did not know.
574 He soon discovered that "he was in front of the Hafiyan them-
*613
682 selves." He tried to conceal his own identity, intending to eat the meal which they offered him and then escape in the dark. But the Hafiyan soon discovered that one from the Zallat was their guest. They told him that they would send men of their tribe with him to give him safe conduct through the desert. They also said that they wished to get together and make peace. Then they made peace, and its conditions were made through the 'awaaqil. No diiya was transferred because each had killed an equal number of men. Then members of the two groups lived together for two or three days and made a feast, they slaughtered sheep and the problem was over. This problem came to an end in 1938.

578 The next case, dealing with wounding, is presented in
682 the form of two documents. It is valuable for the way in
*613 which it illustrates the judicial process and ritual sanction.
• [619] Note that in the first document the case seems to concern two primary segments, i.e., the 'Aishaibat and the Kamailat, but the second document, the "Day of Oath," clearly indicates that the parties involved are 'Ailit Ma'fas ('Aishaibat) and 'Ailit Mahatha (Kamailat), two secondary groups.

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578 that they had received their rights in this case. And
*613 the two parties are satisfied by this according to the
692 witnesses present.

539 Signatures or seals of four witnesses.
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578 The next case represents the only time in the memory
682 of informants that all of the _'awaaqil_ of the 'Ali Ahmar met
*613 to intervene in a case of conflict. This case is extremely
692 unusual because it may be the only time in Awlad 'Ali history
571 that political mobilization of this scale has taken place. As
•619 noted, political action, in war or peace, usually involves
[177] only secondary segments. In view of this, the case probably
[648] reflects an instance of social change: the Egyptian government,
anxious to maintain good relations with Libya, encouraged and
facilitated the settlement of this dispute by furnishing
transportation and cutting administrative red tape so that
the _'awaaqil_ of the 'Ali Ahmar could handle this case in a
most expeditious way. Here is a case where Bedouin traditional
[182] political structures function adequately in the modern situation.
Note here also that, in certain circumstances, the _diiya_ payment
can be divided symbolically and specifically to place guilt and
to indicate the seriousness of a crime.

619 _Date: 1963_. Case: Quarrel between the tribe of 'Ali Ahmar
682 (Egypt) and the Harabi (Libya) concerning murder. A young
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*613 boy of 'Ailit X was visiting his sister in Libya. He learned
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● 619 that one old man kept a large sum of money at home. One day
*613 the boy went to beg a watermelon from the old man, but really
682 he went to learn the layout of the man's house. In the night,
578 the boy returned to the man's house and demanded his money.
[685] The man refused saying that he had no money. The boy stabbed
the old man to death. The boy then went to his sister's
house and washed the blood from his hands, and had the girl
clean the blood from h[illegible] robe. The police came to the sister's
house in search of the boy, but he was hiding in a cave nearby.
The police asked the sister: "Where is your brother, he has
killed your mother?" The girl was horrified and told the
police where they could find her brother.

*613 All of the _'awaaqil_ of the 'Ali Ahmar met at the farm of
619 'Umda Ibrahim. There were forty-one _'awaaqil_ plus 'Umda Ibra-
571 him. They proceeded to Libya by bus, and took forty sheep
682 with them as a _kubaara_. In Libya, they met with officials of
578 the Libyan government and the _'awaaqil_ of the Harabi tribe.
682 The Harabi asked for a _diiya_ of 3000 L.E. The blood-money
578 asked for was extra high for two reasons: a young man had
619 killed an elder; and, the murder was connected with in-
*613 tentional theft. After discussing the crime, the Harabi
[685] reduced the price to 700 L.E. They did this out of respect
for the 'Ali Ahmar who had come so far, and who had paid money
for the sugar and tea. All of the 'Ali Ahmar contributed to

682 the *diiya*: the Qinaishat paid 50 L.E., the Kamailat paid
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● 619 50 L.E., but the 'Aishaibat, the tribe of the killer paid
*613 600 L.E. Of the 600 L.E. paid by the 'Aishaibat it was distributed as follows: 'Ailit Lazumi and "Ailit Ma'fas each paid 100 L.E. because they are rich; 'Ailit Dawlat paid only 30 L.E. because they are poor, and each pays according to their means. The *'aiela* of the killer, although they are poor, had to pay 70 L.E., and the *bait* of the killer had to pay 300 L.E. All paid according to their means, except the killer's *bait*. This was a special case, it never happened before and will never happen again and this is why the killer's *bait* had to pay more. The killer's *bait* was very poor, so what they did not have they had to beg from the richer families of the tribe.

Legal Cases Pertaining to Property Rights

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*613 In general, property in al-Qasr is owned either by an individual or by a tertiary group; seldom, in these days, is
423 property held by the secondary lineage group. If we followed
*613 classic segmentary lineage theory, seeing that the tribal
182 political structure and the *'awaiyid* are still functionally
[671] intact, we might suppose that land and water possession are rights in usufruct and not of ownership. The Bedouins themselves insist that the rights to land and water are rights of ownership. They state that all of the lineage-owned land, with few exceptions, was parcelled out to tertiary groups a

423 Date: 12 October 1954. There came to us (i.e. the 'awaqil)
691 on this day, Khalid Idris of al-'Aishaibat and Yunis Abd
578 al-Nabi of al-Kamailat. The reason for their coming is a
*613 quarrel over land rights at Wadi al-Hijnaiya. And we put
[539] distinct markers between the land of the two parties, the
first, Khalid Idris, and the second, Yunis Abd al-Nabi.
And the boundary passes by the distinct markers; the
first is the wadi marker, the second to the sea and beside
the tree, and the final marker we put east of Halima well.
This is a decision between the two parties in the presence
of the following witnesses:

Signatures or seals of five men.

●619 The case given below indicates, by the use of two
578 documents, the process of conflict settlement involving two
secondary segments of al-Qasr, one Sa'adi and one Marabit.
[671] 'Ailit al-Sulwatiyya, though genealogically not members of the
Awlad 'Ali and holders of a client or vassal status in traditional times, are within the jurisdiction of the 'awaiyid
Awlad 'Ali. They claim their rights under it by virtue of the
fact of their residence in al-Qasr. The power of ritual
sanction is clearly illustrated by this case.

578 Date: 30 July 1964, Marsa Matruh. First Party: Shaikh
685 Khalid Za'aluk al-Sulwatiyya and four relatives. Second
691 Party: Khalid Idris of 'Ailit Ma'fas and three relatives.
619 They are present. The cause of these two parties coming to-
423 gether is a quarrel over a well named Halima. Since the choice
[695] to swear the oath has been made by the two parties, Khalid
Idris, the second party, will swear the oath supported by
twenty-four members of his 'umraa al-dam ("blood group") to

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578 be chosen by Shaikh Khalid Za'aluk, the first party. The text
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691 of the oath which Khalid Idris will swear is: "By the truth
• 619 of the owner of this tomb (maqaam), and this book of God, I
695 swear that you (i.e. the 'Ailit Sulwatiyya represented by
[539] Shaikh Khalid Za'aluk) have neither work of hand nor a
grandfather's stake in this well." If any of the oath-takers are missing on the day of the oath, the well will be owned Khalid Za'aluk. And if they swear the oath, the well will be owned by 'Ailit Ma'fas.

The date of the oath will be the first Friday of month nine,
[778] 1964. The oath will be taken at the shrine of Sidi 'Awam, and
the swearing will deal with the well only. For the land which is west of the well belongs to Khalid Za'aluk and his family, and the land to the east of the well belongs to Khalid Idris and his family. And the water which is west of the well belongs to Khalid Za'aluk. The two parties agreed to this. (Each party, and five witnesses, i.e. rajal khair, for each party, signed the document.)

423 Date: 30 July 1964. I, Khalid Za'aluk, have decided to cancel
619 the oath which was supposed to have been sworn on 9 September
578 1964 at the shrine of Sidi Awam. Khalid Idris and the oath-
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[695] takers were present and were stopped from taking the oath.
And the well named al-Halima which was the cause of the quarrel

423 (*nizaa's*) belongs to Khalid Idris and his brothers. This
•619 happened with the satisfaction of both tribes, and this re-
578 nunciation of claim is valid from today. This paper concern-
691 ing the ownership of land around the well is valid from today
also. And this happened between the parties: (Signatures or
stamps of both parties concerned.)

(There appeared the signatures of twenty-three of the twenty-four men who were to have sworn the oath.)

Only twenty-three oath-takers were present: 30 July 1964. I, Shaikh Khalid Za'aluk, agree on the signatures of only twenty-three oath-takers. (Signature of Khalid Za'aluk.)

648 We have mentioned that the *'awaiyid* prevails in al-
671 Qasr, but have also noted that where the security of the
578 desert is threatened the government is likely to intervene.
The government enters tribal conflict in al-Qasr with the tacit
approval of the Bedouins. As one informant remarked: "The
'awaiyid is the best way to handle problems, but the police
will handle what the *'awaiyid* cannot."

423 *Date: 1964*. Case: Quarrel between al-Afrad ('Ali Abyad) and
691 'Aishaibat ('Ali Ahmar) over water rights. Many members of
578 both tribes took part in this conflict. The government had
619 to intervene: they formed a peace committee made up of all
648 the *'awaaqil* of both tribes and the *'umda* and *shaikh* from
*[613] each tribe.
[634]

423 each tribe. It was decided that the water which flows through
691 the _wadi_ after the rains should be divided equally between the
578 two tribes, and that no one should be stopped from using the
•619
648 water. Had not the government intervened in this conflict,
and had not they collected all of the weapons from the Bedouins,
this problem would have resulted in the death of many men and
even greater problems.

674 Theft is condemned by the Bedouins: "Everything in
685 the desert is loose. We must punish the thief quickly and
severely." It is a fact that the man who goes to steal and
[682] accidentally kills in the act will have judged against him
[829] the full _diiya_, i.e., the amount for intentional killing. On
the other hand, the people of al-Qasr insist that "Bedouins do
[671] not steal." But legal norms exist to sanction violations against
cultural ideals. The following case shows how social and ritual
sanctions operate to enforce ideals.

619 _Date: 1964_. Case: Quarrel between the tribe of Kamailat and
578 the tribe of 'Aishaibat over the theft of 16 L.E. Muhammad of
685 'Ailit Ma'fas was accused of stealing 16 L.E. which belonged
*613 to Ahmad of 'Ailit Idris, Kamailat. The theft occurred while
the two were residing at a hotel in Marsa Matruh. There were
twenty other persons in the hotel that night. The accused
said: "I did not take anything."

•619

578 said: "I did not take anything." The _'awaaqil_ of both parties
685 met and told the accused: "If you have anything give it to
*613 us; if you do not have anything then swear the oath to this
695 fact." Members of 'Ailit Ma'fas said that the boy was innocent
[571] and told the _'awaaqil_ that the boy should have his rights
[692] according to the _'awaiyid_ (i.e. he should be allowed to swear the oath to establish his innocence). The boy accused of the theft, his father, and two other members of 'Ailit Ma'fas selected by the accusers swore the oath and the problem was
619 over. Two months later, the accuser from the Kamailat lost
578 his eye in an accident, because swearing the oath has con-
685 sequences for both parties. A bad oath will work against the
695 one who makes it; there will be a curse upon him, his children,
784 and his money. And the bad effects of an oath will also work against the one who falsely accuses another making him swear the oath.

582 The final two cases deal with marriage rights. The
562 first illustrates a number of things which I have touched on
*613 in the previous discussion of marriage: that a man may choose
792 to ignore the jural structures of the lineage group where the desires of his offspring are concerned; that the female is not the totally subjugated person which one might expect to find in the strongly patrilineal Bedouin society; and that the role of "holy man" functions in the marital area of authority relations.

114
792 The second, rather complex, case occurred while I was
562 in the field. Once again, the role of the "holy man" is shown
to operate in cases dealing with women. Shown here also is an
interesting example of the cultural definition of abnormality.

*613 No Date. Case: Quarrel between 'Ailit al-Abaidi ('Ali Abyad)
578 and 'Ailit al-Afrad ('Ali Abyad) over marriage rights. A man
582 from al-Abaidi agreed that his daughter could marry a man but
792 the rest of the 'aiela did not approve of this marriage. Since
the man could not go to his 'aqila, who disapproved of the
marriage, he took his problem to a "holy man." The "holy man"
decided that the girl should marry the man she wanted to
marry, but he was afraid that this would cause trouble in the
[586] 'aiela. The "holy man" decided to marry the man and woman,
and then to divorce them for a period of one year so that the
conflict would abate. The girl's father knew of this marriage
but the other members of the 'aiela did not. After a period
of one year, the groom went to the "holy man" and said: "Decide
anything that I can do, but I must have the girl." The "holy
[681] man" decided to make him pay a kubaara (expiation) fee of
[684] 100 L.E. to the girl's 'aiela, and he married them again.

*613 Date: 1965. Case: Quarrel within a tertiary segment of the
•619 Qinaishat tribe concerning marriage rights. A girl from the
578 Qinaishat tribe had refused to marry her paternal cousin, but
582 he was insistent upon his right to have her.

*613 he was insistent upon his right to have her. She went to
619 see the "holy man," al-Sanusi, who lives near al-Qasr. (Al-
578 Sanusi is a descendent of "the Great Sanusi," the founder of
582 al-Sanusiyya, who now lives in Egypt after having been exiled
793 from Libya.) Al-Sanusi decided to keep the girl at his farm
*613 until he could decide a course of action. One night, the
619 girl's cousin secretly came to the Sanusi farm and found her
578 room. The girl was sleeping. The cousin struck a match, the
582 girl awoke and was frightened. She jumped from her bed and
793 began to run, in so doing she fell down a flight of stairs
683 and suffered a rupture. This was a serious offense which the cousin had committed, and al-Sanusi decided that he should call all of the 'awaaqil of the area to inform them of this. In the meantime, he sent the girl back to her home and the cousin continued to bother her concerning his rights over her.

[584] The cousin went so far as to "offer the blood-sacrifice for her," a stage in the marriage process which signifies that the union has been consented to by both families. The girl's father was dead, and her brothers and uncles were unable to keep the cousin away from the girl. (It may be assumed that they were conscious of his rights to bint 'amm.) They had even beaten him once. All of the 'awaaqil of 'Ali Ahmar and
[692] 'Ali Abyad, and the Marabtiin in the al-Qasr area came to meet with al-Sanusi at his farm. He (al-Sanusi) said that they all

*613 must come because he, himself, was a Libyan and a member of
● 619 no tribe in Egypt. Al-Sanusi's petition was two-fold: he
578 said the cousin should be punished for violating his right of
582 privacy and property, and the question concerning the cousin's
793 right to the girl should be settled. The 'awaaqil decided
683 692 that al-Sanusi should be awarded a kubaara of 1000 L.E. from
the tribes of the area, and that the girl should be permitted to marry no man of the Qinaishat tribe. Al-Sanusi refused to accept the kubaara, and this was the correct thing to do since the kubaara, especially a large one, is only offered ritualistically. The 'awaaqil took note of the cousin's rights to his bint 'amm: they said that since the girl refused to marry him it would not be right if she married anyone else from the tribe.
*613 Furthermore, the 'awaaqil, on the basis of the cousin's behavior
619 in this matter, decided that the cousin was insane and should
734 be committed to an asylum. They informed the police in Marsa
[648] Matruh of this diagnosis and decision, and the police came and
transported the boy to the mental hospital in Cairo where he is today. The uncles of the boy signed the papers which committed him.

554 of the Bedouin attitude, or lack of it, toward religion.
792 Since the time of Muhammad, the Bedouins have been considered
771 notoriously bad Muslims. Today, the Bedouins tend to joke
about their lack of zeal, and often point out that "holy
619 men" are not to be trusted.[2] This is seen in Sa'adi behavior
771 toward the Marabtin tribes who are their vassals. Theoretically,
792 the Marabtin who trace descent to the Prophet and might be
554 considered "sacred Tribes" should be respected by the "secular"
[778] Sa'adi tribes. But the Sa'adi of al-Qasr tend to deride the
554 Marabit. For instance, the "holy man" of al-Qasr, 'Amm Salih,
792 is a Marabit and well-known for his ability to successfully
627 mediate in conflict situations. But one informant, pointing
619 out this gift which 'Amm Salih possesses, said: "Amm Salih
is a good man, he is not a Marabit." But 'Amm Salih identifies
himself as a "rajal saalih" and a "Marabit"; he sees no role
conflict here.

771 The Bedouins also joke about the manner in which they
[522] practice the "pillars of Islam." Especially, they make light
of the fact that they are irregular in mosque attendance.
They say, with a slight smile, "we pray in the desert." A
[124] common way for an interview to end was by an informant rising
and saying: "Now I must wash for prayers." This happened

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[184] [2] Professor Abou-Zeid also notes this trait in his study of the Bedouin near Sallum, on the Libyan border (1966:248).

554 you for your cloak, you would have immediately given it to
178 [792] him. God was pleased with them at that time."

This notion of changing foci of authority and power cannot be divorced from the related political phenomena of the tendency toward legitimacy and the role institutionalization
128 process. In the next chapter, I will attempt to show how such a conceptual framework can be utilized in an analysis of culture and political change.

Modern Legal Roles

634 554 [648] [177] The roles of *'umda* and *shaikh* were created and imposed upon the Bedouins by Muhammad 'Ali sometime during the early part of the nineteenth century in order to facilitate administration, maintain security in the desert, and protect the Western frontier.

[619] Both of these roles are representative offices at the primary level of the tribal structure. The 'Aishaibat have an *'umda* and a *shaikh* who reside in Marsa Matruh and work in close relation with the Governor. In terms of a chain of command, these offices receive demands which may originate either with the Governor in Matruh or with Bedouins in al-Qasr. But these offices are subservient to both the Governor and the Bedouins since no decision-making powers of any consequence
[571] resides with them. With reference to the two authority
[635] structures, the Egyptian and the Bedouin, the *'umda* and the

635 population of the whole Western Desert, and representatives
[648] of the Egyptian government employees working in the province.
[634] The Bedouin representatives appointed to this council need
not be an _'umda_ or a _shaikh_, although they may be. The
oldest Bedouin member of the council, who happens to be an
'umda, told me that "the Governor picks the men who he feels
understand the problems of the people."

635 The Governor himself thinks that every Bedouin on
124 his council is an _'aqila_. He replied to my question about
*613 the criteria for membership on the _Majlis al-Muhafza_: "I
am using a new selection system. Rather than choose the
'umda or _shaikh_, I choose the _'aqila_. Every man on the
council is an _'aqila_, and the number is determined by the
population of the area . . . But I appoint more men from the
● [619] 'Ali Ahmar (see Figures 3 and 7)[1] than from other tribes.
This is because they are more numerous, and they are near
Matruh where I am able to contact them immediately. The
'Ali Ahmar are represented by six men and the other tribes
by just three men."

156 Hajj 'Ali is one of these six men and the only member
159 of the Council who resides in al-Qasr. I attended and ob-
554 served the December meeting of the Council. The Governor
635 sat at the head of a long table with the Egyptian representa-
648 tives on either side of him. At the other end of the table
[114] sat the Bedouin representatives, Hajj 'Ali among them. Purely

[1] [See pp. 65 & 77 respectively--Analyst]

> 156 There is another objection which I have concerning
> 159 our customs. I mean the case of elections. For
> 554 instance, one from the 'Aishaibat and one from the
> 829 Sanagra, of the 'Ali Abyad, are nominated. Then,
> 666 each man must vote for the one from his own tribe.
> He must vote for the 'Aishaibi even if the other is the better man. But, we should consider that the best man is the man with the best qualifications. 'Umda Ibrahim, for instance, knows how to greet an official or a minister, but he does not know the _'awaiyid_ nor the problems of the Bedouins. His brother (who will probably be the next _'umda_) is a good man and is educated, but he does not know the _'awaiyid_ either.

829 This view contrasts sharply with the traditional stand
666 of most Bedouins in al-Qasr, including the members of the
"status group." For instance, one _'aqila_ voiced what is a prevalent opinion when he said:

> [619] If a man chooses to become a political candidate
> [186] against a Bedouin, he must understand that the
> members of the tribe should and would vote for their _'umda_ because he is a member of their own tribe. Even if a man is crazy and his opponent has the highest college degree, the Bedouins must vote for the man from their own tribe.

156 Hajj 'Ali is modern in his evaluation of the political
159 situation here: a politician should know the problems of his
554 constituents rather than follow principles based on traditional
178 relationships. His motive is not to promote the _'awaiyid_ as
177 a good way of life, for we know he does not think this to be
829 the case. Instead, Hajj 'Ali believes that in order to help
[671] the Bedouins through a period of change one must know what
they are changing from. Through his negative appraisal of

CHAPTER II

ECOLOGY AND HISTORY

619 Awlad Ali are a number of Arabic-speaking semi-nomadic tribes of
101 sheep and goat herders who inhabit the northern part of the Western
162 Desert of Egypt. The total population of Awlad Ali, according to the
1965 preliminary census, was about 100,000 inhabitants. This estimate
is, however, very tentative and fluctuates from one year to the
next, depending on the circumstances of the pasture in the area. The
131 area they occupy consists of the narrow strip of fertile land which extends
along the Mediterranean coast from near Alexandria in the east
some 350 miles westward to the UAR-Libyan border town of Sallum, and
132 varying in width from ten to thirty miles. Vegetation in the area depends
133 on rainfall, supplemented by a number of artesian wells. The
rainy season extends from November to March, but the rain is extremely
erratic in nature, varying from one year to another and from one place
to the next. Draught has been experienced every three to four years,
one of them being experienced at the time of the study. The water situation
312 is further aggravated by the low technological level of the people
[181] which prevents them from making the best use of the available rain water.
There have been some attempts made to store as much of the rain water
as possible, but these attempts are usually made by individuals and in
too crude and primitive a way to prevent most of the water from being
lost by seepage or by evaporation. The most commonly used method of
water preservation in the area is digging cisterns in the ground. But
most of these cisterns are too shallow to keep large amounts of water.
Some deeper wells are found in the area and are called "beer sama"

423 many generations a recognized right by the Egyptian government to use
311 the land for grazing and cultivation, and the tribal concept is that
the land belongs to the tribe.

The concept is true with regard to wells and cisterns. But
legally speaking, land belongs to the state, and the tribal populations
in the area have only the right of usufruct. This does not mean that
the land is exploited jointly by all members of one tribe or tribal
segment, or that a man can cultivate or graze his flocks in any part
he chooses, for there is a certain correlation between the right of
usufruct and the distribution of the tribes in the area on the one hand,
and the inner tribal segmentation on the other. Although land is not
[556] an object of ownership in itself, and wealth is not spoken of in terms
of land, yet, the distinction between ownership and usufruct in the
423 area is sometimes very hard to draw. Each tribal segment has its name
311 associated with a specific area of land which it regards as its own
● 619 and whose boundaries it defends against other tribal segments. The
tribal segment whose name is associated with a certain locality not only
has the right to use the land, but this right is also vested in it to
the exclusion of other segments. Within such an area, each subsegment
has the right to a portion of the land to the exclusion of the other
subsegments. While individual members of the tribal segments know the
land belonging to their tribal segments, their right is not associated
with a specific patch within the total area. Individuals usually cultivate
different patches within that total area as the need may arise;
but one cannot cultivate a patch in an area belonging to another tribal
segment except under certain conditions. This does not mean that the
individual cannot claim the right to a specific patch, for not only

423 can he do this, but he can also sell that right. The right to sell the
311 share of the tribal land has recently become recognized in the Western
• 619 Desert, and the usufruct right is being treated in the same way as
ownership.

423 While the boundaries of the cultivable land belonging to the tribe
311 are guarded, when it comes to grazing land, the boundaries are not so
619 much enforced. The tribes of the Western Desert of Egypt are quite tol-
233 erant in allowing members of other tribal segments to graze their flocks
wherever grazing lands are available. Everyone from any tribe can graze
his flocks in areas that offer better pasture. But in doing so, he does
not have the right to use the wells and cisterns of the tribal segment.
[312] Water is scarce and valuable. Cisterns are owned by the tribal segments,
[432] and if an outsider wants to use the water, he has to buy it from the
owner for the whole season for a sum ranging between $100-$180.

423 In 1958, with the extension of the Mariut irrigation project, a
656 Desert Land Possession Law was enacted and came into force in 1960.
This law restates the right of the government to the ownership of the
land, and therefore does not recognize the tribal possessions of the
land, even when they have made certain improvements in it, such as
planting trees or digging wells. However, it gave the right of the
occupants of a certain area of land to request either the purchase of
the land or its lease for a period not exceeding nine years, granted
that such is made within one year of the passing of the law. Failing
to do so within one year, the government will either remove the plants
and buildings, or confiscate them without compensation.

423 656 The above law met with opposition from the tribal population in the area. As a result of this opposition, a new law was enacted in 1964 (Law #100). Although this later law eliminated some of the shortcomings of the previous one, it is not itself without disadvantages. The 1964 law recognizes the Bedouins' right of ownership only in areas where the fairly permanent trees were planted before 1958. Rain-fed areas cultivated from season to season are excluded. The new law also provides for the sale and transfer of land. Any person can purchase up to 50 feddans (acres) provided that he can develop it into an economic enterprise. The law also provides for the distribution of arable lands in such a way as to permit each head of household to own 10 feddans and to be provided with water possibilities. The price of this kind of land is to be paid over a period of 30 years. Settlers are encouraged and helped in planting trees and building dikes. So far, 8,600 feddans irrigated by windmills have been passessed by members of Awlad Ali tribes, and titles to their holdings are being issued. [312]

233 423 656 With regard to grazing lands, no legislation has yet been issued, and the government feels that at this stage of development, it is essential to start educating and inducing the tribal population of the Western Desert in initiating and implementing new programs for preventing overgrazing and controlling the number of flocks.

The Group

619 The name Awlad Ali covers a number of ethnically distinct groups. In addition to Awlad Ali proper (the descendents of Ali), referred to as the Sa'adi, it includes a number of Murabiteen (holy men) tribes who are attached to various segments of Awlad Ali and occupy an inferior political position. The name also includes various peasant

619 [563] The name also includes various peasant groups and individuals who migrated from the Nile valley and who were incorporated into the tribal organization by a system of tribal adoption called "Iktitab." Most of these peasant groups came to the desert [701] to avoid military drafting by becoming part of Awlad Ali, who, until [554] 1947, were exempted from serving in the Egyptian army. Although groups and individuals thus adopted become part of the pedigrees of the adopting tribal segments and are supposed to enjoy equal status, yet, insofar as their origin is still remembered, they are looked down upon by the Sa'adi and occupy a position somewhere between that of Awlad Ali Sa'adi and that of the Murabiteen.

619 173 The Sa'adi tribes consider themselves to be the descendants of a certain Aqqar Ben Sa'ada or Aqqar El-Sherif, a descendant of Bani Suleim, who settled in Cyrenaica in the Fifth Century. Although they claim to [144] be of pure Arab ancestory, all sources agree that a considerable amount of mixture between Arab and indigenous Berber populations took place during the period they have been in North Africa.



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Fig. 1. The Sa'adi Tribes

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* The exact relationship of the Gemeiat tribe to the Sa'adi tribes is not exactly known. Many informants, as well as accounts of earlier travelers in the area, assert that descent from Hkadiga, a sister of Ali and Harb, and therefore are cousins of Awlad Ali. Others, especially members of Sa'adi tribes, themselves, deny any genealogical

619 Until two centuries ago Awlad Ali lived in eastern Cyrenaica.
173 After the death of Aqqar, his two sons, Ali (founder of Awlad Ali) and
Harb (founder of Harabi tribe on chart), competed for the leadership of
619 the tribe. This competition involved their respective tribes in a
173 bitter war which existed for more than fifty years. In one of the major
726 battles between the two tribal segments, the Harabi segment with help
[648] from the Caramanli rules of Tripoli were able to defeat Awlad Ali and
to drive them eastward across the Libyan-Egyptian borders into the
Egyptian Western Desert. This happened about 150 years ago. At that
time, the area was occupied by the Hanadi, a warlike cousin of Awlad
Ali, who had established a system of dominance over the Murabiteen
tribes who are believed to be the original inhabitants of the desert.
The area also was inhabited by the Gemeiat tribe, which, although believed to have Murabiteen status, yet were not treated as clients of
the powerful Hanadi, as were the other Murabiteen tribes in the area.
With the help from the Murabiteen, Awlad Ali were able to defeat the
Hanadi and to drive them eastward into the Nile Delta, where they
settle now as cultivators.

619 During the rule of Muhammad Ali (1815-1848), the warlike Awlad
175 Ali were frequently used by the government to subdue the tribal uprisings
648 in the Delta and other parts of Egypt, and to hold the Mamlukes
in check. There was no organized army in Egypt at that time except for
a few remnants of the Turkish soldiers. The tribal population of
Awlad Ali agreed to supply Muhammad Ali with fighting men on the condition that they would be provided with food and arms and also exempted

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[619] [173] connection to Gemeiat and insist that they are a Murabiteen tribe who acquired their relatively higher status through their assistance to Awlad Ali during their fight with the Harabi.

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from forced labor in government projects and released from the payment of taxes. The government agreed to these demands, and on their part, Awlad Ali helped Muhammad Ali extensively in his military expedition in Syria and Arabia and were a major factor in the battle of 1815 at Bissel where he succeeded in breaking Wahabi power. They also helped his son, Ismeal, in his expedition to the Sudan.

[701] Later, when the Egyptian army was organized, the government exempted Awlad Ali and other tribal groups which helped in the military conquests from military service, but required them to undertake the guarding of the desert roads and the frontiers of Egypt. Also, in [423] exchange for their previous services, they were given the right to use the land of the Western Desert and left the question of its distribution among the various tribal segments to the native tribal leaders.
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Finally, in 1832, Awlad Ali were granted a form of legal and political autonomy whereby the government acknowledged the tribal legal and judicial system as the means to settle disputes between members of the tribe. The government also recognized the authority of the native tribal leaders and allowed the tribal populations to be governed by their own native system of leadership.

This political autonomy of Awlad Ali existed until 1947. Although their usefulness to the government had long ceased to exist, they had continued to enjoy the privileges they had obtained earlier. This was partly due to the fact that the various governments that came after Muhammad Ali showed no interest in the area occupied by Awlad Ali. There were no taxable lands in the area, no natural resources of any promise, and the tribal population did not present any particular problem to attract the attention of the government. There was some smuggling 000

CHAPTER III

TRIBAL ORGANIZATION

121 In discussing the tribal organization of Awlad Ali two modes of
619 analysis are employed. One is a structural form of analysis in which emphasis is on the hierarchy of groups and subgroups by which the tribesmen order themselves. This view of the system is an outside one regarding all smaller units as parts of a delimited whole: Awlad Ali. The other mode of analysis involves the description of some of these groups in terms of the processes by which they emerge and maintain themselves.

The first problem one encounters in pursuing the first kind of
121 analysis is that of definition of the tribal boundaries. It has been
619 mentioned earlier that the name Awlad Ali includes a number of groups
563 of different ethnic backgrounds. Some of these have been incorporated into the tribe by the system of tribal adoption known as "Iktitab." Such groups consider themselves as Awlad Ali and are considered as such by Awlad Ali proper as well as by outsiders. Other groups such
121 as the Murabiteen are not thus incorporated into the tribe; and although
619 they consider themselves to be Awlad Ali, they are not viewed as such by Awlad Ali themselves who prefer to keep the position of the Murabiteen distinct as an inferior group. On the other hand, many
[167] Awlad Ali have moved outside the area of the Western Desert and have become settled cultivators on the banks of the Nile. These retain a vague and remote genetic connection to the name Awlad Ali.

To avoid this problem, it is best to define the tribe by political rather than by ethnic criterion. There is no paramount chief of the

There is no paramount chief of the
121 tribe at the present time; yet, the unifying force is the recognition
619 by the group of the tribal law, the Daraieb, as a binding set of rules
671
[643] and as the regulator of behavior within the area. In these terms,
Awlad Ali are a clearly delimited group, and it is in terms of the
jurisdiction of these rules that Awlad Ali are treated as a unit for
administrative purposes by the Egyptian government. Viewed this
way, Awlad Ali will be defined as those who recognize and abide by
the Daraieb or the customary law. This includes the Murabiteen tribes
[563] as well as all those who became part of the tribal organization of
Awlad Ali by means of Iktitab. Since the territorial jurisdiction of
the Daraieb is limited to the Western Desert of Egypt, those groups
and individuals of Awlad Ali origin who have moved on a permanent basis
from the area will be excluded from the group. Groups and individuals
who live in the area but are not part of the tribal organization of
Awlad Ali are not subject to the Daraieb.

619 Awlad Ali of the Western Desert of Egypt are an offshoot of the
173 Cyrenaica tribes who in turn believe themselves to be the descendants
of a unique ancestress Sa'ada.


Syrenaica tribes
Sa'ad
Baraghuth
'Aggar
El-Saghir
Jibran
Harb
Ali
Tribe
Abiad
Ahmar
Senenah
Tribe
Awlad Kharouf
Awlad Mansur
El-Sanagrah
'Eila
El-'aggary
Gedeidah
Bu-Mutair
Bait ('Eila)
El-Asabei
Yousef
'afash
Helleis
Daghash
Bait
Semeida
Yunis
Makhum
Hussein

● 619
173 Awlad Ali themselves are divided into three major sections: Ahmar (the Reds); Abiad (the Whites); and Senenah. Each of these sections is referred to as "tribe" and sometimes "tribes." The first two major sections, those of Ahmar or the Reds and Abiad (Whites), are named after their mothers, the wives of Ali (founder of Awlad Ali). The Whites are named after their white mother, and the Reds after their Sudanese mother who, owing to her dark complexion, was known as El-Hamra (the red one).

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[595] In the past, writers such as Robertson-Smith (1903) have interpreted the reference to female names in patrilineal genealogies as indicating an earlier matrilineal descent. I tend to agree with a more recent writer, E. Peters (1959), who explains the reference to female ancestors by two factors: patrilineal descent and polygyny. According to him, it is a way of distinguishing full brothers from half brothers and a means to show this genealogically. "The concept of the 'one womb', of maternal origin, is a critical one in the context of social cohesion, but it does not deny patriliny; on the contrary, it serves a sense to enforce it. Female names can be used to show a greater notion of cohesion than the mere use of male names, and the significance of a female name . . . is that it is symbol of full brother unity at the highest political level." (p.29).

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619 This can be further supported by evidence from my own data which show that reference to female names occur more frequently in charts where tribal names rather than proper names are used. In genealogies using proper names, informants rarely, if ever, trace their descent to an ancestress. But when charts of tribal names are used, it is not

613 uncommon to find reference to female names. This indicates that it is
551 only when the unity of the full brothers becomes politically signifi-
173
619 cant that the name of the mother rather than the name of the father is
used. This may explain why the occurrence of female names in Awlad Ali
[595] genealogies is not as common as one might expect judging from the fre-
quency of polygynous marriages among the group.


Awlad Mansur
Mutair
'aggary
Gedaidah
Bu-Zewah
El-Hafian
El-Marries
Suliman

Fig. 3. Recognized tribal segments of Awlad Mansur (a segment of Awlad Ali)


Mansur
Bu-Asabei
Bu-Mutair
'aggar
Muhammed
Bu-Zewah
Abdellah
Hussein (Hafian)
Muhammed
Suliman
Muhammed
Suliman

613 The two charts show the same unit of Awlad Mansour. The first of
619 the two charts shows the tribal segments in which Eilat Gedaida (a fe-
173
551 male name) appears as one of the segments. When the actual genealogical
chart of one of the living members of that segment was drawn, descent
was traced to Mohammed, the husband of Gedaida, as shown on the second
chart. In this case Gedaida is not a member of Awald Mansour segment.
The unity of the full brothers is emphasized without changing the affil-
iation of the segment. It is simply a means of carrying on the patriline
using the mother's name. This is not always the case, however. Examin-
ation of other cases in which the female name was used reveals the fact
that in certain instances using the female name is a means of carrying
on the line of descent through a daughter. This meant incorporating
within the tribal segment a whole group of individuals who otherwise
would have belonged to a different patriline. Carrying the line through
613
619 the daughter in this manner has the same result as adopting her husband
551 unto the tribe. The question then is why wasn't adoption used. Examin-
597 ation of the two cases in which this happened indicates that a possible
explanation may be that this occurs whenever the husband is unadoptable.
Adoption is possible whenever a man does not have any tribal affiliation.
613 In one of the two cases the husband belonged to the Gemei'at tribe, a
619 Murabiteen tribe which enjoys a relatively higher status than the
551 other Murabiteen tribes by virtue of their being the original settlers
597 of the area and helping the Awald Ali in their fight with the Hanadi,
554 yet compared to Awlad Ali proper occupies an inferior position. In
this case, relating to the patriline of the mother carried with it a

613 definite political advantage. In the second case in which the female
619 name was used, the husband was a member of the Bara'asa tribe of Libya.
551 Although this tribe is one the powerful tribes of Libya, it has no
599
554 political influence in the Egyptian Western Desert. Changing affiliation carried with it the strong political support of the mother's tribal segment.

619 In general the Reds occupy the western half of the coastal area of
131 the Western Desert from the town of Matruh westward to the Libyan border, while the Whites occupy the eastern part which stretches to Alexandria. The Senenah are fairly scattered although their largest concentration is located in the extreme western part overlapping that of the Reds. The territorial division of the area among the three major sections of Awlad Ali is not a strict one. Historical evidence shows that there has been
[174] a considerable tribal displacement throughout the area. This displacement occurred mainly during the intratribal war era and during the Second World War when the area was a main battlefield. In general, however, there is a significant relationship between territorial distribution and tribal segmentation, and this is especially true on the higher levels of segmentation than on the lower ones.

619 Each of the three sections of the apex of a three-tiered order of
613 segments which, following the native usage, will be called Kabila (tribe), Eila (family), and Bait (house).

619 The first order referred to as tribes are structurally equivalent
173 units but of highly-variable size. Each of them has its traditional history. Some of these histories are important to the tribe as a whole.

•619 [173] Such traditions differentiate between these segments which otherwise occupy an equivalent position in the formal system.

This level of segmentation has no particular political significance except that it is at this level that the client tribes of Murabiteen are attached. People in the area differentiate between Awlad Ali proper, who are called the Sa'adi, and the Murabiteen tribes. Murabiteen tribes occupy a special position which tends to complicate the formal analysis of the tribal organization of the Awlad Ali. The Murabiteen are a number of tribes of varying sizes and origin which are attached to the Sa'adi tribes as their vassals or clients. They exhibit the same principles of tribal organization as the Sa'adi tribes escept that they have no common origin similar to that of the latter groups.

619 173 The original division of the Murabiteen tribes among the Sa'adi was made in the famous meeting at El-Haqfa in which the division of land was also made and the Awlad Ali law was first enacted. The number of client groups attached to each Sa'adi tribe reflects the relative prestige and power of thatparticular tribe at the time of the meeting. Having a re- 619 173 latively large number of client tribes meant, in addition to prestige of 651 the patron tribe, large financial support. Until half a century ago this financial support was in the form of an obligatory tribute or "sadaqa" which the client tribes had to pay. This tribute is no longer [178] [431] mandatory, but the client groups are still expected to present members of their patron tribes with gifts on occasions such as weddings, funerals 619 or feasts of the tribal saint. Large vassal groups also meant support in fights. Although the client groups did not constitute part of the vengeance group of their Sa'adi, when the Sa'adi tribe fought, their client

619 groups were expected to help. For these reasons the Sa'adi tribes com-
619 peted and even fought among themselves for the newcoming Murabiteen
721 groups which continued to migrate into the area, escaping the strong
dominance of the Cyrenaica Bedouins..Many of the major tribal wars which occurred in the area before the turn of the century had as their major cause the competition over the Murabiteen.

619 As a vassal group the Murabiteen tribes are kept in an inferior
778 position. This inferiority has certain manifestation, the most obvious
184 of which is the deprivation of the Murabiteen of the right of "nazala"
682 or refuge. When a person is killed the killer and his kin unit seek re-
778 fuge at a neutral tribal segment, and for a period of twelve months they
613 are safe from the revenge of the victim's kin group. The victim's family
[871] cannot follow them to the refuge place, for to do this is to violate one of the basic principles of Awlad Ali law. The philosophy behind the rule of "nazala" is to give time for "the blood to cool off" as one of the informants described it. It also gives the host group a chance to start immediate negotiations with the victim's group to settle permanently the dispute. As soon as the murderer's group takes refuge, which is done either by moving along with their tents and flocks and settling in the locality of the host group or symbolically by having the head of the host group send one of his sons or male relatives to pitch his tent in the locality of the murderer's group, the head of the host group contacts the victim's group, informs them that he has been chosed by the murderer's group in accordance with the right of nazala, and asks for their permission to grant his protection to the murderer's group. To ask for the permission of the victim's group is a matter of formality since, by custom, they cannot refuse to grant this permission except on one single ground:

682 778 617 if the host group is genealogically close enough to the murderer's group as to be themselves part of the vengeance group. As soon as the permission is granted the head of the host group starts negotiations on behalf of the murderer. Since the basic reason for the nazala is to avoid the direct confrontation between the two opposing groups, the first task of the negotiations is to define which places and markets each group can go to during the year of the nazala. Once this has been agreed upon, the difficult task of settling the dispute begins. The success or failure of the negotiations depends on the skill of the negotiator and the weight his tribal segment has in the area. This makes it of extreme importance for the murderer to select the tribal segment which can affect such a settlement. In cases where the host group is not particularly powerful, the victim's group pretends to agree to a settlement in order to have the murderer and his group leave the locality of the host group and then takes revenge by killing the murderer. This cannot happen when the host group is powerful, since such an action would automatically make the host group enemies of the victim's group.

● 619 184 778 682 With very few exceptions which will be dealt with later, the right to offer refuge is limited to the Sa'adi tribes. No Murabiteen tribe can grant refuge to a murderer, although they themselve can seek refuge at a Sa'adi tribal segment if one of them is involved in murder.

619 184 [682] [582] Another less conspicuous manifestation of the inferior position of the Murabiteen relative to the Sa'adi is the fact that the bloodmoney for the Murabit is two-thirds that for the Sa'adi man. Also, until very recently, marriage of a Sa'adi to a member of the Murabiteen tribes was considered by the Sa'adi as a very poor choice and was discouraged.

619
184 In recent years this has changed, however. The increased importance
178 of wealth in the recently introduced money economy relaxed the
582 endogamous tendency that was characteristic of the Sa'adi tribes.

619 In discussing the position of the Murabiteen tribes it is worth
184 noting that not all the Murabiteen tribes in the area occupy the same
position. Some enjoy relatively higher positions than the others.
Actually, there are two kinds of Murabiteen in the area: Mustaqillen
(independent Murabiteen); and the dependent Murabiteen. The latter are
further subdivided into Murabiteen bil-baraka (with the blessing); and
Murabiteen bil-sadaqa (with the tribute). The only independent
Murabiteen in the area is the Gemei'at tribe. These are the original settlers
[173] of the area. Because of their help to Awlad Ali against the Hanadi, the
latter were defeated and Awlad Ali were able to occupy the Western Desert.
For their part the Gemei'at tribe was granted its independence by Awlad
Ali and were given one-third of the total area as their homeland (watan).
619 In theory, the Gemei'at tribe occupies the same position and has the same
184 rights as the Sa'adi tribes, including the right to offer their
778 protection which is denied to all other client groups. In practice, however,
682 this seems to be of no practical value. None of my informants could
remember a single case in which a murderer has taken refuge at a segment
619 of the Gemei'at tribe. The importance of the nazala is not merely to be
778 safe from the pursuit of the victim's group but rather to provide the
184 mediators who undertake the crucial task of negotiation on behalf of the
682 murderer and his gorup. It is the ability to settle the dispute on a
629
628 permanent basis that offers the actual long-lasting protection, even
after the time of the nazala expires. To be successful in his pursuit,

619 the negotiator has to have behind him the full weight of his tribal segment.
778 184 Since the origin of the Gemei'at tribe as a Murabiteen tribe is
682 well known, any negotiator has to rely almost entirely upon his own skill
627 628 to affect any settlement; even if he is able to affect such a settlement, there is no guarantee that it will be permanent.

619 The Murabiteen bil-baraka and Murabiteen bil-sadaqa occupy the same
792 position as vassal groups. The only difference between the two is that the first, the religious men, are much more respected than the latter. They are feared by the other tribes because of the belief that they have direct contact with the religious and spiritual world and can harm those who dare to offend them in one way or another. Because of this factor
[627] and of their neutral position with regard to the rest of the tribes, they
[628] play an important role in mediation and dispute settlement.

619 The origin of inferiority of the Murabiteen tribes in general is
184 hard to account for. Kenneth (1925) believes that hundreds of years ago
174 the Murabiteen were essentially the holymen. They learned to read and
792 write the Qoraan and grouped themselves around the "zawias' which were the centers of learning and religion. While indulging in their religious practices their flocks ere grazed miles away in the open desert under the charge of the Sa'adi shepherds, who originally were the poor paid workers of the Murabiteen. These shepherds, living out in the open, were busy fighting away the raiders attempting to steal their flocks. As time passed the Sa'adi shepherds became not only tough fighters but also wealthy. This latter end was achieved partly as a result of successful raids on neighboring tribes. Later when the Sa'adi planned a large raid, they entrusted their flocks to the Murabiteen, who by that time had become dependent upon the Sa'adi for their protection from the raids of other tribes.

619 The picture was reversed then with the poor Sa'adi shepherds becoming
184 the masters, acquiring great wealth and prestige because of their fighting
174 ability, and the holymen becoming the shepherds and clients of the
792 Sa'adi fighters. Inthe old inter-tribal wars, the Murabiteen stood a
[651] very limited chance so the Sa'adi tribes adopted them and in return for
a yearly tribure guaranteed theprotection of the Murabiteen from external aggression.

As time passed, the main difference between the Sa'adi and Murabiteen tended to diminish. One or two outstanding Murabiteen tribes fought their own battles without seeking the protection of the Sa'adi and remained independent, while a few others rose up and fought on with the protector against a common foe (the case of the Gemei'at tribe is an example) and in return were emancipated from the stigma of serfdom and accepted by the Sa'adi as almost equals. Other Murabiteen tribes remained attached to their Sa'adi protector as client groups.

Ibn Khaldoun also saw the inferiority of the Murabiteen tribes as stemming from a mode of tribal relations adapted to inter-tribal warfare (1845).

613 The Eila

The Eila represents the next level of tribal segmentation among the
Awlad Ali. The Eila is the most important political unit. Although the
Eila lacks any formally recognized leadership, its importance stems from
the fact that it constitutes the vengeance group or Amar El-Dam (unity of
613 the blood). This means that it bears a corporate responsibility for the
672 actions of its members. Anyone of its members can be killed in vengence
682 for a homocide committed by any other, and the duty of revenge for any

613 Article 9:

675 The Amar should never fight on the side of the wrongdoer, because if it does, it will have to pay with him for his wrongdoings. 539

Article 10:

[628] Any dispute or fight involving a member of the Amar and an outsider should be reported to the awaqil in the Amar who are supposed to take the matter up with the other party. If the awaqil are convinced that the outsider is the aggressor or that he is at fault, they should try to make him accede to the demands of the members of the Amar, using all their efforts to convince him and the aqila of his bait. [619] If he refuses, they should call him for a "Miad" (tribal meeting) in which all parties involved should be represented by their respective awaqil.

Article 11:

[563] [619] With regard to "iktitab" (tribal adoption), an outsider wanting to join the Aggary Family or one of its constiuent buite must be asked first about the reason or reasons for his desire to join. This must be done in order to know what kind of person he is and whether he will become a burden and liability to the Amar. If he proves to be of reputable standing, the aqila of the bait he wants to join can accept him without consultation with the rest of the awaqil. If on the other hand he is found to have grudges against someone or if someone has a financial claim over him, then the aqila of the bait cannot accept him without consultation with the other awaqil in the Amar. If all the awaqil agree to accept him, he is considered like one of the Eilat Aggary, having the same rights and bearing the same responsibilities.

Article 12:

A memberof the Amar who wants to separate himself from the Amar and get a "barawa" has to state his reasons beforehe can be released from the obligations of his membership in the amar. If his request to get the barawa was because of injustice he suffered by the Amar or any of its members, the awaqil have the duty to straighten the injustice and restore his rights. If, on the other hand, his request for the barawa was to avoid paying the Amar, then he cannot be released from his membership unless he pays all of his share, or else he must return all that the Amar has paid him until the time he asked for the barawa.

Article 13:

[695] [693] If one of the Amar is accused of an offense for which he is tried by the legal system of the state, the Amar as a whole share the expenses of hiring an attorney to defend him. This, however, is done after the awaqil are sure (by means of administering the oath) that he is innocent and that the accusation is false.

613 Written agreements such as the above are becoming more common in
675 the area. The need to have the responsibility of the vengeance group
[178] or the Amar recorded and the names of its members listed stems from the
[361] increase in the geographical mobility of individuals and separate house-
[464] holds seeking jobs with the government organizations in the area or with
the various industries in the towns and cities outside the Western Desert.
233 The uncertainty of pastoral nomadism and the delicate balance which exists
178 between pastures, animal population, and human population is pushing an
182 ever-increasing number of people to abandon the way of life which they
had lived for generations. Animals are extremely important to sustain
233 the pastoral life of Awlad Ali. Once the balance between the pasture and
182 the animal population is upset by a draught, a segment of the human popu-
731 lation has to make new adjustments. This adjustment is first made by
166 moving with one's flocks to areas in the Delta or in the Cyrenaica region
of Libya. This is a short-term adjustment, however, and cannot be con-
tinued for long periods of time. Pastures in the Delta have to be pur-
chased, and in most cases the owner of the herd has to sell part of his
● [619] herd to feed the rest. The Cyrenaica pasture is very limited and re-
stricted by the strong tribal control of the Cyrenaica Bedouins, who in
general are not friendly with many of the tribal segments living in the
233 Egyptian Western Desert. If the draught continues beyond a certain time,
731 the individual owner of a herd may find himself forced to sell the herd
464 and seek other modes of subsistence in the form of part-time or full-time
434
182 employment as a semi-skilled or unskilled worker with the government or
industrial organizations. Such jobs are usually viewed as a temporary
source of income to help the individual and his immediate family live

613 671 first appeared, the rule has become a practice so common that other Amars
675 find it unnecessary to specify it in their own papers.

682 Another new rule which is in the process of acquiring a great amount
613 of consensus among the tribal population of Awlad Ali is that of the re-
672 675 sponsibility of the Amar for the payment of the lawyer's fees for members
[693] of the Amar who are tried by the government (Article 13 of the Aggary
[695] papers). Another less agreed upon rule is that of the responsibility of
613 the Amar for the financial losses caused by the confiscation of smuggled
672 675 goods or the payment of money for the destruction of government property
439 by a member of the Amar. Where smuggling is an important source of in-
[434] come for the group, Amar papers usually include rules making it a corporate responsibility; other Amar papers, especially those of tribal segments not deeply involved in smuggling, make it an individual responsibility, while still others leave it intentionally with no specific rule, as in the case of the Aggary Amar paper.

613 The Aggary document is a relatively elaborate one. Not all Amar
[675] papers, or at least the ones I had a chance to examine, are as detailed.
[131] Eilat Aggary is the largest Amar in the area of Dera'el Bahari, which
extends from Alexandria 60 miles westward to the town of Alamein. The
613 distinctive characteristics of the Aggary Eila is that it is composed
563 mainly of peasant groups who joined the Aggary by means of tribal adop-
619 tion. Of the 16 Baits constituting the Aggary Amar, only three are believed to be Awlad Ali proper. The attractiveness of the Aggary for the peasant groups seeking to be adopted by the tribal population of the area may be partly explained in terms of the location of Eilat Aggary in an area relatively close to the Delta from where these groups usually migrate.

613 563 619 This makes it possible for those adopted by the tribe to keep in touch with their relatives and friends they left behind in the Delta while enjoying the military exemption gained from their adoption by the Awlad Ali population. It is also believed that Eilat Aggary, made up mostly of peasants themselves, are very lenient in the conditions they put for tribal adoption. Finally, the Eilat Aggary is not among the most powerful tribal segments of Awlad Ali, possibly because of their composition. This assures the adopted peasant groups an equal status not normally obtained if adopted by one of the powerful tribal segments of Awlad Ali.

613 [675] The Amar paper of the Aggary explicitly states some of the basic characteristics of the Amar as a unit in the tribal organization of Awlad Ali. The most distinctive aspect of the Eila or the Amar as a political unit is the absence of any formalized leadership. Although the Amar is viewed by outsiders as a corporate group as far as its legal responsibility in certain cases, from the standpoint of its members, the Amar is no more than the sum total of its constiuent units or Baits. This is shown in the Amar paper of Aggary which states that matters affecting the Amar be decided upon by all the bait represented by their respective leaders, the awaqil. There is no formalized authority above the
613 554 627 awaqil, although one of the awaqil might acquire a position of informal leadership by virtue of personal or other qualities. He will be considered as a mediator and go-between for the various leaders of the Baits. In the case of the Aggary, Sheihk Selouma, the Aqila of Bait Eweida, has acquired such a leadership among the Eilat Aggary. Although Shiehk Selouma is relatively young, (he is about 40 years old), he has the reputation of getting things done. His Bait is the wealthiest in the

621 had started in the area at that time. No special permission was required
563 for the newcomer to join the camp. He only got the permission
of the person whose tent was at the far end of the camp to put his tent
[574] next to it. The first night after the man joined the camp, his next
door neighbor slaughtered a goat in honor of the new member and invited
all members of the camp.

621 Leaving the camp also does not require any permission, although the
622 custom specifies that before one leaves he should inform either his
[576] neighbor or the headman of his time of departure. With the exception of
[613] cases where the headman of a particular camp is at the same time the
Aqila of the bait, the headman of the camp has no authority over the members
622 of the camp. He is usually called upon to solve minor problems between
627 brothers or husband and wife, or give his opinion in decisions of
minor importance. "A headman is like a father," said one informant, "we
call him kabir el-nagi (the old man of the camp)." When a member of the
627 613 nagei is involved in a serious dispute with another, the one to handle
the case is the aqila or awaqil to whom the two disputing parties belong.

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Group	Leadership	Identifying aspects
Kabila	None	Client groups attached.
Eila	None	Vengeance group, Vaguely defined tribal land ("watan").
Bait	Aqila	Corporate land-holding. Formally recognized leadership.
[622] Nagei	Headman	Residential unit with unsegmented structure.

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EILAT AGGARY AND ITS CONSTIUENT BAITS

BAIT	NUMBER OF ADULT MALES (Sayems)[1]	AQILA
Eweidha (El-Burg)*	28	Ta'eb
Eweidha (El-Alamein)*	31	Selouma
Yusef**	30	Suliman
Helleis	22	Hussein
El-Asabei'	56	Shei'eb
Abdel Hamid*	20	Haj Musa
Risq**	30	Yadem
Afash	25	Nayer
Daghas**	[illegible]	Daghash
Bul-Yazid*	21	Haj Shousha
Makhyum**	23	Abdel fattah
Hussein**	17	Masri
El-Ramly**	25	Salem
Rashwan**	30	Rashwan
Attya*	31	Masu'd
Abdella*	22	Abdel Galil

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[1] Numbers are taken from the Amar list which is used to distribute the amount of bloodmoney on the various baits. An adult male or "sayem" is anyone 15 years of age or older. The word "sayem" means fasting individual and the age of 15 is when a child is forced to observe the duties of fasting.

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** Refers to adopted tribal segments (Muktatibeen).
* Baits of doubted origin. Some claim these baits are adopted, while others insist that they are Awlad Ali proper.

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627 to Qudura and to tell him that Hakim wanted to show his respect. This
156 means in everyday parlance that Hakim was willing to pay him money.
[196] Qudura agreed to meet Hakim the following day.

[114] On the day of the meeting, to which I was invited, Hakim arrived
[431] with his son and gifts of three goats, tea and sugar. One of the goats
[574] was slaughtered and supper was prepared for the guests. While the guests
were eating, Hakim and Qudura disappeared inside one of the tents for
more than an hour. When they finally joined the gathering, Hakim announced that he and Qudura were now brothers and that it was his fault
that Qudura was angry because he had accused him of being stupid and
misunderstanding the content of the message sent to him after the meeting
of the Aggary awawil. "I admit," said Hakim, "that I might have meant
at one time and probably said it to sheikh Qudura that I wanted him to
be the Aqila of bait Asabei'. Now that I have admitted this, Sheikh
Qudura should not have any grudges against me or my son." Then Qudura
addressed the gathering and said, in a very cold and dry manner, "I am
glad that Hakim has come to this senses and admitted his mistake." The
gathering lasted for most of the evening, spent mostly in behind-the-scenes meetings involving Hakim, Qudura and different guests. Then as
the last guest left, Shei'eb, who had been inside the tent throughtout
the evening came out and said that Hakim was a fool and that Qudura had
tricked him into admitting publicly that he had lied and that Qudura
still refused to take the oath.

613 Qudura's stand created a strong reaction which affected almost all
619 the tribal segments in the area. The case overshadowed any other event
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[521] and was the main topic of discussion. The reaction was mixed, however.

613 619 578 156 Other tribal segments outside the Aggary amar supported the position of Qudura, and most took his position to prove their notion about his honesty and the fact that despite his poverty, he could not be bribed. They were also pleased with Qudura's trick which demonstrated Hakim's dishonest 613 578 156 techniques. Within the Aggary amar, the general sentiment was still with Hakim although his confession of cheating Qudura made it difficult to support him openly. They directed their attack against Qudura who in their view violated the solidarity of the amar and even of his bait and showed it as divided and noncohesive. They were also fearful that Qudura's [685] refusal to pay would cause the amar to pay the Geneishat the full compensation for the action of Rabbuh, a sum which, as one said, would put the amar in debt for generations to come. The strongest impact of the events affected bait Asabei'itself and left it one step from complete fission into three distinct groups. Shei'eb, finding the tide turning against Hakim, found a chance to assert his claim to the position of the Aqila, stating openly that he would never forfeit his hereditary right. On the other hand, finding the popularity of Qudura increasing rapidly, he started attacking him verbally and even threatened to beat him. He in- [681] sisted that Qudura and his sons should be excluded from the amar and given the barawa.

613 681 [192] The word "barawa" is derived from the Arabic verb "bara" which means to cure one's self of an illness. It also means to sever social ties with undesirable persons. The term is used among Awlad Ali in a much restrited sense to refer to the process by which a tribal segment detaches itself from any responsibility for the actions of a particular member. It is

613 In performing his functions within the bait, personal qualities such as
554 wisdom, soundness of ideas, personal persuasiveness are of importance.
[157]
[428] But the main basis of his authority is patrilineal succession. The Aqila
[556] has no economic power to speak of. Although many aqila are among the
wealthiest members of their baits, many more are among its poorest. The
nature of the economic process and the pastoral life of Awald Ali is
such that the economic position of the individual is always flucuating.
Nor does the Aqila have any military power at his disposal, or any command
of the use of force to back his decisions or to make them binding
[428] upon members of his bait. The main source of compliance to the Aqila's
decisions comes from the knowledge that the Aqila has the authority to
make such decisions and that he has acquired this authority through the
legitimate channel of patrilineal succession.

613 Where membership in formal groups is transmitted by descent, Awlad
428 Ali always choose the patriline. The son of Awlad Ali is regarded as
562
● [619] Awlad Ali even though his mother might not be from the tribe, while a
woman who marries outside the tribe transmits no rights in the tribe to
her children. The importance of agnatic kin is reinforced by an solidary of brothers which is extended laterally to patrilateral cousins. It is also shown in the fact that sons are favored in inheritance usually to the exclusion of daughters. The male line is viewed by Awlad Ali as the natural principle when it comes to anything which is inheritable, whether property or position. In an attempt to defend Shei'eb's position and his right to be the Aqila, one informant told me: "The main purpose that a man has in life is to have sons because it is the son who makes the man live forever. Daughters don't count. A man gives his son

795 Because of their religious position which put
175 them outside the tribal structure, the leaders of the zawyas played a
627 significant role in mediation and settling disputes between various tribal
793 segments. At their disposal was their ability to ostracize anyone
[626] who did not abide by their decision from the zawyas, which meant depriving
him from all the benefits, social as well as religious, that membership
in the zawyas offered.

795 After the First World War when the British replaced the Turks as
175 governors of the area, the zawyas were closed and the religious leaders
177 ordered to leave. The zoning established by the zawyas existed, however,
[648]
[631] and was used as the basis for the redistricting of the area. Police
[625] stations replaced the religious centers. From the standpoint of the tribal
619 population itself, the districts have no psychological or political
634
[795] reality. The zawyas were originally established in the areas of tribal
[361] concentrations. But the area itself did not have any political identity.
The only reality from the standpoint of the inhabitants was the tribal
reality and affiliation which cut across many of these districts. Many
of the tribal segments inhabiting one district were and still are hostile
177 to one another. To transform the zones into administrative districts and
634 to establish one office of leadership for the whole district was to impose
619 a political unity nonexistent among the tribal segments inhabiting
[622] the district. To avoid this difficulty, the government supplemented the
territorial principle of the omda system in the rural area with the principle
of tribal representation and came up with a system which seems to
suite the situation in the Western Desert. For each of the districts,
a list of all tribal segments which habitually occupy the area and whose
tribal land is located within the district, is made. The most powerful

554 The most powerful
177 and numerous segments are then represented by the omda, and the lesser
634 ones are represented by a sheikh. Unlike the system in the rural areas
619 where the sheikh is a subordinate to the omda, the sheikh in the Western
[622] Desert does not occupy the same position. Instead he has the same functions and occupies, with regard to his tribal segment, the same position the omda occupies with regard to his. He does not take orders from the omda and has direct relations with the administration. Sheikhs and omdas from one district are supposed to meet periodically in the police station and discuss with the police officer in charge of the station matters concerning the district and their own tribal groups. The only difference between the omda and the sheikh in the Western Desert seems to be the label of the office. The label itself carries a certain amount of prestige to the tribal segment represented by the omda, since it is an acknowledgement by the government of its importance. This is why many of the tribal segments try to be represented by an omda rather than by a sheikh. In certain districts where two or more strong tribal segments compete for the honor of being represented by an omda, the district may have two or more omdas representing the strong tribal segments and a number of sheikhs representing the lesser tribal groups in the district. Not every tribal segment in a district is represented by an omda or even a sheikh, however. Very small tribal segments may join together and have one sheikh, while others may agree to be represented by one of the larger segment's sheikh or omda.

634 Obviously, the number of omdas and sheikhs differ from one district
554
619 to another depending on the number of important tribal segments in each.
657 There is no specific rule whereby a certain tribal segment is considered

634 by the government to be significant enough to be represented. This matter
554 is left almost entirely to the ability of members of a given tribal segment
619 to convince the authorities that their group is sizable enough to
657 give them the right of omda, or at least sheikh's representation. A segment represented by a sheikh may later ask for an omda because of the prestige involved. It is worth noting in this respect that the various tribal segments in the area are eager to be represented in the government administrative structure. Gaining prestige among the other tribal
622 segments is only one motive for such eagerness. Unlike the omda in the rural areas who functions mainly as a representative of the government to the village, the omda or sheikh in the Western Desert is a representative of the people to the government. This is not a theoretical difference but involves a real difference in the relation of the government and the omda, on the one hand, and between the latter and the people
622 his represnets, on the other. The omda in the village is a symbol of
554 authority to his people. He is the undisputed ruler of the village. His
657 authority is backed by his ability to mobilize and use the force put at his diposal by the government, in the implementation of his decisions. Since he is appointed by the government and not elected by the people, he does not have to rely on his popularity to hold or maintain office. His main concern is to please the government, rather than the people of the village to whom he is merely a symbol of authority. There is very little that the village omda can bring to his people form the outside, while he has to implement government policies, collect taxation, apprehend criminals, all tasks which the villagers are not eager to have done.

634 666 The situation is quite different in the Western Desert. Although
657 it is the government, represented by the province council, which makes
554 the final decision in appointing the omda or sheikh, yet this appoint-
● 619 ment is made on the basis of nominations given by the gribal segment
635 or segments which he would represent. Since the tribal segment usually
nominates one person, the decision of the council is limited to the
examination of the credentials of the nominee and to see if he meets the
basic requirements of the law. If a certain nominee is rejected by the
council, a very rare occurrence, the matter goes back to the tribal
segment to make another nomination. In practice, then, the omda of the
Western Desert is elected by the people and the appointment by the govern-
ment of the omda is significant only in cases where the omda is to repre-
sent more than one small tribal segment and each nominates one. Here the
council has to choose between the various nominaees and appoints the best
634 qualified. Unlike the omda of the village, the tribal omda is a real re-
554 657 presentative of his people. Despite the fact that he becomes part of a
619 governmental structure, his basic function is to look after the interest
[622] of his tribal group. Or, as one informant put it, "The omda is the ser-
vant of the people." In many cases the best interest of the tribal segment
is served through full cooperation of the omda with the government. So
far there seems to be very little conflict between the interest of the
tribal populations and that of the government. There is very little in
[651] the area that the government demands or needs. There is no taxable land
to speak of. There are only a few acres of barley land and even these
634 554 are minimally taxed. The main responsibility of the omda to the govern-
657 ment is to report births and deaths and give a yearly list of young men

634
554
619 "The omda or sheikh is both a blessing and a curse to his tribe," said one member of the Aggary 'eila. "He can bring benefits to his tribe, but at the same time, he has to report his own people if one of them breaks the city laws... His position is like that of a double-edged razor."

Most of the people in the area, however, tolerate the negative aspects of the omda's functions as a moderate price for the possible benefits they may get through his position. This is why each tribal segment does its best to be represented by an omda, or at least by a sheikh.

Within his tribal segment he enjoys a great deal of respect. He does not, by means of position alone, command any power over members of his group similar to the power the omda of the village has over his people. [613] It seems, however, that although the position itself does not carry with it any power, yet, when the holder of that position is at the same time a native tribal leader or aqila, it tends to enhance his position as a tribal leader and to give him more respect among members of his tribal unit as well as among the rest of the tribal groupings.
634
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657
613 This may be explained by the fact that the establishment of the omda system in that area did not involve direct interference with the native political system except in a minimal way, mainly to keep the tribal populations in the area from interfering in the progress of various government projects in the area. As such, the system did not impose too many demands upon the tribal loyalties of the omdas or sheikhs. In the relationship between the government and the tribal population, the balance so far has been in favor of the latter, who, by means of

634 omda representation, are taking from the government much more than
554
● 619 they are giving in return. Being the link between his people and
182 the government in such a system gives the aqila a new basis of
657 political support.
613

581 are necessary for the validation of the marriage contract. Modern
585 legal systems which took as their basis the Islamic law of marriage
671
675 and the family further required the registration of the marriage contract for the marriage to be legal.

584 The request and necessary response forming the marriage are sup-
585 posed to be carried on by the parties involved. However, if either the
429 groom or the bride is not of age, or is mentally unqualified, the trans-
593 action is carried on by his or her guardian, or "wakil." The wakil is
the father, unless he is dead or an invalid, in which case the brothers
[604] become the wakils. If the person has no brothers, then the uncles be-
[184] come the wakil in the order stated. According to certain Sunni sects
in Islam, a woman marrying for the first time is always represented by
her wakil, even if she is of age. The assumption is that a woman who
has never been married does not have the experience that enables her to
enter into any kind of legally binding relationship such as marriage.

585 Following the original Islamic idea, marriage among Awlad Ali is
675 an oral agreement between the groom or his father and the guardian
593
429 (wakil) of the bride-to-be (her father, if alive, or her closest male
[604] kin in the following order: her brothers, her uncles, her grandfather).
585 A religious man is sometimes asked to perform the marriage, although it
792 is not required. Some persons might invite a member of the Murabiteen
[619] tribe or holy men to witness the marriage on the basis that his presence
[778] gives "baraka," or blessing, to the marriage. Before the application of
585 the State legal system to the area, marriage contracts were not regis-
656
177 tered. In recent years, however, and with the increased mobility of
[675] the tribal populations, more and more marriages are being registered in
[634] the administrative districts. Still, according to the unofficial estimates,

Still, according to the unofficial estimates,
585 only about ten per cent of all marriages are registered, and these are
656
177 mainly mixed marriages involving a tribal person and a non-tribal one
582 or a tribal member who is not living in the area anymore. The reason
619 is that such a spouse, especially when he is the husband, is not under
the control of the tribal customs and therefore cannot be forced to fulfill his obligations if he fails to do so. Most of the tribal popula-
[581] tion still feel that marriage is a personal and family affair that
should be kept away from the State legal system.

584 Marriage among Awlad Ali is a relatively informal procedure. When
593 a man decides to marry a certain girl, he informs his mother who, in
turn, informs his father. The father may have objections to his son's choice of the bride. Such objections may be based on already strained relations between the two families or the questionable reputation of the girl or any member of her family. In such cases, the father tries to dissuade his son from going ahead with the marriage. The father is
[583] usually successful in controlling his son's choice when the latter is
dependent on his father for the payment of the bridewealth called "mahr" and for the support of his new household. This is usually the case in the man's first marriage. In subsequent marriages and in the cases where the son has independent means of support for himself and his bride, the father's control of the son's choice is minimal, and asking the father's approval is a matter of formality. In second and subse-
593
595 quent marriages, the approval of the older wives is essential. The
584 older wives have no right to object to the husband taking an additional
wife, but they have the right to object to the choice on the basis that the new bride is hard to get along with or that there is animosity between her family and the families of the other wives which makes

000 agreement and therefore not morally bound to abide by its contents.

582 The lack of serious intentions to marry one's cousin is reflected
in the actual frequency of patrilateral parallel cousin marriage in the
582 area. The following table is taken from the genealogies of five camps
621 in the area of Burg el Arab. The camps belong to different tribal
613 groupings:
619

Agnatic cousins	5
Other cousins	12
Within the bait (other than above)	9
Within the Eila (other than above)	13
Within the tribe (other than above	11
With members of the client tribe	15
With outsiders	9
Total	74

The above table shows that the frequency of patrilateral parallel cousin
marriage is less than eight per cent of the total marriages included in
582 the genealogies of the camps studied. It also shows that the largest
619 frequency of marriage is with a member of a client tribe of Murabiteen.
In the majority of the fifteen cases (eleven cases), it is the woman
who is a member of the Murabiteen tribe while the man is a member of the
Sa'adi tribe. The Murabiteen tribes from which the wives came are not
always the clients of the particular tribal segment to which the husband
[583] belonged. One explanation of the popularity of marriage to the Murabiteen
is that the bridewealth among them is generally less than it is for the
Sa'adi girls. It therefore gives the man the advantage of lower bridewealth
582 without the lack of choice involved in the cousin marriage. It
is important to bear in mind, however, that the sample given above is
by no means representative of the entire tribal population. Furthermore,
the material presented above was based on the actual marriages at the

593 spent the night inside. In the morning Muftah ordered his daughter to
574 pack her clothes because she was to leave with him. He refused to give
606
586 her husband any explanation as to why he was taking his daughter away.
The husband could not prevent him from taking her away because, as he said, "He is her father and has the right to take her away with him at any time."

When the wife did not return for two weeks, her husband went to her father's house to take her, but her father refused to let her go. Hemeida
593 then went to a religious man in the area and asked him to intervene in
574
606 the matter and see why Muftah had taken away his wife. He also asked him
586 to arrange a mi'ad with Muftah to discuss the matter.
627
792 The religious man was selected in this case because he was a close friend of Muftah and was believed to have influence over him. He was also known throughout the area to be fair and of sound opinion. It is important in the cases of disputes that the person selected as a mardi is known as a wise and fair man. It is only then that he is able to mediate between the two parties without being accused of taking sides.
792 The religious men, members of the Murabiteen tribes in the area, by their
619 relative position outside the formal tribal organization of the Sa'adi
627 tribes, are the most likely candidates for such activity. Yet, this is
554 not always the case. For this aspect of assumed impartiality is frequently balanced off by the fact that these religious men lack the support of a powerful tribal segment behind them. To be effective, the mardi has to be respected, not only for his personal qualities, but also for being a member of a respectable tribal segment whose power lends authority to the mardi's decision. This is not usually the case with the client
000 tribes of Murabiteen. Wealth in many cases is also considered an important

CHAPTER VI

HOMICIDE AND BODILY INJURIES

Part 1: Homicide

579 Fighting is quite common among Awlad Ali. Many of these fights
involve a large number of individuals and result in many casualties
579 and sometimes even deaths. Fighting is considered "shar," or evil,
673 for according to Awlad Ali, it threatens the social cohesion which is
182 highly valued in the area. Yet, although undesirable, fighting and
[682] even homicide are not considered a crime against society and sometimes
are viewed as necessary to safeguard individual and collective rights
in the absence of an established authority which could protect these
[177] rights. Although this absence of an authority is remedied now by the
[692] introduction of state administrative justice, this has not yet achieved
enough efficiency and recognition to replace the old tribal system.

619 In the tribal system, there is no concept of individual punishment
681 inflicted upon the suspect. There is no recognized authority to inflict
692 it. The mardi or the 'aqila who performs the function of dispute settle-
[627] ment in the case of homicide has no power to pass or inflict any punish-
ment. His role is restricted to mediation between the two parties involved
682 as was earlier mentioned. Homicide, like all other wrongs among Awlad Ali,
673 are private wrongs affecting the individual or a group of individuals.
[182] The main purpose of the tribal proceedings in the case of homicide is to
restore some form of harmony and order among the group. This harmony is
sometimes restored by killing the murderer or any member of his vengeance
682 group, or amar. Feuds may result from such killing, and a few instances
628 of feuds have, in fact, been recorded in the area (although not in the

682 last two decades). But a feud in the form of extensive, long-term kill-
628 ing between two groups is very rare among Awlad Ali. The principle of
life for life upon which a feud operates would rarely lead to a permanent
settlement or peace, even when the sense of revenge is satisfied for the
682 moment. Among the group, this form of permanent settlement is more likely
to be achieved through the payment of bloodmoney, or "diyya." The pay-
ment of the diyya is based on the assumption that the group has lost,
in the deceased, an economic asset. It has been deprived of his ser-
vices, both in supporting his immediate family and in the collective
activities of his amar. This is illustrated in the distribution of the
bloodmoney. Only half of the bloodmoney is paid to the immediate fam-
ily of the victim, the other half being divided equally among adult
males of his amar or vengeance group. This is intended not only to
satisfy their sense of indignation and curb their desire for revenge,
but also to insure that when the time comes to share in the payment of
the bloodmoney, they will pay.

628 The cessation of feuds in the area seems to coincide with the cessa-
619 tion of inter-tribal and intra-tribal warfare. During the era of tribal
726 warfare, the killing of a tribesman meant the loss in the fighting power
178 of his tribal segment, and feuding, with its emphasis on life for life,
had the purpose of restoring the balance in fighting power among the
[682] groups involved. Monetary compensations were not known in the area dur-
ing that time, according to the informants' accounts, but they were usu-
ally restricted to cases where either the victim or the killer was a
178 non-tribal person. With the cessation of tribal warfare, the death of
682 a tribal member became more an economic, rather than a political, loss,
619
726

178 682 and compensation became more and more accepted in settling murder cases
[619] among the tribal population. Bloodmoney, or diyya," was established
[729] among compensations for injury in general. This scale of compensation
682 is based on the amount of loss of normal activities the injury caused
the victim with death being the total loss of such activities. The
compensation for homocide is estimated at L.E.400 for intentional kill-
682 ing, and L.E. 300, for unintentional killing. Although reference here
673 is made to "intention," the assessment of that intention and its defini-
672 tion are quite different from the general usage of that term among modern
jurists. Among modern jurists, the term refers to a state of mind which
implies that the offender willfully and knowingly committed the prohibited
act. This means, first, that the person is able to recognize the nature
of his act and to distinguish between right and wrong. Secondly, it means
that the person was in a position to choose between committing the act
and not committing it and took the former path. According to this view,
individuals under temporary or permanent insanity, children under the
legal age (the definition of which varies from one legal system to another),
non-human beings and objects are not capable of having criminal intent,
since they are incapable of having a will of their own. Similarly, indi-
viduals who are capable of having a will but, because of certain circum-
stances their freedom of choice was impaired, cannot also have intentions.
Intention, then, in the modern legal conception is a psychological qual-
ity that connects the offender with the prohibited result or results. It
is this psychological connection that differentiates in modern legal sys-
tems between murder and manslaughter, between attempted murder and simple
assault, between first and second degree murder, and between justifiable

311 was a large area of grazing land which also belonged to the Bait
423
613 of Yadem. The area attracted a large number of tribesmen who
233 brought their herds for grazing. One of these was Kuraiem from
311 Awlad Kharouf tribal segment. He brought his wife and child and
619
613 a herd of more than two hundred sheep and goats. Although it is
not proper for one to cultivate the land belonging to another
tribal segment, yet, when it comes to grazing land, no such restriction is imposed. Only the permission of the aqila of that tribal segment is required, and even that is granted so automatically that many tribesmen do not bother to ask for such permission. Kuraiem took this permission for granted and pitched his
233 tent in the grazing land of Yadem and his Bait. Yadem, however,
311 was disturbed because he thought that Kuraiem grazed his flocks in
578 an area very close to his cultivated barley, so close that he feared
that the animals might eat the growing barley. When Yadem asked Kuraiem to move a little further and Kuraiem refused, they entered into an argument during which Yadem told him that if he did not move by the following day, he would break his neck. The following morning Yadem went with his brother to see if Kuraiem was still there. Both Yadem and his brother were armed with heavy sticks. As they reached Kuraiem's tent, they hit him with the sticks on
[682] the head. Kuraiem fell on the ground, and they kept hitting him
until he was dead.

682 In due course, Kuraiem's family claimed L.E. 400 bloodmoney
672 for the intentional killing of Kuraiem. Yadem and his family rejec-
[627] ted the claim and insisted that the killing was unintentional. The
Mi'ad was held, and the two Mardis selected by the two parties

613 the tent and fearing that he might have been a member of the
628 feuding Bait intending to harm him or members of his family,
Galil took his gun and went outside to see who was there. He called on the person to identify himself. When he got no answer, he warned him that unless he identify himself, he (Galil) would fire his gun in the air as a warning. After a short period of no
613 response, Galil fired his gun in the air. A moment later, Galil
628 heard a cry coming from the direction of a small hill at the side
682 of the tent. When Galil went there, he found Salem, a member of a neighboring camp, lying on the ground with a bullet wound in his stomach. He told Galil that his wife was sick and that he had come to borrow Galil's donkey to take her to the doctor in the nearby medical center. He had taken the short cut to Galil's tent when he was hit by the bullet which Galil had fired in the air. Galil took his wounded neighbor to the medical center, but Salem died before they reached it.

682 The Mi'ad was held, and Galil and his family had to pay L.E. 400
672 to the victim's kin group. The amount was that specified for in-
627
673 tentional killing, since the wound that caused the death was inflicted by a lethal weapon.

CASE #5: The Case of the Startled Shepherd

233 This case involves Idris, a poor member of the Sheresat tribal
[464] segment. He earned his living by working as a hired shepherd for
[619] 'Awwad from Bait Ibrahim in the area of Gharbaniat. During the dry
[312] season, each shepherd takes his flocks to the water wells near the coast and leaves them there for three or four hours to get their fill of drinking water. That afternoon, Idris, waiting for the

683
435

If the two lips are cut off:	L. 400
just the lower lip	L. 300
just the upper lip	L. 200
Visible piercing of the lips	L. 50
The tongue: if results in total loss of speech	L. 400
Partial loss of speech is measured in proportion to that total loss.	
All the teeth	L. 400
Each tooth'	L. 50
Testicles: if cut off	L. 400
The entire genitals	L. 800
The breasts:	
of a nubile woman	L. 200
of an old woman	L. 100

683 As in the case of homicide, the above scale of compensation works only as a basis for compromise rather than as a definite or exact fine. 683 To assess the amount of injury and therefore the category of compensation, 629 the victim and his group, as well as a representative of the offender, 463 have to take the injured person to the "nazzar" who examines him and defines the kind of injury sustained. The nazzar is usually a member of [619] one of the Murabiteen tribes who is known to possess a number of shari's books specifying the injuries and the amount of compensation required in each case. Before he assesses the wounds, both parties have to swear that [465] they will accept his judgment, and they pay him a token fee that varies according to the ability to pay and the position of the parties involved. 683 The amount of money estimated by the nazzar is not necessarily the final amount of money paid. For, as in the case of homicide, it is subject to deductions in honor of various members who attend the meeting in which

105 The judicial process among Awlad Ali of the Western Desert of
Egypt has been dealt with in the context of political organization of
105 the group. The main feature of the political organization of Awlad Ali
613 is the absence of centralized leadership. The only formally recognized
leadership is that of the aqila, the leader of the bait tribal segment.
105 The sources of the aqila's authority derive from a number of sources,
613 one of which is his judicial role. It is through him that disputes in-
627 volving members of his bait are solved. The process by which he per-
forms this crucial function is that of informal mediation in which both
the personal qualities of the aqila, as well as the weight of his tribal
[692] segment, play an important role. This is especially important in a so-
ciety with no court system or formal hearing and where durability of any
settlement depends on its being accepted by the parties involved.

105 The main aim of the judicial process is to affect reconciliation of
182 the parties and to restore a certain degree of social order and cohesion
627 that was disrupted by the dispute. The need to restore the social order
[619] and to maintain friendly relations between tribal members is a response
to certain aspects of the natural and social environment in which the
105 group finds itself. Natural resources in the area are very meager, and
182 subsistence activities require that the tribesmen constantly move with
619 233 their herds for pasture throughout an area already divided among the
various tribal segments. Since the place and nature of pasture differ
from one year to the next, the identity of the specific tribal unit which
would be sought for help varies correspondingly. This creates a general
feeling of dependency that characterizes the social relations in the area.

APPENDEX II


MEDITERRANEAN SEA
البحر الأبيض المتوسط
الاسكندرية
ALEXANDRIA
LIBYA
ليبيا
SENENAH
MAHDI
KATJA
GENEITSHAT
AWLAD KHAROUF
أولاد خروف
جميعات
GEMEIAT
AWLAD KHAROUF
سنافقة
SANAGKA
قطايفة
HATAIFA
جميعات
GEMEIAT
سمالوس
SAMALOUS
AGGARY
شهيبات
SHEAEIBAT
AGGAR
جوابيس
GWABIS
سريحات
SEREIHAT
A W L A D A L I
أولاد علي
القطارة
QATTARA
DEPRESSION
SIWA OASIS
قبائل البدو
وخريطة طرق الساحل الشمالي
BEDWIN TRIBES
&, ROAD MAP OF NORTH COAST
REFERENCE
علامات
102
131
619
491
361
133

KEY

102 1. al-'Arq
133 2. al-'Arqub
3. Asqafa
131 4. Aujila
361 5. al-'Azziyyat
6. Banghazi
● 619 7. Bishara
8. Dariyana
9. Darna
10. al-Fayidiya
11. al-Hamama
12. al-Haniya
13. al-Huwaiz
14. Jaghbub
15. Janzur
16. al-Jarfan
17. al-Jikharra
18. Khashm Rzaiq
19. al-Libba
20. al-Makhili
21. Mara
22. Marada
23. al-Marassas
24. Maraziq
25. al-Marj
26. Martuba
27. Mirad Mas'ud
28. Msus
29. al-Naufiliya
30. al-Nayyan
31. Qafanta
32. Qarabarbi
33. al-Qasrain
34. al-Qasur
35. al-Qatafiya
36. Shahhat
37. al-Tailimun
38. Talmaitha
39. Tart
40. Taukra
41. Umm Hafain
42. Umm al-Razam
43. Umm Rukba
44. Umm al-Shakhanab
45. al-Zawiya al-Baida


18°
20°
30°
29°
19°
20°
Banghazi
Barrına
Suluq
Al-Naufiliya
Ajdabiya
Marada
AL-QAIQ
AL-MAGHARBA
AL DOMAGH
WADI AL-FARIGH

THE CHI

[facing P. 34, A]

102
133
131
361
619


21°
22°
23°
24°
25°
31°
30°
29°
AL-DARSA
AL-HASA
AL-'ABID
AL-BARA'ASA
'AILAT FAYID
Al-Qubba
Al-Qaiqab
Khawalan
Marawa
Tokra
Abyar
A B A I D A T
'Akrama
Bir Hakaim
Al-Burdi Sulaiman
Al-Sallum
FAWAKHIR
WADI AL-MRA
Jaghbub
ZUWAIYA
AL-AWAJILA
Al-Jikharra
Aujila
Jalo
AL-MAJABRA
Contours in metres
Tribal boundaries
Towns
Place names
Zawiyas
Scale
0 10 20 50 80 110 kms.

EF TRIBES OF CYRENAICA (after De Agostini)

[facing P. 34, B]

Those of the *barqa* plain may never camp on the plateau but 221
they move freely between grazing grounds, permanent water 233
supplies, and ploughland.

Of the plateau tribes, the Darsa, the ʻArafa, most of the Hasa, 221
and a number of ʻAbaidat and ʻAwaqir sections remain there 233
throughout the year. The Bedouin met with wandering about 619 ●
in the southern grazing grounds after the rains are the ʻAbaidat Ghaith, ʻAwakla, and Shahin, some of the Hasa Shabarqa and Bakhayit, the whole of the small *ʻAilat* Fayid tribe, large numbers of Baraʻasa Husain, Tamiya, and Masaʻid, ʻAbid Mansur and Jabar, ʻAwaqir Sdaidi and Brahim, and numerous small client groups more or less affiliated to these tribal sections. The nomadic sections are generally richer than the others in sheep and camels, and are also more vigorous, independent, and warlike. Politically, they are the leading sections of the tribes to which they belong. The foremost Shaikhs of the ʻAbaidat, Hasa, Baraʻasa, ʻAbid, ʻAwaqir, and Magharba are all to be found during the rains farther away in the steppe than most of their fellow-tribesmen.

The move southwards starts in December after the barley 221
has been sown, or part of a group may take the animals south 233
while the rest finish the ploughing. Most of these semi-nomads [243]
return to the plateau in May, when water becomes scarce, but some, including some of the most powerful elements, remain to the south of it permanently. There are many advantages in this annual move to the south. Rain falls and the grasses spring up in advance of the plateau, and grazing is more abundant and of a better quality. On the other hand, the grasses of the plateau and its southern slopes are still green when the desert grasses, except in specially favoured depressions, are withered. By their annual oscillation the Bedouin thus give their animals the best grazing at all seasons of the year. Sheep mostly lamb round about November, which is the month in which new grasses spring up in the *barr*, so that the move southwards gives the sheep the richest grazing at a time when they need it most; and the warmer conditions prevailing
in the south suit the lambs. At the same time, the Bedouin in [262]
southern grazing grounds are compelled to live very largely on
milk food, and the combination of rich pastures with the dropping of their young by sheep, goats, and camels, enables them to live on the country to a great extent.

565 Arabian ways. In Egypt necessity has slowly subjugated the
167 exiles to the peasant yoke. They long resisted but, like the
Bedouin nomads coming from the Sinai Peninsula, had in the
end to submit or perish. The absence of a substantial peasantry
in Cyrenaica is one of the characteristics which most distinguish
it from the Arab societies of Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Egypt, and
565 the Maghrib. The peasant can be dominated. He is fixed to the
earth and can be made to surrender it and till it for others. The
Cyrenaican Bedouin is fixed to no place and cannot be forced to
sell his birthright by bad seasons or intimidation. This has
565 meant that there have not been in Cyrenaica any social enclaves
632 attached to the towns through which the towns and administrative
centres could lord it over the Bedouin. Outside the towns
*[648] all is Bedouin and the Turkish Administration, and afterwards
● [619] the Italian Administration, found that they could not get a
grip on the Bedouin of Cyrenaica as they could on the peasantry
of Tripolitania.

632 Nevertheless the towns and the Turkish, and later the Italian,
*648 Administration in them affected the tribal system by acting as
619 a pull on those tribal segments which lived nearest to them, so
that the tribes which lay between the towns and the steppe
were attracted towards one or other of these poles. The political
structure of Cyrenaica as a whole exercised in this way a significant
influence on the segmentary tribal system.

IV

619 The Bedouin who became followers of the Sanusiya Order
178 and whose country and way of life I have described are divided
into tribes and tribal sections owning different tracts of the
[793] country. This tribal system existed in Cyrenaica long before
the Grand Sanusi preached there and it continued to exist after
*[795] his grandson Sayyid Muhammad Idris had fled the country
and the Sanusiya Order had been abolished and its lodges
destroyed by the Italians. It is the fundamental structure of
Bedouin society which the Sulaimid tribes brought with them
from Arabia.

619 The Bedouin of Cyrenaica are Arabs. The Arabian tribes
101 who conquered the country and settled in it mixed with the
144 indigenous Berbers, as is evident in their physical features to-

day, but even ethnically the Bedouin are more Arabian than 619
the people of Egypt, the Sudan, and Tripolitania, while 101
culturally they are as completely Arab as any people in the [144]
world, proud Tamim and Quraish not excepted. In essentials
their language is that of the Hilalian invasion of the eleventh 197
century and no foreign language competes with it. The Berber-speakers [191]
are a handful in the distant oasis of Aujila, and even
there they are bilingual, and the insignificant fractions of Jews
and Cretans in the towns speak Arabic, the Cretans being
Muslims as well. The Italian immigrants left the country of 619
their own accord during the late war. Thus the obstacles to [167]
complete Arabization in the Maghrib (Tripolitania, Tunisia,
Algeria, and Morocco), a Berber culture, large Jewish colonies,
and European colonization are to-day all absent in Cyrenaica.
In all essential matters also the Bedouin of Cyrenaica
are like Bedouin tribesmen elsewhere in the Arab world: they [184]
have the same tented, pastoral, way of life, the same social
organization, the same laws and customs and manners, and the
same values.

The people of Cyrenaica are linked to the classical Arab 177
world of the east, to Egypt and the Jazirat al-'Arab (Arabia,
Palestine, Iraq, and Syria) rather than to the Maghrib; to the
sacred towns of Islam and to Umayyad Damascus, 'Abbasid
Baghdad, and Fatimid Cairo. More particularly they are linked
to Egypt, with which their country has had political ties from
the earliest times, and which is their natural market. The [133]
desert comes down to the sea at the Gulf of Sirte and separates
Cyrenaica from Tripolitania and these two countries have
always gone each its own way. Cyrenaica was linked to Graeco-Egypt,
Tripolitania to Phoenician Carthage. Cyrenaica went
with Byzantium, Tripolitania with Rome. Indeed, as Despois
says: 'The Greater Syrtis is without dispute one of the most
decided frontiers, natural and human, to be found anywhere in
the world.'[1]

During the last few decades this separation has been brought [195]
into relief again by the rise of the Sanusiya Order, for whereas
almost to a man the Cyrenaicans follow the Order politically,
the Tripolitanians, except for the Bedouin tribes, have shown a
lively animosity towards it. Moreover tribal ties between the 619

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[1] Op. cit., p. 45.

619 two countries are weak. On the other hand, Cyrenaican tribes and tribal sections, notably the Aulad 'Ali tribe, speaking the same dialect and with the same customs as their cousins still in Cyrenaica, stretch unbroken from al-Sallum to Alexandria, and are also numerous in the Bahaira province of Egypt and in the Fayum. The Cyrenaican Arabs form to-day numerically by far the most important Bedouin element in Egypt, and apart from those who have remained tented there, there are many who have settled on the land.

*175 619 In its general outline the history of the Arab conquest of Cyrenaica is well known. 'Amr ibn al-'As, during the Caliphate of 'Umar, conquered Syria and Egypt and in 643 overran Cyrenaica, then occupied by Berber tribes and under the nominal rule of Byzantium. He met with little resistance, and within seventy years the whole of North Africa, from Sinai to the Atlantic, was in Muslim hands. It seems, however, that the original conquerors only settled as garrisons in the coastal towns, and neither controlled the hinterland nor had any considerable ethnic influence on its Berber peoples. Bedouin settlement on a big scale and the complete Arabization of the indigenous Berber population took place from 1050 or 1051 in the famous Hilalian migration.

*175 167 619 The Bani Sulaim and the Bani Hilal came originally from Nadj. They are of Mudarid stock, the Bani Sulaim being the senior branch. They passed into Upper Egypt as a result of the check to the Carmathian movement in Arabia, in which they were involved, and settled there; but they were inclined to be troublesome in a country little suited to their traditional way of life, so during the reign of the Fatimid Caliph al-Mustansir, his Vizier encouraged them to reconquer Tripoli and Tunis from the Berbers, who had again asserted their independence. Arab historians have compared their migration to that of locusts or wolves. The Bani Hilal passed westwards into Tripolitania and Tunisia, where many Bedouin tribes claim descent from them to-day. The Bani Sulaim mostly settled in Cyrenaica. It must be added that the nobility and the historical exploits of their forbears are for the most part unknown to the Bedouin of Cyrenaica.

619 The present-day descendants of the Bani Sulaim are spread from Egypt to Tunisia. Those of Cyrenaica are divided into

two main branches, the Jibarna and the Harabi. The Jibarna 619 tribes are 'Awaqir, Magharba (some list the 'Araibat section of this tribe separately), 'Abid, and 'Arafa. The Harabi tribes are 'Abaidat, Hasa, *'Ailat* Fayid, Bara'asa, and Darsa. These tribes are shown on the diagram below, which presents them as tribes and not in the genealogical fiction of proper names. Strictly speaking, the Bara'asa should not appear on this chart since it is only one section of this tribe, the Aulad Hamad, who are true Harabi. However, it has become customary to class them as Harabi.



Attention is drawn to other names on this chart. The Aulad 619
'Ali, who have a fraternal relationship to the Harabi, about a 167
century and a half ago lived in eastern Cyrenaica, but were 131
compelled to migrate to Egypt by pressure from the Harabi, 175*
who received support from the Caramanli rulers of Tripoli. To-day they occupy the Mediterranean littoral from al-Sallum to Alexandria. Another branch of the Aqaqra, the Sharai', who migrated to Egypt, have become *fallahin* and are now found only as scattered families. When the Aulad 'Ali entered Egypt they found the Hanadi in possession of part of their present-day territory and drove them out of it. These Hanadi are now settled in the Sharqiya Province of Egypt. As will be noted from the chart, they belong to the Bani Sallam branch of the *Sa'adi* family of tribes. The Hanadi had previously dispossessed their brothers the Bani 'Una and this tribe is now completely absorbed in the *fallahin* population of Lower Egypt. A third fraternal branch of the Bani Sallam, the Bahaja, were also expelled from the Bahaira and are now settled in the Sharqiya and Gharbiya Provinces of Egypt. Of the Jibarna group, the Fawayid used to occupy the part of the plateau and plain now occupied by the Hasa, the Bara'asa, and the 'Abid. They were driven out of their country early in the nineteenth century, at the

619 same time as the Jawazi, by a combination of the 'Awaqir, the
167 Magharba, and the Bara'asa, assisted by the Caramanli rulers of
131 Tripoli, and are now settled in the provinces of Fayum, Bani Suef,
*175 Bahaira, and Minya in Egypt. The Jawazi used to live in the
country now occupied by the 'Awaqir, and they now mostly live
in Minya Province of Egypt and in the Fayum. Another struggle
*[648] which greatly altered the tribal distribution in Cyrenaica was
two wars, the last about 1832, of the Magharba and 'Awaqir,
aided by their Jibarna kinsmen the 'Abid and 'Arafa, against
the tribes which occupied the *barqa* and the remnants of which
now range the littoral of the western Sirtica. These tribes are
known as *al-'Arab al-Gharb*, the Western Arabs.

*175 So, in 1800 the Harabi and Jibarna tribes, which are now in
131 undisputed control of all Cyrenaica outside the towns, occupied
619 only part of the country, mostly the central, and the most
northerly reaches of the western, plateau. The Jibarna were
cut off from the southern steppe by the Fawayid and Jawazi,
the whole of the *barqa* was occupied by *al-'Arab al-Gharb*, and
the eastern part of the plateau by the Aulad 'Ali. The wars by
[726] which they drove out their rivals were long and savagely fought
and many incidents in them still form part of Bedouin tradition.

*175 As a result of these tribal wars the descendants of the Bani
Sulaim invaders of Cyrenaica and the Maghrib thus began to
131 return eastwards with a quota of Berber blood about the end of
167 the seventeenth century and pushed out the tribes they found
619 dwelling in the Western Desert of Egypt and pressed them into
the Delta, where they were absorbed by the *fallahin*. The first
intruders from the west were pushed to the Nile by stronger
tribes coming behind them and these by yet stronger. They
pushed one another like trucks on a siding. The Hanadi pushed
out the Bani 'Una and the Aulad 'Ali pushed out the Hanadi,
being themselves pushed on from behind by the 'Abaidat and
other Harabi tribes. Besides the migration of whole tribes from
Cyrenaica into Egypt there has taken place an exodus of many
tribal sections and fragments, owing to intertribal fighting, until
to-day there is not a Cyrenaican tribe, or even large section,
which has not some of its members in Egypt, often whole
619 lineages. The Bedouin of Cyrenaica know their kinsmen in
167 Egypt and sometimes when the price of sheep is low in the
602 Egyptian markets they leave their animals with them to sell on
439 their behalf when prices rise.

their behalf when prices rise. There are said to be 30,000 619
'Harabi' alone, excluding the Bara'asa, in Egypt, most of them 167
in the Fayum, while the Aulad 'Ali and their client aggregates 162
number nearly 40,000.[1]

V

The Arabs of Cyrenaica distinguish between those tribes which 619
are *Sa'adi* and those which are *Marabtin*. The *Sa'adi* tribes are
so called after Sa'ada of the Bani Sulaim, their ancestress. They
are those nine tribes who hold the country by right of conquest:
the 'Abaidat, the Hasa, the '*Ailat* Fayid, the Aulad Hamad
(Bara'asa), the Darsa, the 'Abid, the 'Arafa, the 'Awaqir, and
the Magharba. The *Marabtin* tribes use the earth and water by
grace of the *Sa'adi* tribes of whom they are to a greater or lesser
degree clients. Savarese says that their status in Turkish times
lay between that of clients of ancient Roman law and that of
serfs of the glebe in western Europe in the Middle Ages.[2] The
Sanusiya did much to lessen the difference in status between
free and client tribes in Cyrenaica and to-day the larger groups
of *Marabtin*, although they may in theory live on *Sa'adi* land,
do in fact live independently and pay no fees to the owners of
the land. Sometimes violent disputes, and even wars, have
broken out between free tribes and their clients, such as the
famous battles between the 'Awaqir and the Shahaibat. Moreover,
one has only to note that the predominance of the leading
sections of some free tribes is due to the support of powerful
client fractions to realize that, though the clients may be
considered not to have the full status of a noble Arab tribe, the
relationship between them and the owners of the country is often
one of mutual dependence. Thus the leading section of the [162]
powerful Bara'asa tribe is the '*Ailat* Hadduth which in De
Agostini's lists numbers 2,520 persons, of whom only 630 are
true Bara'asa, the remainder being clients; and the leading
section of the 'Awaqir, the '*Ailat* Suliman, counts 1,200 clients
out of a total of 1,940. Where the relationship is one of mutual
dependence the two tribes are expected to help each other in
the payment of blood-money.

The client tribes are of different categories to which corre-

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[1] G. W. Murray, *Sons of Ishmael*, 1935, pp. 277 and 296.

[2] Op. cit., p. 56.

619 spond different social statuses. Some are classed as *Marabtin*
bil baraka, 'client tribes with the blessing' or *Marabtin al-Fatha*,
619 'client tribes of the prayer', and they often claim to be Sharifs.
778 These 'sacred' tribes, such as the Aulad al-Shaikh and most of

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
TUNISIA
Tarabulis
Masallata
Misurata
Al-Rujban
Al-Haraba
Al-Qal'a
AL-AMAMRA
Bani Walid
AL-MASHASHIA
Mizda
AL-HARABA
AL-RUJBAN
URFALLA
Sinawin
Ghadamis
Darj
AULAD BUSAIF
Al-Tabaqa
AL-ZINTAN
Sirt
AL-QADHADHFA
Al-Naufiliya
AL-ZAWIYA
AL-MAGHARBA
SULIMAN
AL-MAQARHA
RIYAH
AL-JAMAAT
Saukna
Hun
Waddan
Zalla
AL-HARABA
AULAD SULIMAN
Al-Fuqha
Birqin
AL-HUTMAN
AL-HASAUNA
Sabha
Ghudwa
Tamassa
Umm Al-Aranab
Zuwila
Murzuq
Taghaghan
Dlaim
Wau Al-Kabir
Wau Al-Namus
Ghath
Al-Qatrun
AL-HARABA → Names of Tribes
Al-Haraba → Sanusiya Zawiyas
— · — · — Boundary Lines
Scale
0 50 100 150 200 400 kms.

The Chief Sanusi Bedouin Tribes of Tripolitania.

619 the Masamir and Farjan, live among the *Sa'adi* as equals in
778 virtue of the prestige they derive from their descent, or sup-
posed descent, from saints, though the free tribes do not regard
[173] them as quite like themselves. Their ancestors are almost
invariably believed to have come from the west, Morocco,
Algeria, Tunisia, or Tripolitania. This move of pious men to

the east began in the middle of the thirteenth century and has 619
lasted to the present day. It is intimately bound up with the 778
pilgrimage to the sacred towns of Islam. Round these pious [173]
men and round their tombs gathered for sanctuary the simple [788]
and oppressed, and from these and from the children of the
holy men have sprung the *Marabtin bil baraka* tribes. The other 619
client tribes have no sacred associations and are known as 651
Marabtin al-sadqan because they pay *sadaqa*, a fee, to a free tribe for protection and for the privilege of using the earth and water. Some small broken-up fragments of this category on the plateau, such as the 'Awwama, Alauna, Hasanna, and some of the Qat'an and Sa'it, even to-day have a very inferior social position and are forced to make payments to, and to perform
services for, the free tribes among whom they live. Other 619
tribes of this second category live, as already mentioned, on territory which is to all intents and purposes their own and have long since ceased to pay a fee. This is especially the case to the east, in 'Abaidat tribal territory, where such client tribes as the Minifa, Qat'an, Taraki, and Huta live with independent status. In the west also the Fawakhir and Zuwaya are too powerful and warlike to accept overlordship. Also, the more nomadic groups in Cyrenaica are mostly client tribes and, like all nomads, resent any control or authority. Whatever the free tribes may say about them, they regard themselves as independent.

The provenance of the *Sa'adi* tribes and of some of the 619
Marabtin tribes is shown together with the distribution of the 162
Sanusiya lodges on the map facing page 35, and the approximate numbers of these tribes, and of a few others not shown on the map, are listed below.

Sa'adi	
al-'Abaidat	30,450
al-'Awaqir	27,500
al-Bara'asa	21,000
al-Darsa	18,850
al-Magharba	13,000
al-'Arafa	9,300
al-'Abid	6,850
al-Hasa	6,500
'Ailat Fayid	100
Marabtin	
al-Qat'an	5,850
al-'Awwama	3,800
al-Zuwaya	3,700
al-Shwa'ir	3,400
al-Fawakhir	3,300
al-Sa'it	2,900
al-Majabra	2,500
al-Minifa	2,500
al-Masamir	2,400
al-Awajila	2,300
Aulad al-Shaikh	1,650
al-'Aqail	1,400
al-Shahaibat	1,350
al-Sarahna	1,250
al-Qabail	1,150
al-Huta	1,150

● 619 The figures for the free tribes include attached client groups,
162 for the principal of which estimates are also given separately.
[127] The figures are taken from Col. De Agostini's monograph. The
provenance of the chief Bedouin tribes of Tripolitania and of
the fringes of Fazzan who are Sanusi, or sympathetic to the
Sanusiya, is shown likewise in relation to the distribution of
Sanusiya lodges, on the map on page 52.

VI

619 Although there were in the past intertribal wars and feuds
[671] which have lasted into the present time, and in spite of the
[574] difference in status between free and client tribes, there were
laws of the tents which gave every Bedouin the freedom of the
whole country, and there was much coming and going between
the tribes and exchange of hospitality, especially in the grazing
grounds where sections with distinct territories on the plateau
shared common pasturage to the south of it, and where the
necessities of Bedouin life, watering at wells in transit, the crossing
of another tribe's territory on the way to markets, the
pursuit of straying camels, and the need to sow where rain fell,
imposed a recognition of individual rights without regard to
tribal affiliations or social status. Had it not been so, the Grand
[793] Sanusi could not have built on the tribal system his inclusive
organization, for there would have been no foundations in
*[795] culture, social structure, and sentiment, on which to build.

128 My inclinations as an anthropologist are to discuss at some
length the tribal and kinship systems and the life of the tents,
619 but I refrain from giving more than a bare outline of the tribal
system, and I neglect altogether kinship and the life of the tents,
because, however interesting detail about these matters might
be to the ethnologist, a knowledge of them is, I think, unnecessary
for an understanding of the development of the
Sanusiya Order in Cyrenaica. I discuss the structure of the
Cyrenaican tribe therefore only in so far as it is relevant to this
general theme.[1]

619 Use of the term 'tribe' in Cyrenaica, even if it be restricted
to the big free tribes, is always to some extent arbitrary for the
political structure is highly segmentary. Nevertheless, though

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[1] For a more general account see Savarese, op. cit., Pt. II, *passim*.

sections of a tribe may be opposed to one another they regard 619
themselves as an undivided group in opposition to neighbouring
tribes, and are so regarded by their neighbours. Thus a Qalbati
is only a Qalbati in Hasa country. In 'Abaidat or Bara'asa
country he is a Hasi. Likewise a Darsi or an 'Abidi in contrast
to members of other tribes regards the whole of the Darsa or the
'Abid as his people, his tribal brothers.

Each tribe in this commonly accepted sense has its *watan*, its 619
homeland, its soil, its arable, its pastures, and its wells; and 421
each has its camel-brand which is also carved on the tomb- [764]
stones of its dead. The tribal lands are vested in the tribe, which
has residual rights in them. They cannot, therefore, be alienated
to other tribes without the consent of the whole tribe. A tribe 619
is conceived of as a huge family descended from a common 614
ancestor, from whom the tribe generally takes its name. Hence
its segments can be figured either as a series of political sections
or as genealogical branches of a clan.

A tribe is divided into several, generally two or three, 619
primary divisions, or sub-tribes, which own well-defined portions 613
of the tribal territory, in most cases running in strips unbroken by intrusive elements. These primary divisions are of the same pattern as the tribe of which they form part. Each division has its *watan*, which its members own and defend collectively. They believe that they are descended from a common ancestor, who is generally a son of the ancestor of the tribe. Primary tribal divisions split into secondary divisions, and secondary divisions into tertiary divisions, and so on. Each of the smaller divisions is a replica of the larger ones and has the same preferential and exclusive rights in its lands, an encroachment on which by another division will lead to fighting. Each has within the tribal brand its special lineage markings. The members of each division also consider that they are descended from a common ancestor who, in his turn, is descended from the ancestor of the larger division of which they form a section. The further the sub-division the more the resultant groups take on the complexion of kinship aggregates, rather than of political aggregates.

These kinship aggregates or extended family groups are the
basic units of tribal life. They are called *biyut* (sing. *bait*). The [423]
tribe may be the residual owner of land and water but the
biyut are the owners in use. Their members live in the same

619 stretch of tribal territory, move during the rains to the same
613 grazing grounds, use the same wells during the dry season, and
cultivate adjacent strips of arable. The members of a *bait* have
a lively sense of solidarity, and this is most evident in fighting
and feuds. It is their common duty to avenge a slain kinsman
and they share the *diya*, indemnity, should they accept it in
[672] the place of a life. They are jointly responsible for a wrong any
one of them may commit. The smaller *biyut* are often identical
[621] with camps, usually from five to ten tents, in grazing grounds,
and several closely related *biyut* camp near together in the
vicinity of springs and wells in the summer, their combined
camps then amounting sometimes to over a hundred tents.

619 What has been said above about tribal structure applies only
to the free tribes and the larger client tribes living on their own
land. The client tribes which are split up and scattered throughout
Cyrenaica are not tribes in a political, but only in an ethnic,
619 sense. It will be found that in any of the main tribes stranger
614 groups, sometimes of client origin, have attached themselves
608 to the clan dominant in the tribal area and through some fiction,
myth, or fraud, have grafted their branch of descent on to the
genealogical tree of this clan. The Bedouin use the word *laf* to
describe this process and they say that kinship established in this
way may become as strong as kinship of blood.

619 The structure of a tribe is expressed in terms of the lineage
system of the clan dominant in its territory, the tribal segments
614 being associated with branches of descent from the ancestor of
613 this clan. The primary tribal sections are identified with lineages
descended from some of this ancestor's descendants in the male
line; the secondary tribal sections are identified with lineages
descended from more of his descendants farther down the line
of descent; and so on till the smallest territorial segments and
the smallest lineages are reached. Thus a lineage considered as
a branch of a clan consists of all those persons who trace their
descent through the male line to a common ancestor, but it can
also be, and in speech often is, conceived of politically as an
agnatic group of this kind together with stranger and *Marabtin*
accretions which occupy its territory and make common cause
with it in disputes with other tribes or segments of the same
tribe.

A simple example is given in illustration of tribal segmentation

and of the consistency between lineages of a clan and segments 619
of a tribe. In explanation of it a few words must first be said 614
about the terms *qabila*, *'aila*, and *bait*. *Qabila* is the word 613
generally used to denote a tribe or primary tribal division.


AL-DARSA
MASAMIR
MARABTIN
AL-SHABA
AL-QALABTA
Al-Mahamda
At Brahim
At al-Mzatal
AL-MUASA
Balrabat
Al-Slabbin
Al-Aqta
AL-BAKHAYIT
BARQA
AL-BARA'ASA
AL-'ABAIDAT
'AILAT FAYID
Tribal Boundaries
1st. Subdivision
2nd Subdivision
3rd. Subdivision
Al-Aqta' 4th Subdivision
Sanusiya Zawiya:–
Built
Not completed
Marabout Tomb
Scale
0 1 2 3 4 kms.

102
131
619
778
795*
613

The Divisions of the Hasa Tribe.

'Ailat are the lineages into which a clan is divided and hence 619
the sections of a tribe of various sizes in which these lineages are 614
found and after which they take their names. *Biyut* are small 613
lineages, or extended families, with a depth of five or six generations from the present day to their founders. It must be noted, however, that all these terms are relative and are used in a more or less comprehensive sense according to the context.

601
● 619
613


AL-HASA
Hawass
AL-QALABTA
Qalbat
Qassam
AL-MUASA
AL-MAHAMDA
AL-SHABARQA
AL-BAKHAYIT
Musa
Muhammad
Shibriq
Bakhit
'At BRAHIM
'At AL-MZATAL
'At AL-SHAUQI
Brahim
Mzatal
Ma'afi
'At AL-SLAILIKH
Zaidan
Mansur
'At BALRABA'I
'At AL-AQTA'
Bt Bu SHNAINIFA
Muhammad
Tahir
Bu Shnainifa
Sultan
Jibrin
Bt BU HAUDHANA
Sultan
Sa'ad
'Umar
Bt WA'AIRA
Balal
Wa'aira
Bt MUHAMMAD
Bt QASHAISH
Bt 'ALI
Muhammad
Qashaish
'Ali
Bu Halaiqa
Salih
Bt BU HALAIQA
Bt GHAIZAN
Bt BRAHIM
Bt MUSTAFA
Bt AL-HABAL
Bu Halaiqa
Ghaizan
Brahim
Mustafa
Husain
'Aqila
Mehemmed
Muhammad
Jibrin
Mustafa
'Abd al-Khaliq
Hamad
Mahmud
Sa'ad
'Abd al-'Azim
'Abd al-Salam
'Abd al-Razaq
'Abdalla
Salih
Mahmud
Mustafa
Ramadan

Names of tribal sections are printed in capital letters.
'At = 'Ailat.
Bt = Bait.

619
613 If reference be made to the accompanying map and genealogical chart it will be seen that the Hasa tribe is made up of three primary sections, the Qalabta, the Shabarqa, and the Bakhayit, distributed in strips running from north to south, which are very typical and give to each section equal condi-

tions of soil, water, and grazing. We trace the segmentation of 619
the Qalabta alone and see that it has two divisions, the Muasa 613
and the Mahamda. We follow the line of Muhammad alone and
note that it splits into three lineages, *'Ailat* Brahim, *'Ailat* al-
Mzatal, and *'Ailat* al-Shauqi (there is dispute, arising from
quarrels over land, about the legitimacy of this branch). From
Mzatal descend the three minor *'ailat*, al-Slailikh, al-Aqta', and
Balraba'i. Following only the first line we note that *'Ailat*
al-Shlailikh then divides into the various *biyut* shown on the
chart, al-Habal, Mustafa, Brahim, &c., the male membership of
only one of which, *bait* al-Habal, is presented in the genealogy.
Where the name of an *'aila* or *bait* is different from that of its
founder, it almost invariably means that the founder's nick-
name has been used, the Cyrenaican Bedouin having a partiality
for nicknames.

Each section of a tribe, from the smallest to the largest, has 619
its Shaikh or Shaikhs. The tribal system, typical of segmentary 554
structures everywhere, is a system of balanced opposition
between tribes and tribal sections from the largest to the
smallest divisions, and there cannot therefore be any single
authority in a tribe. Authority is distributed at every point of
the tribal structure and political leadership is limited to situa-
tions in which a tribe or a segment of it acts corporately. With
a tribe this only happens in war or in dealings with an outside
authority which for its own purposes recognizes the tribe as an
administrative unit. There cannot, obviously, be any absolute [643]
authority vested in a single Shaikh of a tribe when the funda-
mental principle of tribal structure is opposition between its [671]
segments, and in such segmentary systems there is no state and
no government as we understand these institutions; and
criminal law is absent and civil law exists only in a very rudi-
mentary form. Consequently the exact status of a Shaikh can 554
only be defined in terms of a complicated network of kinship
ties and structural relations. It is only necessary here to
emphasize that his social position is unformalized and that he
must in no sense be regarded as a ruler or administrator.
Bedouin respect their Shaikhs, but they do not regard them as
superiors. Rather their influence and wealth are considered as
capital to be drawn on for the benefit of whoever is in need of
them. So long as a Shaikhly family can keep their prestige,

554 derived from the strength of their section, their wealth, their
traditional place in Bedouin society, and the character of their
leading members, so long only are they regarded as Shaikhs of
whatever the grade may be.

554 In recording his impressions of the Aulad 'Ali tribe the
generous and unfortunate Pacho gives an excellent picture of
• 619 the Bedouin Shaikh's position in tribal society. He says that it
[642] is difficult to discover any government in their society, which
might be called aristocratic, though it is such in form rather
than in substance. The precarious authority of the Shaikhs
rests not on force but on the renown and esteem they enjoy in
554 the tribe. He adds that at the time of his visit it had become
619 customary, after Muhammad 'Ali Pasha had broken the
tribe, for the Shaikhs to get their titles confirmed by the
*648 Pasha of Egypt but that when they returned to their camps
with the robes of honour bestowed on them by the Pasha of
Egypt, these garments, far from adding to their prestige and
making them objects of regard, excited derision and aversion
unless the backing of the tribe had preceded the approval of
the Pasha.[1]

554 The Italian lawyer Savarese has also written an illuminating
description of the status of a Cyrenaican Bedouin Shaikh. Each
613 *bait* and each *'aila* has its Shaikh, chosen for his age and
wisdom or for his prowess, though the Shaikhship is generally
[556] hereditary in certain families. A Shaikh receives obedience and
respect from his dependants but ought to be rich because the
demands of hospitality are considerable. He takes a leading part
in the settlement of disputes and must have the tact necessary
to maintain the unity of the group in opposition to other groups
of the same order. He represents his group in relations with
these other groups and in the larger group of which it forms part.
In matters in which his group as a whole is concerned he takes
the advice of the Shaikhs of its divisions. He commands the
men of the group in war and he collects the tribute due from
554 the group to the Government. Nevertheless, a Bedouin Shaikh,
however large the group he represents, lives and dresses like his
fellow Bedouin, though, being rich, his tent may be larger than
most and he has more horses and they are more richly appointed.

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[1] J. R. Pacho, *Relation d'un Voyage dans la Marmarique, la Cyrénaïque et les Oasis d'Audjelah et de Maradèh*, 1827, p. 67.

[P.62]

CHAPTER III

THE SANUSIYA AND THE TRIBES

I

793 WHEN the Grand Sanusi came to preach in Cyrenaica he found 619 the kind of society I have outlined: a congeries of tribes without law or effective government, for the Turks had little control over the interior, but with like values and habits and a community of life which crossed tribal boundaries. The Bedouin to [181] whom he preached were simple people living the austere and monotonous life of the tents, with that savage character which has been so often portrayed, but also with those noble qualities which have seldom failed to evoke admiration from those who [177] have lived among them. They were profoundly ignorant about the outside world and also—which is what touched the heart of [797] the Grand Sanusi—about the faith of their fathers, and to this matter I must now return, since the Sanusiya was a missionary Order and can only be understood as such.

771 Though the Bedouin professed Islam before the Grand Sanusi influenced them by his teaching, they were almost totally [797] ignorant of its doctrinal content, rites, or ritual and moral duties, and it is safe to assume that they did not obey its precepts. It is safe to assume this because even to-day, after a century of Sanusiya instruction, the Bedouin perform their religious duties in a very perfunctory way, if at all, and when Muslim law is at variance with tribal custom they follow tribal custom. In saying that they are lax, I do not suggest that they [186] are not very sincere, Muslims. They are proud of being Muslims and consider themselves greatly superior to Christians, while they are contemptuous of Jews. Nevertheless, though they would not belittle, the Cyrenaican Bedouin feel no embarrassment at neglecting, the duties obligatory on every Muslim. The Confession of Faith is known to all and implicitly accepted by all. It imposes no irksome restrictions or tiresome duties. But they almost completely neglect—I speak of the more [782] nomadic sections whom I know best, but it is probably true of most Cyrenaican Bedouin—their daily prayers, a duty which is

771 men in North Africa whose families still retain much wealth and
792 influence. It was this Marabout status of the Grand Sanusi in
793 the eyes of the Bedouin which won him their respect: it was the
776 organization of the Sanusiya Order, an organization the earlier
778 Marabouts did not have, which enabled him to turn this respect
into a theocracy.

*175 There is more than one explanation of the origin of the word
792 '*Marabat*'. That generally accepted is that it derives from the
● 619 root RBT, to bind, and hence from '*ribat*', a fortified convent, inhabited by warrior-monks, found on the marches of Islam in
[192] its early days of expansion by arms. The word later became attached to the tribes which settled in Andalousia under the leadership of the Saharan tribe of the Sanhaja and was corrupted into the European 'Almoravides'. After the fall of the Sanhaja dynasty in the twelfth century part of the *Marabtin* tribes fell back into central and southern Morocco, whence many individuals moved eastwards. Some settled in Cyrenaica, generally on their return from the pilgrimage to Mecca, and their fanaticism, asceticism, ability to read and write, and thaumaturgic powers, impressed the simple Bedouin, who accepted them as holy men and magicians and used them to write charms, to perform religious rites, and to act as mediators in inter-
[613] tribal disputes. Sometimes, as we have seen, these men founded lineages which, dwelling under the shadow of their saintly forbears, became nuclei of social agglomerations which have developed in course of time into tribal groups, thus taking the shape of the tribal society in which they lived. The word
[192] '*Marabtin*' thus came to mean holy men (and their tombs) and then, in addition, tribes tracing their descent, or supposed descent, from these holy men and also, finally, in Cyrenaica, tribes who are clients of the great *Sa'adi* tribes which own the earth and water.

778 Some of the better known of the Cyrenaican saints, but by
776 no means all, have gleaming white cupolas, supported by four
792 walls, erected over their tombs, and inside the walls is a *tub*, a wooden box, over the grave, and this is covered with coloured cloth on which are inscribed passages from the Koran. Inside also are often a few pages from sacred books, occasionally a few small coins given by the local Bedouin, and any property, such as tents or ploughs, the Bedouin have wished to deposit in a

safe place when on seasonal moves. Often a shrine, sometimes 778
the shrine of a very famous saint, is no more than a wall of 776
stones, with perhaps a stick, with pieces of cloth tied to it, 792
erected over the grave, and this is the usual form in the steppe
grazing-grounds. There are generally cemeteries around the [764]
tombs.

All these shrines are visited by the Bedouin from time to time,
when they are passing by or when they have some request to
make of the holy man. Many of them are cult centres, an annual [796]
ceremony, one of the chief events of the Bedouin year, being [619]
held at them; and when they are near the border between tribes,
or between tribal sections, this is an occasion for intertribal, or
intersectional, gatherings. There is no saint whose tomb is much [789]
visited by the Bedouin who has not performed miracles, some [755]
of them very remarkable miracles, and there is probably none
who has not at some time or other cured the sick or given an heir.

The tombs of these holy men, Sidi this, Sidi that, and Sidi
the other, are found in profusion over the whole of inhabited
Cyrenaica. The historically best known are those of Sidi Rafa‘,
one of the Companions of the Prophet, near al-Zawiya al-Baida
on the plateau, of Sidi ‘Abdalla, one of the Prophet's standard-bearers,
in the oasis of Aujila, and of the founder of the Sanusiya
Order, Sidi Muhammad bin ‘Ali al-Sanusi, at Jaghbub oasis.
The shrines belong to the tribes and tribal sections in whose [619]
earth the Marabouts are buried and the Marabouts are looked [423]
upon as tribal and sub-tribal patrons. Like the Sanusiya Order,
they have become part of tribal life.

I have earlier reproduced Col. De Agostini's map of the Hasa 778
tribe to serve as an example of the territorial distribution of 619
lineages. The same map serves to illustrate the distribution of 792
shrines in a tribal territory. It can be seen from this map, which 776
shows only the best-known Marabout tombs, that all the different
sections of the tribe have their shrines, and I would draw
attention to an interesting feature of the distribution which I
have also noted in other tribal areas: how often these sacred
spots are near a tribal boundary, or near the boundary between
one tribal section and another. This may not be pure chance,
for the Marabouts in their lifetimes were regarded as standing
outside the tribal system, to which indeed, being foreigners from
the west, they did not belong, and their chief political role was

778 to act as mediators between tribes and between one tribal
● 619 section and another. Even to-day their tombs are regarded as
792 neutral points, as it were, and are often the place chosen for a
776 meeting between the Shaikhs of one tribe, or tribal section, and
those of an adjacent tribe, or section, when some matter has to
be settled between them. It has sometimes happened also that
when two tribes have disputed the ownership of territory, they
have settled the dispute by allotting it to a Marabout, which
means to his descendants, so that one then finds a *Marabtin*
strip between two *Sa'adi* tribes or tribal sections. One of the
best examples of this is the strip of country owned by the Aulad
al-Shaikh tribe between the 'Awaqir and the 'Abid and 'Arafa
tribal domains. In the same way tribes made gifts of disputed
wells to dead saints. Where a *Marabtin* tribe has grown out of a
Marabout family they will be found living in the area around
their tombs. Thus the Aulad al-Shaikh territory spreads out
from Sidi Mahiyus, part of the Masamir live near Sidi Nuh, the
Mshaitat live around Sidi al-Mshaiti, and the Qat'an live near
Sidi Hashim and Sidi Suliman al-Tair.

792 So, long centuries before the Grand Sanusi began his mission
776 in Cyrenaica, the Bedouin were used to the sight of an *'alim*, a
212 learned man—for anyone who can read and write is a learned
554 man to the Bedouin—coming from the west to heal their
children and beasts, break droughts, write talismans, and teach
them the beliefs and law of Islam. Such a man was also a
muhakkam, one who arbitrated in their disputes and said the
fatiha at their settlements and undertakings to make them binding.
He could arbitrate among them because he was not of
them. He was not like them a tented son of the steppe, though
his descendants may have learned to live as such, but a *Marabat*,
a man who follows religion and not the rains. The Bedouin of
Cyrenaica owe much to these holy men, for, ignorant and
superstitious though they may have been, they taught the
tribesmen to respect learning and religion and kept those twin
lights burning, even if dimly, through centuries. The Bedouin
do not forget them, or to say a prayer for them, when they pass
their tombs; and they have given the freedom of their earth
[182] and water to their descendants. Without these forerunners the
Grand Sanusi could not have planted his Order in the country.
* [795] It is planted in their bones.

Marabouts of the kind I have described were still coming to 792
Cyrenaica from the west up to the time when the Grand Sanusi 793
began his preaching in the country. Two of them whom he 795*
found there already living among the Bedouin, the one on the
western and the other on the eastern part of the plateau, teaching
them and settling their disputes, became his followers: Sidi
Ahmad bin 'Abdalla al-Sakkuri, a late arrival from the west
whose descendants became Shaikhs of the zawiya of al-Marj,
and Sidi al-Martadi Farkash, of an old *Marabtin* family of
Cyrenaica, whose descendants became Shaikhs of the lodges at
Umm al-Razam, Bishara, and Martuba. But the great majority
of the Grand Sanusi's helpers were men who had come with him
from the west, chiefly from Algeria. Other *Ikhwan* families, [613]
mostly of the Khattabi lineage, of which the Sanusi family are
a branch, came later, also from Algeria, in the time of Sayyid
al-Mahdi. To the Bedouin they were all Marabouts and when
they had in their lifetimes a reputation for piety or learning [778]
their tombs in the Sanusiya lodges in which they resided became
places of cult like those of their forerunners all over Cyrenaica.
But unlike the earlier Marabouts these Sanusiya Brothers were
not only holy men. They were also members of a fraternity, of
an organization. The Sanusiya Order was thus not only heir 795*
to the accumulated capital of the Marabouts, but was able to 182
exploit it as a corporation. It incorporated a number of isolated
cults into a single wider cult, fractionized, it is true, by tribal
particularisms, but, all the same, brought under a common
organization. Each lodge of the Order was a cult centre, but it
was something more: it was part of a general cult directed
through the lodges towards the Head of the Order. The tribes 619 ●
of Cyrenaica became through the Order linked from above in a 182
common, if loose, organization under a single, sacred, Head. 795*
This was possible only because a tribal system already existed
uniting the different tribes, in spite of their feuds and enmities, 793
into a society which, though lacking political unity, rested on
common sentiments, a common way of life, and a common
lineage structure.

What gave stability to this new relationship between the [648]*
Bedouin tribes and the Sanusiya Order, turning the sacred Head
into a secular leader and the religious organization into a
government, and changed a loose federation of tribes into a

619

182 nation, was common hostility to outside interference, an ingre-
*795 dient supplied in measured quantities by the Turks and copiously
793 by the Italians.

*[648]

III

The rudiments of Islam which the Grand Sanusi found in
Cyrenaica made his teachings acceptable, delivered as they were
without embellishments, to the Bedouin of the country, and
the Marabout tradition which he also found there made him
[578] personally acceptable to them. His chief difficulty must have
been the rivalries between tribe and tribe and between tribal
section and tribal section down to the smallest sections. This
[361] difficulty was overcome by transferring the centre of the Order
to desert oases, where it could not become identified with any
particular tribe, and by distributing its lodges impartially
throughout the tribal territories.

*795 Of the forty-five zawiyas belonging to the tribes of Cyrenaica
793 proper (including al-Naufiliya and excluding the Kufra lodges)
*175 probably twenty-one were founded before 1860 or during the
lifetime of the Grand Sanusi, twenty-two during the lifetime of
Sayyid al-Mahdi, and two when Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif was
Head of the Order.

*795 A high proportion of the lodges of the Order in the time of the
361 Grand Sanusi were along the line of oases on the 29th parallel,
[175] for to the lodges of the Cyrenaican oases on that line must be
added those in the oases of the Sirtica, Zalla, Saukna, Hun, and
Waddan, all founded round about 1855, and probably that in
al-Fuqha also. Lodges were early planted in the oases partly on
account of their importance as caravanserai and trading centres,
partly because the oases-folk were more tractable than the
Bedouin, and partly because the stability of these centres gave
greater opportunity for corporate religious life. The Sanusiya
certainly made a deeper religious impression on the peoples of
the oases than on the Bedouin.

*795 It will have been noticed also how few of the Sanusiya lodges
632 were founded in the towns of North Africa. There are no lodges
361 in the towns of Egypt and though the Order counts many
[175] followers in the towns of Cyrenaica and is politically dominant
in them it has only one zawiya in each, Banghazi, Darna, and
al-Marj; and that at Banghazi, the capital of the country, was

only founded about 1870. The Sanusiya lodge in Tripoli town 795*
was not built till 1882. It must, however, be remembered that in 361
Turkish times Banghazi and Darna were little more than villages 632
and al-Marj only a military post and that, as already explained, [175]*
their inhabitants were foreigners, either Jews or immigrants
from Tripolitanian towns who were generally affiliated already to
other Orders. Moreover, the Turkish administration functioned 795*
from these centres, and that alone would have prevented the 361
Grand Sanusi from making them the headquarters of his 632
mission. There could not be two governments in one large 648*
village, especially as the Grand Sanusi disapproved of the
Turks and they were suspicious of him. Also the presence of the
Turkish Government in the towns ensured order and some, even
if very small, opportunities for education and religious instruction and services, and Sayyid Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi had
settled in Cyrenaica with the express purpose of reviving the
faith and raising the culture of the totally illiterate and almost
heathen Bedouin, whose contact with the towns was negligible.
The social functions carried out by the Sanusiya lodges in 795*
Cyrenaica were more consistent with settlement among wild
tribesmen than among peaceful citizens. Propaganda of the
faith, educational work, cultivation of gardens, settlement of
disputes, provision of shelter, hospitality, and security to
travellers, and of refuge for the pursued, the weak, and the
oppressed are all functions especially appropriate to tribal and
barbarous conditions of life

The Order was based on the tribes and not on the towns. The 795*
lodges were founded by tribes or tribal sections and the tribes 619 ●
or their sections regarded them as tribal institutions. Al-Qasur
zawiya was not just a lodge of the Order in 'Abid tribal territory. It was the 'Abid zawiya; just as al-Marj was the 'Arafa
zawiya, Shahhat the Hasa zawiya, and so on. The tribal system
and the Sanusiya organization interpenetrated. The Sanusiya
gave to the tribes a national symbol and the tribes participated
in it through their lodges. It was the combination of a common [182]
organization with representation that allowed for tribal allegiances and rivalries which provided the Order with sure
foundations.

So much was the Sanusiya organization based on the tribal system that the distribution of the lodges may be said to

*795 have reflected tribal segmentation, mirroring lines of cleavage
619 between tribes and between tribal sections. The Sanusiya organization was fractionized along these fissures. The distribution of lodges among the 8 *Sa'adi* tribes was Hasa, 1; 'Ailat Fayid, 1; Bara'asa, 1 (a second lodge, al-Nayyan, was little more than a grain store attached to al-Zawiya al-Baida); 'Abid, 1; 'Arafa, 1; Magharba, 2; 'Awaqir, 6; Darsa, 9; and 'Abaidat, 14. There were 17 lodges among the Aulad 'Ali tribe in Egypt and for the Aulad Suliman with their attached tribes in the Sirtica only one, Sirt, if we exclude the lodges in the Sirtican oases. This uneven distribution may be related in part to the location of trade routes, harbours, springs, concentration of summer wells, and so forth, but it was undoubtedly due chiefly to variations in tribal cohesion. The more cohesive tribes had a single lodge, or, in the case of the Magharba, 2 lodges. The very cantonized Darsa tribe, whose lack of solidarity was largely due to their very broken country and the oecological self-sufficiency of their sections, each of which was more or less stable in its own territory, had no less than 9 lodges. The ethnically heterogeneous, widely dispersed, and structurally confused 'Awaqir tribe had 6 lodges, and the 'Abaidat tribe, which showed even less unity of sentiment and action, had 9 lodges. The most broken up tribe of all, the tribe in which the sections were most intermixed, and the tribe which displayed the minimum of political cohesion, was the Aulad 'Ali of Egypt, which had 17 lodges.

[578] Among the Hasa, who possessed only the Shahhat lodge, in the territory of the Shabarqa section, though on the edge of the territory of the Qalabta section, rivalry between these two sections led to the foundation of a lodge at Marsa Susa, where the Order still claims the endowments, but a sense of tribal unity in the end prevailed and the project was abandoned. Likewise in the leading Tamia section of the Bara'asa tribe the rivalry between its two principal sub-sections, the Hadduth, in whose territory was the al-Baida lodge, and the Jilghaf, led to the Jilghaf marking out with a low wall the site of a new zawiya in the *silk* al-Hamama in the southern steppe country; but, here again, the lodge was never built. The location of al-Qatafiya and al-Naufiliya corresponded to a traditional jealousy between the Shamakh and the Ra'idat sections of the Magharba

tribe. 795* In the oasis of Jalu, where there was not the same tribal solidarity as in the neighbouring oases of Aujila and al-Jikharra, 619 the two lodges were almost next door to each other. This was because the oasis was split into two opposed villages, each occupying about half of it with a strip of waste ground in between. A similar lack of unity in the Egyptian oasis of Siwa accounts for the building of several Sanusiya lodges there.

IV

Starting from the foundation of al-Zawiya al-Baida in 1843 [175]* the Order spread itself throughout Cyrenaica until it embraced in its network of lodges the entire tribal system of the country. It seeded itself, as it were, in the crevasses between tribes and between tribal sections, and its points of growth were thus also the points of convergence in tribal and lineage structure.

A tribal zawiya seems generally to have been founded in the 795* following manner. 793 A tribe or tribal section saw with envy that a neighbouring tribe or section had a zawiya. 619 They sent a deputation to the Head of the Order and asked him for a Shaikh to teach their children, cater for their religious needs, settle their disputes, and so forth. The Head of the Order granted them their request and sent them a Shaikh chosen from among the learned and pious men who surrounded him at Jaghbub. The Shaikh probably took with him one or two companions, *Ikhwan*, Brothers of the Order, to help him start the new lodge which the tribesmen built in the most favoured spot in their territory. Simple structures though these zawiyas were, they took many years to complete, being added to when further accommodation was required, in the leisurely Arab way. [172] Most of them were built on Graeco-Roman foundations so that the tribesmen who constructed them found stone ready to hand.

Through the kindness of Shaikh Muhammad al-Tayyib al-Ashhab 175* I have seen the letter sent in 1855 by al-Sayyid Muhammad 795* Ibn 'Ali al-Sanusi al-Khattabi al-Hasani al-Idrisi to his 793 virtuous sons, some of the Shaikhs of the Sdaidi section of the 'Awaqir tribe, about the building of the zawiya of Msus. He says that he is sending to them Brothers to construct the buildings and that he has instructed them to build an annex which he can use as a resthouse when he visits the zawiya, though this

*795 find hereditary transmission of Shaikhship of lodges most
793 accentuated, such as the Bara'asa-Tamia section (al-Zawiya
613 al-Baida), the 'Awaqir-Sdaidi section (Msus zawiya), and the
428 'Abaidat-Ghaith section (Tart zawiya). In the same way the
[792] earlier Marabouts became, as has been noted, founders of
lineages which were on the pattern of the branches of the
Bedouin clans among whom they lived, and attached to them.

*795 Also it must be remembered that the lodges were tribal
778 institutions built by the local Bedouin so that they might
778 participate in the *baraka* of Sayyid Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi.
793 They participated in it through the Shaikhs of their
619 zawiyas who received their *baraka* direct from the hands of the
182 Grand Sanusi himself, or from the hands of son Sayyid al-Mahdi,
and passed it on to their sons. This *baraka* belonged to
the tribe, or tribal section, which built a lodge just as the
shaukha, the secular Shaikhship of the tribe, or tribal section,
belonged to it and had to be kept in it. In both the continuity
of family succession had to be maintained, unless there were
good reasons for acting otherwise. Thus each tribal section
emphasized its autonomy in its hereditary line of religious
Shaikhs, through whom the *baraka* of the founder of the Order
was transmitted to them, whilst proclaiming its membership of
a tribal federation with common allegiance to the Head of the
Order.

*795 As I have pointed out when speaking of the sacred *Marabtin*
793 tribes of Cyrenaica, it was customary for the descendants of a
778 Marabout to reside near his tomb. I have further mentioned
[776] that the Shaikh of a Sanusiya lodge, who is also called a *Marabat*
by the Bedouin, might, if he had during life a reputation for
piety, rather easily gained in Islam, be venerated as a saint
when he was dead and his tomb become a shrine. This is
another reason why Shaikhly families have tended to become
hereditary directors of lodges.

*795 Just as almost all the Marabouts of Cyrenaica were foreigners
793 from the west, so were almost all the Shaikhs of the Sanusiya
554 lodges. The Dardafi and Isma'ili families came from Tripolitania,
[167] the Ghumari family from Morocco, the 'Ammur, Bu
Jibali, and Khattab families came from Algeria, and so on. As
a class they enjoyed, and still enjoy, a reputation for sanctity
among the Bedouin on account of their knowledge of the Koran

*175 them a reprimand on the double count of decrease in revenue
*648 and lack of security. It was essential, therefore, to get the
651 Bedouin to pay their taxes without making too much trouble
about doing so. To this end the Turkish administrative organization
*175 was largely directed. In 1879 the *Vilayet* of Banghazi was,
in matters of civil administration, finally separated from that of
*648 Tripoli and in 1888 became an autonomous *sanjaq* directly
631 dependent on Istanbul. It was governed by a *mutasarrif*
nominated by, and directly responsible to, the Central Government.
On him depended all the officials of the Administration,
though the chief among them were appointed by the Imperial
Government. The senior officials were usually Turks. The
*175 country was divided for administrative purposes into a number
*648 of districts, each under a *qaimaqam*, except that of Banghazi,
634 which came directly under the Governor himself; and all except
the Aujila-Jalu and Kufra districts were further divided into
*175 sub-districts under mudirs. These districts and sub-districts
followed tribal divisions and subdivisions as any administration
*648 in Cyrenaica must do, since the tribes and their sections
634 are the fundamental social departments of the country. Hence
619 sections of a nomadic tribe might be residing at any time in a
sub-district different to that to which they were administratively
attached, and even in a different district.

In his direction of the affairs of the administration, finances,
*175 and police, the Governor was assisted by an administrative
*648 council composed of the chief accountant, the secretary, the
631 qadi, the mufti, and four elected members from the local population.
Each *qaimaqam*, nominated by the Imperial Government,
had an administrative council similarly composed. The mudirs,
nominated by the Imperial Government on the proposal of the
Governor, had no council established by statute but co-opted
tribal Shaikhs when they wanted their advice or co-operation.
In the towns there was a representative, called *mukhtar*,
elected by the property-owning citizens for each ward, and at
Banghazi and Darna there were urban councils of a simple
kind.

*175 It was the mudir in charge of a sub-district who had direct
dealings with the Bedouin tribes and the lodges of the Sanusiya
*648 Order. In 1911, just before the Italian invasion, there were six
634 districts including Kufra, which came nominally under the

Turkish administration in 1910, and the Banghazi district, 175*
which came directly under the Governor of Cyrenaica for 648*
administration. Attached to each district were the sub-districts 634
shown in the list below,[1] in which the tribes attached to each
sub-district are also given. The Bara'asa came under Banghazi,
although they lived well to the east, for political reasons, the
tribe being exceptionally rebellious.[2]

175* 648* 634 619 ●

Districts	*Sub-districts*	*Tribes*
Banghazi (directly dependent on the Governor)	Suluq Qaminis Barsis Sidi Khalifa	'Awaqir
	Slanta	Bara'asa
al-Marj	al-Marj	'Arafa and 'Abid
	al-Haniya	Darsa
Darna	al-Sallum Tubruq al-Banba al-Qubba	'Abaidat
	Shahhat	Hasa
Ajadabiya	Marsa Braiqa	Magharba
Aujila and Jalu	—	Awajila and Majabra
Kufra	—	—

The administration was very slapdash by European standards. 175*
Indeed, Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman says darkly: 'There is at 648*
Banghazi no organization, political, administrative, or financial. 631
I say no more about this matter: it will be understood why.'[3]
This was, of course, an exaggeration, for however simple the
administration may have been, and perhaps for that reason, it
worked—with a good deal of grumbling it is true, but without
undue conflict. Revenue was collected and would have exceeded 175*
the cost of the very cheap administration of the country if the 648*
proceeds of some taxes had not been sent to Istanbul. Much of 651
this revenue came from import and export duties, but the bulk 634
of it was derived from taxes on herds and a tenth of the harvest
in kind, the collection of which was in the hands of the mudirs.
It was the task of these mudirs, who were generally literate

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[1] *Notizie relative al Sangiacato della Cirenaica e alle Mudirie dipendenti dal Mutassarifato di Bengasi* (Ufficio Politico Militare), 1913.

[2] Fabrizio Serra, *Italia e Senussia*, 1933, p. 17; idem in *La Cirenaica*, 1922–3, p. 182.

[3] Op. cit., pp. 59–60.

*175 *648 Arabs, to assess and collect taxes, to maintain security, and to
651 control the few police allotted to them. In this task they
634 expected co-operation from the local Shaikhs of the tribal
[619] sections and the Shaikhs of the Sanusiya lodges.

• [793] It is remarkable that the Bedouin paid any taxes at all, for
the mudirs had not sufficient force at their command, nor had
the Governor at Banghazi, to compel the Bedouin to pay if they
were determined not to do so. The mudir of Slanta had only 50
[701] to 60 soldiers in his sub-district and the Bara'asa whom he
[625] administered could have annihilated this force with ease, as
could the 'Awaqir the 50 soldiers and the handful of police
*175 stationed at Suluq. That taxes were collected at all, and all the
more that they were collected without constant disturbance, is
*648 to be accounted for partly by the recognition by the Shaikhs of
651 the tribal sections, with whom the mudirs were careful to keep
634 on good personal terms, that there was a moral obligation to
619 pay them; but there were also sanctions if they were not paid.
If the Shaikh of a tribal section did not collect the taxes due
from that section, he was held responsible and action could be
taken against him personally. The mudir, accompanied by a
small armed force, went a round of the tribal sections attached
to his sub-district each year, generally in springtime, and sent
out other tax-collecting parties in other directions. Sometimes
special tax commissions appointed by the Governor also toured
the country. A favourite device was for such parties to quarter
themselves in the camp of a recalcitrant Shaikh and to reside
there as his guests, for the soldiers and police carried few provisions,
till the tax was paid. The Shaikhs, on the other hand,
were made partners in the undertaking by, besides investment
with an official robe and status, receiving a percentage of the
taxes collected, the mudir himself also taking a percentage.
Moreover, each Shaikh whose section paid the tax was determined
that the other sections should not escape paying as well. A
Shaikh was able to divide up the assessment on his section
among the minor Shaikhs, and the minor Shaikhs among yet
smaller ones. It was in the interest of each Shaikh to see that
the smaller ones did not escape their share and leave him with
the responsibility for a deficit. Responsibility was in this way
*175 passed down the tribal structure. On the whole the system
*648 worked well and the Turkish officials and the Bedouin did not
651

get on badly together. Each understood the other. Also there 175*
was much elasticity in the taxes which appealed to the Bedouin, 648*
who prefer to pay a heavy tax one year and lightly or not at all 651
another year, rather than to pay a regular and inevitable tax.
The assessments were seldom revised and often had little relation
to the capacity of a tribal section to pay. The result was
that taxes were always in arrears and in some years, or for
some sections, remitted altogether. Those sections nearest the
Turkish posts paid the more easily because they were the more
vulnerable. Some of the more nomadic Bedouin escaped payment
altogether, or at any rate for years at a stretch. It is, I
think, safe to assume that the taxes actually collected over a
number of years were light. Otherwise the Bedouin would not
have paid them.

Perhaps the chief reason why taxes were collected without 175*
constant rebellion was the support given to the administration 648*
in this matter by the Sanusiya. The Turks held the coastal 651
towns and a few inland posts outside which their direct control 795*
of the country was restricted to those Bedouin who lived a
fairly stable life in the immediate vicinity of these centres. The
rest of the country was left to the Sanusiya and its own devices,
though, as we have seen, the Turks sent occasional patrols into
the interior. Sporadically, without much enthusiasm or perseverance, 175*
the Administration at one time tried to extend its 648*
effective control into the hinterland by nominating to official
posts, and giving arms and money to, selected tribal chiefs, such 651
as the Shaikhly families of Hadduth, Lataiwish, and Saif al-Nasir. 795*
Bu Bakr bin Hadduth of the Bara'asa was made 793
qaimaqam of al-Qaiqab, where he had a castle; 'Ali Lataiwish 619 ●
of the Magharba was made *qaimaqam* of Sirt, where he, also, 634
had a castle; and the fierce old warrior chieftain of the Aulad
Suliman, Saif al-Nasir, was made mudir of Bu Njaim. This
procedure resulted in brigandage rather than in good administration
and was in the main discarded. Instead the mudirs worked
directly through the Shaikhs of the tribal sections and, especially
when dealing with intertribal and intersectional affairs, through
the Shaikhs of the Sanusiya zawiyas. Some of the older notables
of Banghazi have told me that the Pasha, as the Governor was
often called, would never have succeeded in collecting taxes
among the Bedouin had it not been for the co-operation of the

*175 *648 651 *795 793 [619] [634] Heads of the Sanusiya lodges, who often accompanied the mudirs and tax commissions to the Shaikhs of the tribal sections attached to their lodges. It was to the common interest of the Turkish Administration and of the Sanusiya that there should be order, security, justice, and trade in the country, and they co-operated to maintain them.

The Turkish officials did their utmost to remain on good terms with the Sanusiya Shaikhs and to this end, and doubtless also because they found no difficulty in accepting, as educated men, its exalted teachings, some of them affiliated themselves to the Order. Membership of it gave them prestige in the eyes of the Bedouin as great, if not greater, than their official status gave them. Likewise the more prosperous merchants who had dealings with the Bedouin tribes or sent caravans to the Sahara and [556] Sudan found it advisable to be received into the Order. It is for this reason that in all the towns of Libya we find a small body of the richer and more cultured citizens ascribed to the Order, while the common people belong to other or no Orders.[1]

*175 *648 651 *795 But though the administration of Cyrenaica might be called at this period a Turco-Sanusi condominium there was an undercurrent of jealousy on both sides which occasionally gave rise to open conflict. A sure occasion was any effort on the part of the Administration to tax the Sanusiya estates. Although these had been exempted from taxation by the Sultan's firman, the local administration made rare and unsuccessful efforts to exact taxation on them. When in 1908 they tried to tax the crops of the Sanusiya holdings a tribal meeting, attended by 150 Shaikhs headed by 'Umar bu Rqaia of the Darsa tribe, met at the zawiya of al-Haniya and decided not to pay any more tribute to the Turkish Government till it revoked the tax. The Government then dropped the matter, though the trouble continued till 1910. Earlier, the Governor Ahmad Pasha Zuhadi (1904–5), acting on instructions from Istanbul, had tried to impose a tax on the crops of tribesmen and zawiyas alike. The Bedouin round al-Marj had thereupon attacked a Turkish detachment charged with collecting the tax and sent them back to Banghazi stripped of everything they possessed. The outcome was that the Governor was relieved of his office.

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[1] Capt. Emilio Canevari, *Zauie ed Ichuan Senussiti della Tripolitania*, 1917, *passim*.

The Sanusiya thus used the Turks to buttress its position in 175*
its dealings with the tribes, and combined with the tribes to 648*
resist any encroachments on its prerogatives by the Turkish 795*
Government. It was in the interests of both Administration 619
and Order that the tribes should not get out of hand, and it was in the interests of tribes and Order that the Administration should not become too powerful. The Sanusiya acquired from its central position between the other two parties a pre-eminence in the interior which led to the tribal system becoming already in Turkish times a proto-state with an embryonic government of its own. The tribes first began to see themselves as a nation through the Sanusiya's relations with the Turkish Administration. They were all 'Sanusi' *vis-à-vis* the Administration.

Ultimately it was the tribes who called the tune to both the Turkish Government and the Sanusiya Order. It would have taken a well-equipped army to have subdued them had they made a united revolt, and the Governor had only a meagre force at his disposal and could have had little hope of receiving much assistance from Istanbul. The Order had only moral weapons and though the tribal Shaikhs received its instructions with respect and every sign of acquiescence they did not necessarily act on them. Both Administration and Order were therefore compelled to compromise in their dealings with the tribes, who were, as Bedouin always are, at heart opposed to any interference and restriction. A typical situation of the latter days of Turkish rule was that described to me by the Banghazi notable 'Umar al-Kakhiya, at one time a member of the Ottoman House of Representatives. He was sent by the Governor of Cyrenaica to make agreements with the tribes in the eastern and western wings of the country by which they should refrain from cutting the Government's telegraph wires, a Bedouin habit which was later to irritate the Italian authorities and during the late war British Signals. I mention two further
incidents in illustration of Turco-Bedouin relations. About 175*
1895 forty members of the Tamiya section of the Bara'asa tribe 648*
jointly killed a tax-collector, a certain 'Abd al-Rahman al- 651
Katib, for, among other affronts, having taxed the client tribes 795*
directly instead of through their *Sa'adi* overlords. They then
fled to the Marmarica, from where they treated with the Turkish 682
Authorities for a settlement by payment of 13,000 Riyal, or 619
thirteen times the usual blood money, to the dead man's son.

account of the Italian invasion of Tripolitania. Realizing that 175*
they were helpless without Sanusiya support not only in the 648*
Sahara but also in Libya, since they would not be able without 795*
command of the sea to reinforce their garrisons there, the Turks showed themselves anxious to win over Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif by also conferring on him new privileges. In 1910 the Governor of Banghazi proposed to make him a monthly grant of 4,000 Piastres, and the Governor of Tripoli sent a telegram in cipher to his representatives in various parts of Tripolitania asking them whether they thought the Sanusiya Order powerful enough to warrant additional privileges, which was apparently the view of Istanbul. His representatives, judging by its lesser influence in Tripolitania, where it never gained the unanimous support it received in Cyrenaica, reported that in their opinion the political importance of the Order had been exaggerated.[1]

Such of these events as were known to Italian observers
shortly before and in the early stages of their war with Turkey 175*
led them to false conclusions because the complexity of Arab 648*
sentiments was not appreciated. The structure of Bedouin 181
society is such that whatever the size of the group a man con- 186
siders himself to belong to in any situation, he is in virtue of his 619
loyalty to it opposed to other groups of like order in the tribal
structure. He is loyal to his *bait* against other *biyut*, to his *'aila* [613]
against other *'ailat*, and to his *qabila* against other *qabail*. Nevertheless, he has a strong feeling of communion with all the Bedouin of his country, regardless of their tribal affiliations, in common opposition to the towns. But Bedouin and citizen are both Arab and they made common cause against the Turks, especially when the activities of the 'Young Turks' forced Turk and Arab into rival camps. But even Arab and Turk shared wider loyalties in their regard—unequal, it is true, but still shared—for the Sultanate and for Islam and they reacted in spontaneous accord against threats from Christian Powers, the French advance in the Sahara and the Italian invasion of Libya. Against Christians and Europeans Arabs and Turks were no longer Arabs and Turks but Muslims, just as against the Turks Bedouin and citizens were no longer Bedouin and citizens but Arabs, and against the towns tribesmen were no longer members of different tribes but a Bedouin community.

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[1] Macaluso, op. cit., pp. 88–90, and Serra, op. cit., p. 37.

CHAPTER V

THE FIRST ITALO-SANUSI WAR (1911–17)

I

128 I HAVE given an account of the conditions in which the Sanusiya
*795 took root in Cyrenaica and of the circumstances which favoured
its growth. I now describe how its Bedouin followers, under
*648 its leadership, resisted Italian aggression during two wars, from
*175 1911 to 1917 and from 1923 to 1932, and finally lost their independence and suffered Italian domination until relieved by British arms in 1942. It will be seen how the long struggle accentuated the political functions of the Sanusiya in a manner I indicate forthwith.

121 For segmentary structures of the kind we find among the
182 Bedouin of Cyrenaica to develop rudimentary governmental,
or statal, organs it would seem necessary that for a long period
*648 of time all the segments of the society should find themselves in common opposition to some outside force. It is not merely that such opposition fuses the segments in corporate action. A new form of political structure which includes the enemy comes into existence and necessitates a new orientation of political values. In a segmentary system each segment sees itself as a unity in opposition to an opposed segment of the same size and kind; so when all the segments come into a corporate relation of opposition to some political group outside them which has a different kind of political structure and belongs to a different political system they tend to see themselves as a unity *vis-à-vis* this group and as a unity on the same structural model as itself.
[177] The small Bedouin society of Cyrenaica in this way slowly took
on the political form of the European countries into the orbit of which it was drawn. It could only enter into structural relations with the states of Europe on the model of the European state.

*175 When the Italians invaded the country and the Turks made
*648 peace the tribes continued their resistance in the name of the
Sanusiya. In their social system tribe was balanced against
*795 tribe and tribal section against tribal section. It was the
● 619 Sanusiya which gave to all the tribes and their sections a com-

mon symbol which stood for their common interests. Faced 175*
with amorphous, but seemingly ineradicable, opposition from 648*
the Bedouin the Italians more and more directed their hostility 795*
to the Sanusiya Order as a tangible head to the resistance which 619 ●
could be destroyed. Failing to crush opposition they were forced [793]
to come to terms with it, but they could not come to terms with
a tribal system—only with an organization and through a
person, the Head of the Order, who could speak for that
organization and for the tribes which it represented. Both in
fighting the tribes and in trying to come to terms with them,
the Italians thus threw the Sanusiya organization into political
relief, and the *tariqa*, the religious Order, began to speak of
itself as a *hakuma*, government. The peace negotiations, there-
fore, centred round a contradiction. The Italians attempted to 175*
exact recognition of sovereignty and this implied recognition of 648*
the right of the Head of the Order to surrender sovereignty,
which he could do only if he were in a position analogous to 728
that of the Head of the Italian State, a status the Italians would 795*
not concede. Nevertheless they were compelled, in order to 793
establish relations with the tribes, to grant the Head of the 554
Order the title of Amir, and implicitly to recognize him as not
only the Shaikh of a religious Order, but the Head of a political
organization. As will be seen, the dilemma led to much equivocation and finally to a second Italo-Sanusi war. In this second war the Sanusiya was entirely destroyed as an organization, political, economic, and religious. It persisted nevertheless as a sentiment, and the Head of the Order in exile in Egypt still retained the allegiance of the Bedouin who saw in his freedom the hope of their own.

When the last European war broke out and Cyrenaica became 175*
a battlefield of first importance it was in the interests of each 648*
side to ensure that the local population would be favourable 795*
to it. The Italians, having destroyed the Order, the one organization through which they might have made effective propaganda among the Bedouin, were confronted in the country with an unimpressionable mass of sullen resentment which could in no way be influenced to their advantage. The British,
on the other hand, who sought to rouse the Bedouin to renewed [793]
rebellion, at any rate up to the point at which they gave what [554]
assistance to British arms they were capable of, had a ready

as well as religious functionaries. The Italians seem to have 175*
been under the impression that they could exclude the Sultan's 648*
secular authority while admitting the Caliph's spiritual authority in Libya. This was a singular error, because the functions of the Caliph of Islam were not of a sacerdotal order at all, but entirely political. Hence, as Macaluso justly observes, by the Treaty of Losanna 'sovereignty in Libya was divided for some years between Italy and Turkey'.[1]

The Turks withdrew their forces from Tripolitania under the 175*
terms of the treaty and opposition in that country was soon 648*
overcome, except for sporadic resistance in the *qibla*, the Sirtica, 795*
and Fazzan, in which parts Sanusiya influence was strong. The
peace made very little difference to the military situation in [619]
Cyrenaica, partly because the Turkish garrisons remained behind to provide a disciplined core to the tribal resistance, and partly because the Bedouin tribes, who gave bulk to the resistance, had in the Sanusiya Order a common organization and leadership lacking in Tripolitania, where every tribe and every prominent tribal Shaikh acted independently and internal dissensions showed themselves as soon as the integrating presence of the Turkish army was withdrawn.

The Turkish soldiers who remained in Cyrenaica were drawn 175*
from every part of the Ottoman Empire—Albanians, Kurds, 648*
Syrians, Iraqis, Circassians, Anatolians, Macedonians, and Thracians—and were practically mercenaries who lived by the sword. Slovenly though they were, they were fine fighters and frugal as well, being content to campaign on rice, potatoes, bread, and an occasional helping of meat; and in Enver Bey they had an inspiring leader. Enver, being a regular soldier, was, however, anxious to return to Turkey to take part in the fighting in the Balkans. Before departing for the Bulgarian front and handing over his command in Cyrenaica to 'Aziz al-Masri he paid a visit to Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif at Jaghbub, making a remarkable trip to the oasis in the only motor-car the Turco-Arab forces possessed. According to local statements the Sayyid, who had arrived at Jaghbub from Kufra in September 1912, had already declared that he would not be partner to a peace, so he required no persuading when Enver asked him in the name of the Sultan Muhammad V to carry on the struggle

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[1] Giuseppe Macaluso, *Fascismo e Colonie*, 1930, p. 7.

mechanized surface vehicles and aeroplanes unknown in 1911. 175*
By the end of 1926 they had some 20,000 men in the field, 648*
mostly native troops, while after the opening round of the 795*
campaign the Sanusi probably seldom had more than 1,000 men on operational service at any one time. It was estimated that in 1923 they could put into the field 2,000 men armed with modern rifles and a few machine-guns and artillery pieces, and that in addition there were some 3,000 to 4,000 rifles among the tribes. With this superiority in mobility, fire, and numbers, the Italians were able, as in the first war, to push heavy columns in any direction they chose and to seize and fortify any point they pleased. Therefore, what is often called 'organized resistance' broke down very early in the campaign, if there can be [726] said to have been such at any time, and gave way to guerrilla warfare in which sentries, advanced posts, supply convoys, and communications were subjected to sniping, raids, ambushes, and sabotage. Consequently the war was made up of a succession of small, and often unrelated, incidents in different parts of the country. Italian operational and intelligence reports and Bedouin stories about these hundreds of fights and skirmishes are not easily arranged into a coherent picture. The hundreds of bits and pieces are all very much alike in size and shape and colour, and the guide of any clear pattern is lacking. To attempt, therefore, to construct from them a complete mosaic of events would be a task alike arduous for the writer and confusing and unprofitable for the reader; and I shall not endeavour to do more than sketch the development of the campaign. It would, I think, be of assistance to the reader were I first to mention some very general features of the fighting, which are, indeed, features of guerrilla warfare always and everywhere.

II

The war, which was waged with increasing bitterness as the [632] years went by, was not against all the Arabs of Cyrenaica, but only against the Bedouin, for the townsmen played no active part in the resistance, though they sympathized with it. Also, among the Bedouin, whilst there was no one who could be fairly [619] labelled pro-Italian there were many persons, and even whole tribal sections, who remained passive, chiefly because of their

*175 vulnerability: the Baraghtha and other northern 'Awaqir
*648 sections, the 'Arafa, the Hasa, some of the Darsa, and a large
*795 part of the 'Abaidat. Most of these pacific sections, the least
619 nomadic of the Bedouin, had a long history of intercourse with the urban population and the Turkish administration, and when Italian officials took the place of Turkish officials contact was early resumed. They tended to look northwards to the coast. The other sections, more nomadic, warlike, and powerful, and further removed from settled centres, looked southwards to the desert: the Aulad Suliman, the Magharba, the southern 'Awaqir, the Bara'asa, most of the 'Abid, the *'Ailat* Fayid, and the southern and eastern 'Abaidat. Beyond striking distance by horse patrols, these hardy wanderers of the steppe, whose history was nothing more than a long record of tribal wars, had paid scant attention to the Turks, had refused in the first Italian war to make terms, had disdainfully turned their backs on the intruder during the ensuing years of peace, and were now to offer a stubborn resistance to renewed aggression. The structural polarity exemplified in the tendency of some tribal sections to be drawn into the political orbit of the Administration while others remained politically aloof from it was earlier referred to. It corresponded to the well-known division between the *saf al-bahr*, the coastal party, and the *saf al-fauqi*, the interior party, of Tripolitania and to a political dichotomy found in some form in all countries where nomads are the social hinterland of peasants or citizens. In Cyrenaica it took the form of a pull in opposite directions by the Turkish (and afterwards Italian) Administration with its centre of attraction at Banghazi and the Sanusiya with its centre of attraction in the desert.

The more peaceful and sedentary sections early ceased to fight the Italians in the first war, and in the period between the two wars put up little outward resistance to Italian penetration. In appearance, at any rate, they had accepted Italian supervision. This was, in fact, the issue during those years: the Italians seeking to draw these sections deeper into their sphere of influence through trade and administrative liaison, and the Sanusiya seeking in its own interests to pull them back from the Government and to eliminate Italian propaganda among them. When war broke out again the Italians had the advantage, denied to them in 1911, of being in occupation of all the principal

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619

centres of the country. They believed that they had the further advantage of having, by incessant propaganda and subsidies, weakened Sanusiya influence among the Bedouin around the towns and posts. Consequently, with optimism scarcely sustained by the facts, they regarded these sections as allies against those which openly supported the Sanusiya. The coastal sections did, as the Italians expected, remain outside the war or, as the Italians called it, the rebellion, and they were, therefore, known as the *sottomessi* in contrast to the *ribelli*, the sections which resisted, and whom I shall speak of by the fitter term 'Patriots', having an objection to the language of colonial imperialism by which an honourable attempt to defend home and property against foreign aggression is labelled rebellion. They called themselves the *muhafiziya*.

It was Italian policy to deal with the collaborationist, or supposedly collaborationist, Bedouin as friends and to create between them and the Patriots a state of permanent feud. The Patriots expected the submitted sections to give them asylum when hard pressed, and to supply them with food and other requirements, and if they did not receive what they wanted, they took it by force. The Italians could not allow the Patriots to use the submitted districts as bases of operation and supply and had, therefore, for both prestige and security, either by constant patrolling to protect the submitted population from reprisals or to supply them with arms for their own protection. Both were perilous expedients. The patrols to be effective had to be highly mobile and therefore small and vulnerable to guerrilla tactics. The arms might, and did, find their way to the Patriots, the Italians becoming themselves one of the main sources of supply to their enemies. They hoped, however, that if they armed the submitted population they might, since they were Bedouin, be expected to defend their own stock against Patriot requisitioning, which the Italians called brigandage and the Patriots called payment of religious dues. It was believed that a state of civil war would necessarily result from the manifold feuds which would have to be prosecuted by bereaved families on both sides in accordance with the Bedouin law of vengeance. It was proposed to make 'furrows of blood' ('*solci di sangue*') between tribe and tribe, and between tribal section and tribal section, across which the Bedouin might exterminate each other and

*175 save the Italians much labour and danger. The policy had very
*648 limited success, for in practice the Patriots recruited from every
*795 tribe and every section. Bedouin sentiments about kinship and
• 619 its obligations worked both ways. If it was a duty to avenge a
slain kinsman it was no less a duty to protect and aid a living
[602] kinsman, and the sense of kin and its compelling influence in
[183] conduct, all that is meant by *'asabiya* in Bedouin values, are the
life and the soul of the Romany world.

It took the Italians a long time to realize that the Bedouin mind was not all of one piece but a Joseph's coat of conflicting interests. These interests excluded each other as the social situation evoked one loyalty to the detriment of another and it was, therefore, only in terms of their social structure that the apparent inconsistencies of Bedouin behaviour could be understood. Consequently the Italians were for ever suffering disappointments and accused the Bedouin, with increasing resentment and bitterness as the struggle continued, of disloyalty and treachery. Among the collaborationists, the *mtalyanin*, the Italianized, as the Patriots called them, there was every degree of participation from passivity, the refraining from taking an active part in the resistance, to full co-operation with the Italian army as spies, guides, informers, and administrative officials; but even those guilty of the worst complicity could, especially when some personal tie was involved, do the guerrillas a good turn. Many poor Bedouin near the towns joined the Italian forces as one kind or other of irregulars, police, and friendlies, and as labourers and camelmen, and it was found that these, while drawing Italian pay and rations, did not hesitate to assist the Patriots when an opportunity offered itself. Desertions to the enemy with full equipment were frequent. Italian rifles and ammunition and even pay were often handed over to the guerrillas. After an engagement the ground was left strewn with live ammunition for the guerrillas to glean. Many reported fights between the Patriots and the submitted population were undoubtedly inventions to cover gifts of ammunition, supplied by the Italians, from the Italian-sponsored irregulars to the Patriot bands. These native battalions constituted, in fact, 'a sort of supply depot of men, arms, and ammunition for the Sanusi formations'.[1] Information about Italian troop move-

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[113] [1] 'La pulizia del Gehel Cirenaico', by 'Gadria', *L'Oltremare*, Dec. 1930.

ments and plans was soon passed on to the guerrilla bands, for 175*
Sidi 'Umar al-Mukhtar had agents in every Italian post. Those 648*
sottomessi who were armed and paid by the Italians to protect 795*
their territories against Patriot foraging expeditions would be 619
found among the Patriot casualties after skirmishes with Italian patrols. The submitted population, it was discovered, allowed their horses to graze far from their camps so that the Patriots could borrow them for operational purposes. The Patriots sold their animals in Italian and Egyptian markets through their submitted kinsmen, and Italian efforts to keep track of such transactions through tribal markings were, as might be supposed, unavailing. So useful, indeed, was a submitted population to the Patriots that the tribal Shaikhs sometimes arranged among themselves who among them should submit and who take the field. Even most of the Cyrenaican officials in the Italian administration did what was consistent with their safety to help their own people against their employers. Their faith unfaithful kept them falsely true. In the end the Italians came to the conclusion that they could trust no Cyrenaican, least of all a Cyrenaican Bedouin. The hearts of all were with their fighting fellow countrymen and fellow Muslims. The *sottomessi* and *ribelli* alike were all Bedouin, jealous of each other and hostile to tribes other than their own, but united by blood and a common way of life—one faith, one speech, one law. All regarded the Italians as foreigners whom one may serve but not love. 'The entire population thus took part directly or indirectly in the rebellion', wrote Graziani.[1]

The lot of the submitted sections was unenviable. They were compelled to live near Italian posts and their areas of sowing and pasturing were severely restricted. Their camps were subjected to constant inspections. Hostages were taken. Horses were confiscated. If it was discovered that they had dealings of any kind with their kinsmen in the Patriot bands they were heavily fined in animals and cereals, their camps were burnt, they were imprisoned, and sometimes shot. On the other hand,
if they did not supply the Patriots with victuals or if they [651]
refused to pay taxes in support of the resistance they were subjected to punitive operations by the guerrillas. Suffering from Italian interference and Patriot levies and from punitive action

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[1] Op. cit., p. 60.

*175 *648 *795 by both sides, many came to the conclusion that they were better off fighting in the Patriot bands than living under Italian protection.

● 619 That all Cyrenaica was hard hostile rock beneath the shallowest covering of local collaboration is shown by the fact that the guerrillas kept up their numbers till the end of the war in spite of the slaughter of many times the number of men engaged at any one time in operations. Whenever a man fell there was another to take his place. Apart from the connivance of the whole Bedouin population at Patriot activities it was not easy for the Italians to tell the difference between a Bedouin who was a guerrilla and a Bedouin who belonged to one of the submitted sections. The guerrillas had no uniforms and when defeated had only to disperse and hide their rifles to become harmless shepherds. The Italians found that killed and captured guerrillas all possessed Italian identity cards issued to them when in camps in the guise of *sottomessi*. The Italians were thus victualling directly the forces opposed to them, for any holder of one of their cards could draw Italian rations. I have myself met Bedouin ex-guerrillas who, wounded in a fight, went to Italian hospitals for treatment, pretending to have been shot by the guerrillas while defending their flocks.

Italian writers who themselves experienced at first hand the sense of insecurity and the feeling, slowly mounting to a conviction, that their efforts to win over the Bedouin by bribes were as vain as their hopes of a speedy conquest, have described the situation of disillusionment in which their despondency was born. Biagio Pace writes that there did not exist, in reality, submitted and rebels, the entire population of Cyrenaica being under the control of the leaders of the rebellion, thus constituting a demographic, political, and financial whole, which maintained a force in the field. The *sottomessi* were regularly [651] taxed to provide the guerrilla bands with food, arms, ammunition, clothes, money, and all the other requirements of war and life, and no-one escaped this levy. Pastoral nomads, urban merchants, agriculturists, even the police irregulars, made their contributions to maintain the rebellion. Even the tribal Shaikhs who received subsidies from the Government gave a tithe to 'Umar al-Mukhtar. The entire country was a capillary system of roots which fed from their hidden depths the visible foliage

of resistance. It was useless to try to destroy this plant of the 175*
resistance by striking at its visible foliage, for when the fighting 648*
bands were hard pressed, they dispersed and resided among 795*
the *sottomessi* for repose, recuperation, and refitting.[1] Serra, 619 ●
looking back across the years of struggle, with their mixture of compromise and ruthlessness, optimism and disillusionment, tells the same sombre story. The implacable hostility of the Arabs to their Christian conquerors was as formless as it was ineradicable. Everybody and everything were against the invaders, but in a flaccid and crumbling opposition which inhibited a precise reaction. The enemy, he complains, habitually withdrew from the struggle. The environment offered nothing to the Italians and everything to the Bedouin, whose culture was unexacting and unpretentious. The Shaikhs had authority only so long as they opposed the Italians, and if they co-operated with them they lost it and could only regain it at Italian expense. The population was unstable, adventurous, and accustomed to such privations that they did not recognize the limits of resistance to the hardships of war. In one thing alone there was constancy and reality, the hatred they had for their Christian conquerors, which persisted in spite of all appearances and all protestations of friendship.[2] When Graziani took charge of the operations in 1930 he likened the Cyrenaican situation to 'a poisoned organism which sets up, on one point of the body, a purulent bube. The bube in this case was the fighting band of 'Umar al-Mukhtar, resulting from an entire infected situation.'[3]

In this semi-darkness of suspicion and uncertainty, this twilight of confidence, when every human being was a foe, the friend behind no less than the enemy in front, every thicket an ambush, and every crag and boss a sniper's nest, the campaign became distorted to unreality. It was a fantastic shadow-show in which dozens of unrelated episodes were thrown at the same time on to a gigantic screen.

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[1] 'La pacificazione della Cirenaica', *Rivista delle Colonie Italiane*, 1932, p. 330. [113]

[2] Op. cit., pp. 152-3. See also 'Che cosa è il Gebel Cirenaico', by the same writer, in *L'Oltremare*, May 1928.

[3] Op. cit., p. 64.

III

*175 *648 *795 What gave the Bedouin the courage to endure the hardships and bereavements of the struggle? Certainly those two great sentiments, patriotism and religion. I have said that the first Italo-Sanusi war began as a war against Turkey and slowly became transformed into a war against the Sanusiya. The war against the Sanusiya also became transformed slowly into a simple struggle of the Bedouin for survival, for their lands and their freedom to live their ancient way of life; and in this struggle they felt themselves, in spite of all their cleavages and feuds, to be at one against the intruder. Beneath the surface of political expressions the issue was the same in both wars: whether the Italians could deprive the Bedouin of their lands and colonize them. Whether the Bedouin fought in the name of the Sultan or of the Sanusiya, or just fought, they always realized, from the first days of the struggle, that the issue was their right to live by their own laws in their own land. In the first war the outer bark of Turkish administration was stripped. [619] In the second war the inner bark of Sanusiya organization was ripped off, leaving bare beneath it the hard wood of the tribal system.

*175 *648 *795 721 798 619 The war also, as wars have a way of doing, bared the religious content in the struggle. The Caliph had declared a religious war, but when the Caliphate no longer counted in Cyrenaica, or indeed anywhere else, the war continued to be fought in the name of a religious Order. With the destruction of the Sanusiya it still went on in the name of religion. It then became simply a war of Muslims to defend their faith against a Christian Power. Deep love of home and deep love of God nourished each other. In fighting for their lands and herds the Bedouin were fortified by the knowledge that they fought also for their faith. Without due appreciation of the religious feelings involved in the resistance it would, I think, be impossible to understand how it went on for so long against such overwhelming odds or how the tribes, with a long history of feuds dividing them, co-operated as much as they did under Sanusiya guidance.

*175 *648 *795 619 From their experiences in the first war the Italians had learned to expect that they would be more strongly resisted in Cyrenaica

than in Tripolitania, and they had learned the reason for this: 175*
'Inasmuch as in Cyrenaica the opposition to our rule was not 648*
fractionized and enfeebled by the personal ambitions and 795*
rivalries of numerous chiefs, but was retrenched and assembled 619
around a single will, the Sanusiya, which manipulated it as it pleased.'[1] They started the war afresh in 1923 with this conclusion firmly fixed in their minds: *delenda est Sanusiya.* But they still believed, not understanding the place of the Order in tribal life, that the attachment of the Bedouin to it was superficial, that it was some kind of parasitic growth which could be cut out of the tribal system. They further believed that their incessant propaganda had already undermined the hold of the Order on the Bedouin.

The Sanusi family, as will be seen, played an inconspicuous 175*
and inglorious part in the resistance. Italian writers confess 648*
surprise that the Bedouin should have continued to show 795*
devotion to persons whose character displayed so few of those 793
qualities Bedouin admire. The Bedouin may indeed have 554
expected a higher standard of conduct than some members of the family lived up to, but they did not suppose that they would distinguish themselves as military leaders. They knew that the descendants of the Grand Sanusi had been brought up in the oases to a sedentary and bookish life and not in the hard way of their own children and that they were unsuited to the frugal and exhausting life of a guerrilla. Their duty, in most cases little in evidence in fulfilment, was to pursue holiness and learning that their presence among the people might bring down on them God's blessing. In the eyes of the Bedouin they lacked in full measure the manly qualities of courage and endurance that Bedouin demand in their own folk, but they were credited with the scholarship and sanctity of the religious, which Bedouin admire in their spiritual guides rather than seek to emulate in their own lives. Italian writers sometimes refer to a member of the family accompanying the guerrilla bands, as did Sayyid al-Hasan and Sayyid Saddiq, as having the role of a standard (*insegna*), a word which well describes their peculiar position in the resistance. Where in a man the qualities of *marabat*, holy man, and of *mujahid*, fighter for the faith, were combined, as in Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif and Sidi 'Umar al-Mukhtar, the

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[1] Agostino Gaibi, *Storia delle Colonie Italiane*, 1934, p. 344.

*175 Bedouin followed them at great sacrifice. They were combined
*648 in many of the Sanusiya Brothers.

*795 The Shaikhs and Brothers of the Order, with few exceptions,
793 played a prominent part in the war, both in the field and by
554 keeping the Bedouin, submitted and unsubmitted alike, in a
ferment. The Italian soldiers and administrators constantly
*175 complained that whenever the Bedouin were tiring of the
*648 struggle the Brothers of the Order urged them to continue it.
• 619 It was their example and exhortations which made it something
793 more than the usual piecemeal resistance of a barbarous people
794 to colonial conquest or more than a succession of raids of the
kind Bedouin have enjoyed for so many centuries. Their parti-
*795 cipation made it both a national and a religious movement. It did much also to establish the Sanusiya in the hearts of the Bedouin. Some of the best-known names of the resistance, like Salih Lataiwish, 'Abd al-Hamid al-'Abbar, Saifat and Muhammad bu Farwa, Husain al-Juwaifi, Brahim al-Fallah, Fadil al-Mahashash, and Qtait bu Musa, were those of Bedouin Shaikhs, but most of the leading figures were Sanusiya *Ikhwan*, men like 'Umar al-Mukhtar, Yusif bu Rahil, Khalid al-Humri, Sharif al-Mailud, 'Abd al-Qadir Farkash, Fadil bu 'Umar, Salih al-'Awwami, and Muhammad bu Najwa al-Masmari.

*175 The indomitable Sidi 'Umar al-Mukhtar was the soul of the
resistance and the struggle is always associated with his name
*648 as similar struggles against French aggression in Algeria and
*795 Morocco are associated with the names of 'Abd al-Qadir and
793 'Abd al-Karim. Sidi 'Umar, 'our irreducible enemy, the faith-
159 ful and able servant of Idris, the heart and soul of the Cyrenaican rebellion', as Graziani called him,[1] was that rare combination of Bedouin and Sanusiya Shaikh. He was born about 1862 of the '*Ailat* Farhan of the Braidan section of the Minifa tribe of the Marmarica and was educated first at the Sanusiya school at Janzur and afterwards at Jaghbub. He was nominated by Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif Shaikh of al-Qasur lodge among the stubborn 'Abid tribe but only performed his duties there for two years before being summoned to Kufra to serve against the French in the Wadai. He returned to al-Qasur about 1906 and later took a prominent part in the first Italo-Sanusi war and in obstructing Italian penetration in the years of peace which

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[1] Op. cit., p. 235.

followed it. In 1923, when he was called to take the foremost 175*
part in the struggle, he was already over sixty years of age. 648*
He was a simple man, religious, courageous, contemptuous of 795*
worldly honours and success, and with singular tenacity and 793
powers of physical endurance. It may well be true that, as is 159
reported, Sayyid al-Mahdi said 'If we had ten men like 'Umar
we would not need any more'.

IV

All the *adwar*, or guerrilla bands, on the plateau came under 175*
Sidi 'Umar's command and he signed himself *al-Naib al-'Amm*, 648*
the Representative-General (of the Sanusiya). Each Bedouin 795*
tribe, as in Enver's day, maintained its own guerrilla band, some 793
100 to 300 men strong. Towards the end of the war the guerrillas 701
never numbered, all told, more than 600 to 700. Only a certain 619 ●
number of men could maintain themselves on the country and move through it with speed and secrecy. As in other guerrilla wars, the actual fighting was done by small bands of enthusiasts, whose success nevertheless depended on the goodwill of the whole population. The bands suffered very heavy casualties, but were maintained at strength by a constant stream of adventurous spirits from submitted and unsubmitted sections alike. Though each band was named after a tribe and its members were chiefly recruited from that tribe and fought in its territory, they were not entirely recruited from it and they might fight anywhere. In each tribal band there were a good number of volunteers from other tribes and a sprinkling of *Ikhwan*, Sudanese, and Tripolitanians. The 'Awaqir and Magharba had separate bands while the other tribal bands usually fought in pairs, Hasa–'Abaidat, Bara'asa–Darsa, and 'Abid–'Arafa. A Misuratan contingent formed a small band of its own which greatly distinguished itself in the fighting. Each band had a simple organization: a commander, a *qaimaqam* for civil affairs, a qadi for religious and legal purposes, a commissariat agent, and a number of officers, some of whom had been trained
in Turkish regular units. Sidi 'Umar maintained discipline in [703]
the bands, and acts of pillage or personal vendetta were severely
punished. Those of the guerrillas who possessed horses rode
them. The rest went on foot. Each band had its Sanusi flag. [186]

*175 When things were quiet members of a band would have their
*648 families and herds with them and live in their own tents, but
*795 when pressed they left their women and children and beasts in
701 the tents of the submitted population and the only non-
619 combatants in their camps would then be a few female cooks.
[722] Before the end of the war many of the Patriots, including Sidi
'Umar, had sent their families to Egypt so that they could act more freely.

*175 There was also a general administration for all the bands and
*648 this came directly under Sidi 'Umar. They maintained inter-
*795 communication and worked to a common strategy. Guerrilla
793 headquarters had also to arrange for the collection of a tithe
701 from the entire population to help pay for the expenses of the
619 campaign. Throughout the war Sidi 'Umar's tax-collectors were
[651] taking tithes from the submitted population, not always without trouble, and were giving written receipts for the payments. The tithe paid by each tribe went to support its own band. Sidi
[705] 'Umar had also to arrange for caravans to bring supplies from Egypt, and to supervise their distribution to the armed forces and the payment of customs dues on what went to the civilian population. Sidi 'Umar also kept up correspondence with Sayyid Idris and Sanusi elements and sympathizers in Egypt.

*175 The guerrilla bands were in constant contact with the enemy.
*648 One of the most striking features of the campaign was the
*795 frequency of the fighting. At some point or other on the plateau a skirmish or larger engagement took place every few days for nearly nine years during the spring and summer months. In the account of the campaign which follows I mention but few of these fights, those which had exceptional importance for the campaign as a whole or as examples of the scale of the fighting. The few mentioned are therefore no indication of the amount of fighting. Its frequency may be judged by Gen. Graziani's statement that in the final year of the war, when resistance, compared with earlier years, was feeble and sporadic, there took place 53 engagements (*combattimenti*) and 210 skirmishes (*conflitti*).[1]

This incessant fighting cannot, as I have already said, be described in the language of text-book logistics in terms of manœuvring, objectives, and battles. Indeed, the Italians had

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[1] *Rivista delle Colonie Italiane*, vol. vi (I), 1932, pp. 52–3.

Italians to occupy it on 21 April, the Birthday of Rome. This 175* 648*
proved to be less favourable an augury than was hoped, for 795*
early in June two of their columns advancing from Ajadabiya [701]
on Marsa al-Braiqa were almost annihilated by Magharba
tribesmen.

Their experience in the *barqa* taught the Italians afresh the
lesson of 1911 to 1915, that against Bedouin unwieldy columns
advancing without concealment in a direct line on definite and
fixed objectives could lead to little more than skirmishes, for
the enemy was too wise to become involved in decisive action
and mobile enough to avoid it; so they adopted the new tactics
of making surprise raids by mechanized units on the Bedouin
encampments, slaughtering man and beast indiscriminately, and
destroying the grain stores. In these raids, on what in a
non-colonial war would be regarded as the civilian population, the
purpose was to kill as many of the Bedouin as possible, striking
terror into the hearts of the shepherd folk of Cyrenaica. When
the rains came and mechanized transport could no longer be
used, the camps were bombed and machine-gunned from the air.
The Bedouin suffered greatly from this persistent strafing, the
Italian estimate of their losses—I must repeat that Italian [727]
figures are highly suspect—from 6 March to 3 September 1923
being 800 killed, 230 captured, and 1,000 wounded, besides
about 700 camels and 22,000 sheep killed or confiscated. These
losses were incurred only in the western part of Cyrenaica, for
during the opening phase the rest of the country was quiet,
except for minor skirmishes between Sidi 'Umar and the
Italians in the Marmarica. At the end of the year the Sanusi [701]
forces had retired to country where they were less
vulnerable, roughly to south and east of the line
al-Braiqa–al-Qatafiya–Msus, with infiltrations everywhere along it towards
the Italian posts.

The ease with which they had entered Ajadabiya and had 175*
raided and overcome resistance in the *barqa* generally had misled 648*
the Italians into believing that they would encounter little 795*
resistance elsewhere. They were further misled by the number 619 ●
of submissions they received at the commencement of the
campaign: by the end of May 1923, 10,380 in the Ajadabiya
zone, 3,417 in the Banghazi zone, and 7,000 in the zone of
al-Marj; a total of 20,797 with 6,028 tents and more than 10,000

*175 *648 *795 ● 619 head of livestock, on which fines were levied for having taken part in the resistance. These submissions were from the less warlike Bedouin, those within easy reach of administrative centres, who had been taken by surprise and overwhelmed by the size of the Italian forces and their mechanized equipment, especially their planes, against the indiscriminate bombing and machine-gunning of which they had neither protection nor reply. They lacked the forest covering of the plateau tribes and the desert wastes into which the tribes of the Sirtica could retire. Moreover, the Italians had not yet realized that submission to protect families and herds did not exclude help in men, supplies, and intelligence to the fighting bands which continued resistance in country better suited to guerrilla warfare. The quietness of the plateau also deceived them. The Bedouin, unlike themselves, did not have an army ready to hand which could be sent into action at a moment's notice. It took the plateau tribes time to grasp what was happening and to form guerrilla groups. It also took the leaders of the Bedouin, both tribal Shaikhs and zawiya Shaikhs, time to accommodate themselves to Sayyid Idris's defection and vacillation, which seriously affected morale in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania and caused much coming and going between Cairo and the battlefields.

As the war entered its second phase in 1924–5 it soon became evident that neither the ponderous spectacular movements nor the mechanized raids on the camps which had been used in the flat *barqa* country were suited to the rugged and wooded plateau. The campaign rapidly assumed the character of guerrilla warfare, some of the features of which I have already outlined, with its tedious record of countless skirmishes and surprises. When the operational season opened in March 1924 the advanced Italian dispositions were on the west–east line al-Shlaidima–al-Abyar–Sidi Salim–Taknis–Marawa–Slanta–al-Fayidiya–Khawalan–al-Makhili. [901] The Sanusi 'regular army', mixed with tribal volunteers from the Magharba and southern 'Awaqir, was still unbeaten under al-Qazza in the eastern Sirtica between Ajadabiya and the Wadi al-Farigh. The tribal guerrilla bands under Sidi 'Umar were mostly on the southern slopes of the central plateau. They were chiefly recruited from the Bara'asa, 'Abid, and 'Awaqir tribes which had from the earliest days of the Italian occupation of Cyrenaica shown themselves most hostile to

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penetration, though they were assisted by contingents from the 648*
Darsa, Hasa, and ʻAbaidat. 795*

In the fighting between March and June of 1924 the Italians 619●
reckoned that about 600 men of the ʻAbid, Baraʻasa, and [701]
northern ʻAwaqir had been killed and 25,000 head of their live- [727]
stock had been captured. In the summer and autumn at least another 250 were killed and about 1,500 camels and 17,000 sheep and goats captured. In spite of these, what were to them very heavy, casualties, the Bedouin continued to harass Italian posts and communications. Salih Lataiwish with his Magharba tribesmen menaced Ajadabiya; Abu al-Qasim al-Zintani with an ʻAwaqir band threatened the advanced Italian bases at al-Abyar, al-Rajma, and Banina; Sidi ʻUmar with the ʻAbid tribal band contained the posts in the al-Marj sector, and detachments under his lieutenant ʻAli bu Rahayyim operated against communications between al-Marj and Talmaitha; Husain Juwaifi's Baraʻasa band worried the garrisons at al-Zawiya al-Baida, al-Fayidiya, and Slanta; and Qtait bu Musa with his Hasa and ʻAbaidat volunteers was camped opposite Khawalan. Behind these detachments were the camps of the Bedouin who had not submitted, even in appearance, in the *sirwal*, the *barqa al-baida*, and along the southern slopes of the plateau everywhere. The Italians found it necessary to pause to consolidate gains of territory and to carry out a reorganization of their operational units. 175*

Sidi ʻUmar's strategy at the time, both as Commander of the 648*
ʻAbid band and as Commander-in-Chief of all the guerrilla forces 795*
on the plateau, was to hold its southern slopes. Their rugged 701
desolation prevented the use of mechanized forces against him and gave him tactical superiority over foot and horse patrols. From the slopes he was able both to menace the Italian posts and communications on the plateau and to cover the families of his fighting men in their camps to the south of it. The Italian answer to these tactics was obvious. They could not prevent guerrilla bands from circulating on the plateau in the cover of forest and deep ravines, but they had by this time established themselves in sufficient strength on the margin of the plateau, and had gained sufficient experience in the handling of mechanized patrols to attack the camps of non-combatants in the flat steppe country to the south. These camps were easily

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Teruzzi soon discovered that matters appeared in a different light to those in charge of the operations in Cyrenaica from that in which they appeared to those sitting on committees at Rome. In spite of all their successes, their occupation of the main strongholds of the country, and the submission of the greater number of the tribal sections, the Italians of all ranks were far from happy. The enemy was still protean and ubiquitous. It was like fighting mosquitoes. They have to be killed one by one and there are always a few left. Next sunset they are back again in the same numbers as before. Italian difficulties were increased by the absence of any single policy towards the tribal sections taking no open part in the struggle. Teruzzi found in the five Commissariats five different formulas of political action.[1]

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In the Banghazi district the submitted Bedouin were placed under strict surveillance, being organized into armed groups to defend their property against guerrilla raids. This separated them from the Patriots but meant entrusting to the Bedouin a function rightly belonging to the Government. In the Barce (al-Marj) district, on the other hand, relations between the submitted and the guerrillas were tolerated. This enabled the Italians to make propaganda in the Patriot camps, but it still more effectively allowed the Patriots to incite the submitted to further resistance or to exact from them tribute as the price of tranquillity. In the Cirene (Shahhat) district the Hasa tribe had submitted and was concentrated in the cages (*reticolati*) of Marsa Susa and Shahhat. In the Darna and Marmarica districts the 'Abaidat tribesmen, who had submitted as early as 1915–16 and had remained peaceful since the renewal of hostilities in 1923, thereby relieving the Italians of the necessity of sending a large body of troops to eastern Cyrenaica, were becoming restless and were purchasing quiet by payment of tribute in money, provisions, and volunteers to Sidi 'Umar. Taking all in all, there was lacking in the submitted districts good administration, effective propaganda, and adequate force to back decisions.

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Teruzzi also found that, although almost unbroken success had been reported month by month in every part of the country ever since the war began, even as late as the middle of 1927 the Italians had little real control beyond the immediate vicinity

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[1] Op. cit., p. 37.

*175 situation which had developed there in 1915 seemed likely to
*648 develop again. Concerted operations from Cyrenaica and
Tripolitania were, therefore, planned. To facilitate them from
*795 the Cyrenaican side the Italian line was advanced in March
1927 from Qaminis–Tailimun–Suluq–al-Shlaidima to Ajadabiya–Sawunnu–Msus; and Teruzzi, always an advocate of combining political with military action, decided to try what

[102]



The Italian conquest of Cyrenaica.

diplomacy could do to ease the task of the soldiers. He had
[793] some success, with the aid of the treacherous Sanusiya Shaikh
Sharif al-Ghariyani, in that he was able to arrange a meeting in
[619] June in the *barqa al-baida* with a number of tribal Shaikhs and
to persuade 13 of those belonging to the Magharba Shammakh to make submission. This pacification of the Magharba near Ajadabiya, indispensable to operations in the Sirtica, had an immediate result in the uncontested occupation of al-Qatafiya towards the end of September and of al-'Aqaila a few days later. Sayyid Saddiq al-Rida collected a small force to the south of the Wadi al-Farigh to prevent a further advance but neither he nor his father, a man lacking both vigour and spirit, had the character of the Bedouin and both were wavering. The son entered into correspondence with the Italians and the father

*175 *648 rather than of capital. For these and for political reasons the plan was abandoned and Balbo decreed in 1939 that only the Bedouin might own herds for nomadic pastoralism. This excluded both Italian colonists and urban merchants and left most of the southern slopes of the plateau, the steppe at their termination and on the *barqa*, and Cyrenaica's two arid wings, the Marmarica and the Sirtica, to those Bedouin who preferred to continue their ancient shepherds' way of life.

*175 *648 • 619 The loss of their best land could not by itself disrupt the social life of the Bedouin. It was necessary at the same time to destroy their social organization. As a first step in this direction an attempt was made to undermine the influence of the tribal Shaikhs. In the early days of their partial occupation of Cyrenaica the Italians continued, because they had no choice, the Turkish administrative divisions and their policy of consultation with the Shaikhs, confining the duties of Italian officials to inspection and advice, though native participation was illusory.[1] This policy was carried to excess in the Basic Law of 1919 which gave extensive powers to a local Parliament of representatives elected from the tribes and urban centres with ex-officio and nominated members who were not to exceed in number a sixth of the elected members. For administrative purposes the Shaikhs of each sub-tribe and the Shaikh al-Mashayakh of each tribe were recognized as such by decree. By official recognition as tribal Shaikhs of large numbers of men of no great importance in tribal life the status of Shaikh was lowered in the eyes of the Bedouin, and official subsidies to these Shaikhs occasioned much rancour between individuals and sections.

The Fascists revoked the Law of 1919 and reversed the tribal policy of the liberal period. Administration was in future to be as direct as could be—straightforward military rule of a beaten people without use of intermediaries and without tribal co-operation through their leaders. Graziani told his audience at the Fascist Institute of Culture: 'Direct rule will not be an empty phrase, because chiefs and sub-chiefs are going to be abolished; I have withdrawn them from circulation.' He went on to say: 'They will be replaced by old battalion N.C.O.s (*graduati*) made worthy of such employment by services

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[1] Mondaini, op. cit., p. 327.

rendered in fighting faithfully for Italy.' On this point Balbo, 175*
who replaced Graziani, was equally emphatic: 'Chiefs do not 648*
exist any more—there are only citizens with equality of duties 619 ●
and rights.'[1] Tribal Shaikhs, therefore, were not asked to advise
the Government or to co-operate with it in any official capacity
and the subsidies they had received in the pre-Fascist and early
Fascist periods were withdrawn. Cyrenaica under the Fascists
was administered by decrees issued by a Governor directly
responsible to the Minister for the Colonies at Rome. Under the [646]
Organic Law of 1927 a General Council with very limited
advisory functions was allowed for, and Arabs chosen from the
notables of the sedentary population and Shaikhs of the Bedouin
tribes could be nominated to sit on it by the Minister for the
Colonies on the recommendation of the Governor. Its constitutional
importance was nil, because it never came into operation.
It was replaced by the Law-Decree of 1934, by which 175*
Tripolitania and Cyrenaica became a single colony with the 648*
seat of its administration at Tripoli. The new colony was divided 631
into four commissariats (Tripoli, Misurata, Bengasi, and Derna) 619
and a military territory of the Sahara. Each commissariat came
under a Prefect and was divided into administrative sections:
departments, residencies, and districts, all under Italian officials.
It was recognized that the Bedouin were divided into tribes and
sub-tribes. At the head of each was a Shaikh chosen in accordance
with tribal custom and nominated by the Head of a
commissariat. The Shaikh of a tribe was personally responsible
to the competent Italian authority for order and security within
the tribal territory. His functions and powers were those
accorded him by tribal custom. The Shaikhs of the sub-tribes
came under his control and had within their sub-tribal areas
functions analogous to his. All that this meant was that certain
tribal Shaikhs were recognized as such in so far as they were held
responsible for any shortcomings of the Bedouin, but were
accorded no privileges and had no representation. Consultative
councils, where allowed for, were composed of administrative
officials. So long as the Bedouin obeyed the Government and 175*
submitted to whatever curtailments of their freedom and rights 648*
it chose to enact, they could stew in their own juice until the 619

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[1] Italo Balbo, *La Politica Sociale Fascista verso gli Arabi della Libia*, 1938. [113]

*175 *648 Italians had more leisure to devote to breaking up tribal life altogether.

[619] The final decree of the Fascists affecting Arab status was issued in 1939. It incorporated Tripolitania and Cyrenaica within the Kingdom of Italy, and to quiet any dismay this might cause among the Effendiya of the towns it offered them certain privileges, mostly nominal. The decree in no way affected the Bedouin. Indeed very little of the unceasing flow of legislation which poured from the Italian bureaucrats and lawyers in the form of Laws, Royal-Decrees, Royal-Law-Decrees, Ministerial Decrees, and Governatorial Decrees affected the Bedouin. The vast majority of these rules and regulations in no way touched their lives and they remained in blissful ignorance of their content. They had little or no money, they settled their own cases with the aid of their Shaikhs and religious teachers, they made their own trading arrangements, they provided their own labour, and so on. Where a law affected them it could often be eluded or circumvented. As the Bedouin [181] themselves say, '*Sama' min gher ta'a*', 'To hear without obeying', is one of their chief characteristics. The Italians in any case, sitting comfortably in their offices and entirely out of touch with the people, relied on their Cyrenaican police and minor officials to report breaches of regulations, and if they did not choose to do so, the law became a dead letter. Also it cannot be assumed that because there were regulations great efforts were always made to enforce them. 'The gap between the letter of the law and daily practice, wide in all countries, becomes an abyss in Italy.'[1]

With all their regulations and petty interference the Italians were most careful not to offend Arab opinion in religious matters. From the moment of their invasion of Libya they vociferated their respect for Arab custom, culture, and religion. Thus the Minister Bertolini said to the Arabs in a discourse at Tripoli in 1914: 'We will respect your religion and your customs; we know the splendour with which your civilization has already illumined the world and we do not intend in any way to threaten it. . . .'[2] The Italians prided themselves on their Islamic policy and claimed that as a result of it and of their justice and of their

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[1] James Meenan, *The Italian Corporative System*, 1944, p. 340.

[2] Mondaini, op. cit., pp. 327–8.

their rights in it, and this presented no more difficulty to the 175*
lawyers than the discovery of a formula to cover confiscation of 648*
the Sanusiya properties had done. 167

Ancient rights in the lands of Cyrenaica rested with the 175*
Sa'adi tribes and whatever tribal fragments they permitted to 648*
reside there by grace. Disputes about ownership had been 423
settled either by war or through discussion between the groups 619•
concerned in them, sometimes with the aid of Turkish officials [795]
or Marabouts, particularly of the Shaikhs of Sanusiya lodges [578]
after the Order had become established in the country. In 1858 the Ottoman Government, under pressure of Western ideas, promulgated a land code in all parts of the empire, and to put it into effect in Cyrenaica the Governor, Khalil Sami Pasha (1863–8), appointed a committee which declared the lands round Banghazi and Darna to be for the use of these towns and the rest of the country for the use of the tribes in occupation of it, except for barren hills and deserts which, like woods and roads, were regarded as the natural demesne of the State. The tribal boundaries of to-day were finally fixed by this committee, though the fixing of them was less an adjudication than a recording of existing conditions.

The new Turkish land code operated in the towns and just outside them and was not applied to tribal lands and grazing grounds, and the tribes were not asked to acquire a title to their lands by registration of them. This would have been an impossible task, and the Turks were in any case too wise to meddle with Bedouin lands, knowing that the Bedouin would not have consented to change or interference of any kind. Nevertheless the State claimed all tribal lands not bearing buildings or plantations as *miri*, public demesne, and from a legal point of view it was in virtue of this absolute and residuary ownership that it taxed the tribal occupiers and users of the land. This was a legal formalism which made no difference to anyone since the Government had neither the wish nor the power to exploit the lands and accepted that the tribes had rights of use, the *tassaruf*, in them in perpetuity. The Italian Land Registry, created in 1913 on the basis of the Turkish registers, followed Turkish practice in this matter, classing tribal lands as State demesne in which the occupiers had rights of use, and also in allowing tribal disputes to be settled by tribal custom, which

*175 the Italians called *Sa'adi* law. In 1923 the Land Registry, which
*648 had hitherto restricted its attention to urban properties, took
423 the first steps towards an assessment of tribal lands and by the
end of 1932 had registered in the name of the Colony 120,790
• 619 hectares, a large part of which was already marked for colonial settlement. The lands were acquired by 'natural right' (9,124 Ha.), by purchase, expropriation, and renunciation (43,441 Ha.), and by confiscation of Sanusiya estates (62,225 Ha.) and of properties of persons fighting in patriot bands and classed as rebels against the State (6,000 Ha.). However, expropriation for purposes of public utility and purchase were found to be slow, expensive, inadequate, and, in the political circumstances, inopportune methods of acquiring land for colonial settlement. Both also led to most complicated disputes about the distribution of the compensation in a country where every member of a tribe had preemptive rights of some degree in all its lands. In 1928 a new system was therefore adopted. The State in virtue of its supreme authority asked the owners of the lands considered useful to the State to renounce their rights in them. Compensation was to be divided equally among the various participants in the *tassaruf*.

*175 No action of the kind allowed for in the new decrees was, or
*648 could be, taken till the Bedouin had been subdued. It would have been useless to attempt to register the lands of the Bedouin
423 in the name of the State on those parts of the plateau in which the guerrillas still operated freely, and to have attempted to register them in the submitted areas would merely have driven the population to renewed revolt. Action does not seem to have been taken till 1935–6 and it was then taken in a form which is said to have disgusted even some of the lawyers. Proclamations covering the lands required for colonial settlement were drawn up and it was stated in them that the particular lands to which each referred were State property and that if no objection were raised by a certain date they would be registered in the name of the State. The proclamations were published by being fixed to official notice-boards in the Land Department and municipalities, but they were not published on the lands concerned, or anywhere near them, so that the Bedouin, even had they any idea of what the procedure was, and even could they have read the proclamations, did not in

174 not male names are used, is assumed; and secondly that the
613 Bedouin are polygamous. If, then, half-brother differentiation
551 or full sibling unity is to be shown genealogically, the obvious
562 way in which this can be done is to use a maternal name in the
genealogy. Thus, in the Cyrenaican genealogy, a number of
tribal groups will be shown as sons of a particular father. If differentiation
182 of these groups needs to be shown, this can be effected
613 by clustering the groups round, say, two female names
551 (the names of the respective mothers) thereby making the two
562 clusters of groups stand in the relationship of paternal half
brothers. The concept of the 'one womb', of maternal origin, is a critical one in the context of social cohesion, but it does not deny patriliny; on the contrary, it serves in a sense to reinforce it. Female names can be used to show a greater notion of cohesion than the mere use of male names, and the significance of a female name placed at the apex of the Cyrenaican genealogy is that it is the symbol of full brother unity at the highest political level.

173 The founding ancestress Sa'ada is credited with two sons, who
613 in turn are considered to be the founding ancestors of the two
largest groups of tribes in Cyrenaica. Each of these sons is said
● 619 to have begottten two sons, as shown on the accompanying
genealogy. The next generation shows a total of nine names, and these nine ancestors are considered to be the founding ancestors of the nine noble tribes of Cyrenaica.[2] Continuing the line of descent of one of these tribes—the Magharba—the same pattern of segmentation repeats itself: the tribe is divided into two primary sections having ar-Ra'aid and ash-Shamakh as the respective founding ancestors. Ash-Shamakh is said to have had four sons, and these are the founding ancestors of four secondary sections. These latter four are credited with a varying number of sons, as shown in the genealogy (Fig. 18-1).

One feature of the Cyrenaican genealogy immediately stands out from this brief description: the uniformity in the number of segments at the various levels of segmentation. Along the line of descent from Sa'ada to Nasr, the number of sons shown in the

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[162] [2] One of these, the 'Ailat Fayid, now only numbers about 150 souls, and although it is given the structural position of a tribe in the genealogy, it scarcely merits this distinction in practice.

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173
613
619


SA'ADA
(1)
BARAGHITH
'AQQARA
(2)
BARAGHUTH AL-SGHAIR
JIBARNA
HARABI
'ALI
(In Egypt)
TRIBES
(3)
'ABID
'ARIF
'AWAQIR
MAGHARBA
DARSA
HASA
BARA'ASA
'AILAT FAYID
ABAIDAT
(4) PRIMARY
AL-RA'AIDAT
AULAD AL-SHAMAKH
(5) SECONDARY
'ALI
MANSUR
NASR
SUBH
(6) TERTIARY
13
6
4
4
MADHKUR
HAIBA
AL-DAWWAS
UMBARAKA

FIG. 18-1 GENEALOGY 1. The names given in this genealogy are the tribal names in use. All are derivatives of personal names of ancestors, like all tribal names, except for some nicknames (e.g. Baraghith means 'the fleas') and a few which refer to a general location (e.g. the Magharba means the 'Westerners'). [551]

first four descending generations is two. At the fifth level the 173
number increases to four and finally, at the sixth level there 613
characteristically occurs a marked irregularity in the number of 619
descendants forming the founding ancestors of the tertiary sections.

Another feature of the Cyrenaican genealogy is that its 613
branches show an intimate relationship with ecological areas. 619
Thus, the major division into two branches stemming from 13
Sa'ada represents the eastern and western halves of the country 182
with associated and clear differences in ecology. Continuing the line of descent, the Jibarna and Baraghith groups of tribes occupy plain and mountain foot-hills respectively. The two Jibarna tribes in turn occupy two distinct kinds of plain. Following now the division of the Magharba tribe, its two primary sections are divided by a very conspicuous dry valley. The four secondary divisions of the Aulad ash-Shamakh primary section likewise show a relation to ecological boundaries, albeit on a smaller scale than those previously referred to, but none the less important in this more local context. Finally, the unevenly numbered tertiary sections which are derived from these four

613
619
13
182

secondary sections, in their very unevenness, show a more sensitive relation to more detailed ecological differences.

At all levels of segmentation, therefore, a high degree of consistency between the ecological divisions of the country and the genealogical divisions can be shown. Indeed the relationship is so close that it is tempting to consider the contemporary pattern of things as the only one possible. What historical evidence [167] exists is against such a view being taken. It is known that tribes have been displaced in the past, some of them or sections of them having been pushed out into Egypt, and others having altered their position. This being so, there obviously cannot be any finality about the present distribution of tribes in relation to the ecological divisions of the country. Rather, the existing pattern is one of a number of possible permutations. Again, as the relation between groups of people to their environment becomes progressively sensitive with the decrease in the size and order of the group, then the more unstable will be the relationship between the two. Conversely the greater the size and order of the group the more persistent will be its relationship to the ecology. In other words, the major ecological divisions are more fundamental in their effect on the way of life and the economy of people, whereas the more detailed ecological differences between, say, tertiary sections have a relatively minor effect. The [233] [433] ecological differences between the wooded plateau area with its cow and goat herding economy, and the arid semi-desert area with its camel and sheep herding economy has a much more profound effect on the general way of life, and is a more persistent division, than that which exists between two tertiary sections where the differences may only be in topographical details.

While therefore, the division of people into groups of various sorts is not permanently fixed in relation to ecological divisions, there is always an intimate relationship between the two which is progressively more enduring as the order of the structural segment increases. Yet even this statement of the relationship, guarded as it is, does not suffice, for the pattern and distribution of tribes and their sections at any given moment are not only a function of ecology, but they are also the result of a number of other complex factors which may be operating to reinforce or to

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complicate the more direct relationship of the distribution of groups of people to the ecology.[3] 619 [13] [182]

The Cyrenaican genealogy, then, is a conceptualization of a hierarchy[4] of ordered territorial segments. The groups stemming from the ancestor at the third order of segmentation are referred to as tribes, and each tribe is the apex of a three-tiered order of segments, which, following customary practice, are referred to as primary, secondary, and tertiary. The latter, the tertiary segment, 621 represents the group of people who, for a period of six to eight 613 months, gather together and live in what, for all intents and purposes, is a single discrete residential group.[5] This tertiary group is also the smallest political group. It has its own homeland, with its [423] water supplies, pastures, and ploughland. In this homeland live most of its members. It is a lineage segment, and most of the agnates of this segment live on their own homeland.[6] It is also the [682] vengeance group, which means that any one of its members can [628] be killed in vengeance for a homicide committed by any other, and that the obligation to exact vengeance falls on all members alike, regardless of relationship to the victim. Likewise, its members pay blood money as a group, and although when they receive it, a bigger portion goes to the nearest agnate of the victim, the remainder is distributed equally among all its members. The number of generations which supervene between the founding ancestor of a tertiary segment and the living is usually four or five, but there is little consistency in this number. Some tertiary

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[3] This part of the discussion is necessarily brief, but further amplification will appear in two subsequent articles now in preparation, one of which is concerned with a general treatment of Cyrenaican genealogies, and the other with a discussion of the effects of ecology on the social organization of the Bedouin. [114]

[4] I use the word hierarchy here since, although segments of any order display many like features, the orders represent distinct and progressively more embracing interests, and these differences are of such consequence that to consider one order of groups as a facsimile of a superior or inferior order can only lead to confusion. A tertiary group, that is to say, may possess many of the characteristics of a secondary group, but the one is a fundamentally different sort of group from the other, as I shall show in my forthcoming article on the feud. (cf. Smith, M. G. 1956.) [128]

[5] This statement does not apply to the Darsa and the Hasa tribes, two of the plateau tribes in Cyrenaica. The statements in this article are confined almost exclusively to the camel herders of the semi-desert. [619] [128]

[6] This, admittedly, is too general a statement to make about such an important issue, but I would prefer to leave its documentation and precision for an article on the analysis of the composition of Bedouin camps.

121 173 613 619 178 If, moreover, the view of a genealogy as a continually expanding line of descent is to be accepted, it must be accepted also that large structural units, even in conditions of population stability, are to experience a continuous re-ordering of their structural relationships. In practice, what this means is that a tribe of, say 20,000 souls cease to be tribesmen of a named tribe and instead all become members of an almost identical group but with a different name. To take an example from the genealogy given [162] on page 365: the Magharba tribe shown there has a total population of some 13,000 souls. If proliferation affected the topmost limits of this tribe, the apical name disappears and presumably the name of one of the primary sections is to be substituted. That is, half the tribe would have to take on the lineage name of their opposed primary section. The only alternative to the use of the name of a primary segment as a substitute for the abandoned tribal name is the acceptance by 13,000 people of a totally new name, which is most unlikely.

It is reasonable to assume therefore, that the genealogy, in its general form, is fixed for long periods of time at least. This still leaves the problem of how and where adjustments are made to face the contingencies of birth and death, of the succession of generations, and of the irregular increases and decreases of population among the tertiary segments. An important clue lies in the number of segments which appear at the various orders of segmentation. From Sa'ada, the founding ancestress, in the line which runs to Nasr, each ancestor is shown as having a pair of sons for four orders of segmentation. At the fifth generation from Sa'ada—this is now the secondary order of segmentation within the tribe—the number of sons increases to four. Not all tribes will show the same number of sons at each generation as the Magharba—some, for example, might show three instead of two at the primary order—but what is true of all tribes is that there is evident consistency in the number down to and including the fifth generation from Sa'ada; if, that is to say, one of a tribe's primary segments is divided into three secondary sections, the other one or two, as the case may be, will be divided likewise. Throughout the tribes in Cyrenaica, then, segmentation of orders superior to the tertiary segments shows a pronounced consistency in their numbers.

613 At the next level of segmentation (this now being the tertiary
619 order in any given tribe) the number of segments which appear
621 is conspicuously irregular. For the Magharba tribe, the four sec-
ondary segments, 'Ali, Mansur, Subh and Nasr are divided into
thirteen, six, four, and four segments respectively. Similar irregu-
larity appears in other tribes.[11] The pattern of the genealogy
is always one of regularity in the number of segments at all points
in it except for the point of tertiary segmentation where con-
spicuous irregularity becomes immediately evident. Since these
613 segments constitute the summer camps of the Bedouin, this is not
619 surprising, for these small groups will show greater susceptibility
621 to details of local water supplies, pasturing facilities, ploughland
133 areas, and topographical features than would the numerically
182 larger and structurally superior groups occupying larger areas of
territories of greater ecological importance. If we follow the line
131 from Sa'ada to Nasr again, the bifurcation at the first order of
segmentation is consistent with the division of the country into
the permanently green high altitudes of the plateau, and the ex-
tended low-lying plain area of the western half of the country.
[134] Between the territory of the Magharba tribe ('The White Plain')
and that of its neighbour tribe, the 'Awaqir ('The Red Plain'),
there is a major soil difference, which is such a conspicuous fea-
ture of the landscape, and so sharply defined, that one is almost
aware when one has crossed the tribal boundary. Within the
Magharba tribe, a prominent dry river valley cuts the territory
in two, the landscape to the west of it being characteristically
serrated, making travel in an east-west direction difficult, while
to the east the landscape is much more docile and undulating.
The four sections of the ash-Shamakh branch again represent
four quite distinct areas. The territory of one section is almost
conterminous with the narrow belt of sand dunes along the coast;
the territory of another is a block of rough and tumbled land in
the west; the territory of a third, in the centre, is made up of a
few low-lying shallow valleys; and the territory of the fourth,

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[114] [11] It is necessary here to warn the reader that, brilliant an ethnographer as Agostini undoubtedly was, his grouping of tribal sections is not always correct. I had his book (Agostini 1922–23) with me in the field and checked his tribal survey. I found that at several important points his ordering of the segments was incorrect. I should add that the differences between Agostini and myself are not due to the kind of changes discussed in this article.

stretching across to the village of Ajadabiya in the east, topples 613
in undulations away into the flat expanses of the desert to the 619
south. At all these points of segmentation, the territories occupied 621
by the various sections are large and roughly defined, and 133
the population aggregates supported on these territories run from 182
over a thousand at one end to tens of thousands at the upper 131
limits. The tertiary sections are numerically much smaller, some
of them numbering as few as a hundred souls in all, and the
territories to which they are attached are correspondingly
smaller. The relationship between the numbers in this order of
section, and the precise amount of water available in the local
wells is an intimate one. If the population of one of these groups
increases, or if the number of animals rises, or if the springs show
a decline in the volume of water they give forth, or if the winter
rainfall has allowed the storage in wells of only a small quantity
of water, a rearrangement of the group must be effected. A significant
alteration of any one of these components must mean
that the local group must split to enable a new adjustment to be
made in the relationship of man and animals to water.

Whatever changes occur within groups of any size, since the 173
genealogy embraces the entire population, these must appear on 178
the genealogy in some way or other. Now a genealogy is as rigid 829
a framework, as fixed and final a pattern of grouping, as can be 613
imagined. The impression that they are thus rigid and fixed, except 551
for the addition of successive generations, is strengthened
by the way in which the Bedouin use them. From their young
boys to their old men, the Bedouin are expert genealogists, and
the names of ancestors, for one reason or another, are never far
from their lips. Names are kept alive by constant use, since all [571]
references to inter-group relationships must be in terms of these
names. More than this, the Bedouin were proud to the point of 173
boastfulness of their genealogical knowledge, and, wherever I 829
travelled, the first request I had to comply with was to take down 613
a large portion of a tribal genealogy. In recording their endless 551
genealogies, one feature about them came to assume increasing 123
interest; while there was remarkable unanimity with regard to 126
most of the names given, there was one point of marked ambiguity—at
the tertiary level of segmentation. I recorded genealogies
in four tribes on an extensive scale, and in each tribe

There are, in Cyrenaica, three major status groups among the 619
tribes: the noble or free-born tribesmen (*al-Hurr*), those who 554
have been adopted or grafted on to a tribe (the *Laff*), and the 608
clients (*Marabtin*).

Those who claim to be free-born also claim ownership of the 619
natural resources. The *Laff* do not own these. They are people 608
thought not to have originally been of the lineage of the tribe 621
with which they are resident. They are found sometimes in ones 613
and twos in the camps of the free-born, but sometimes constituting [423]
tertiary groups themselves. Now when such people have resided 619
with their free-born hosts for several years and one of them
has married one of the host's daughters, they are grafted to the 608
genealogy at the point of tertiary segmentation, that is, where 613
ambiguity occurs in the genealogy. Obviously, persons thus 621
grafted to the lineage cannot be shown as descendants of one 173
of the living or of the recently dead, remembered perhaps by
some of the elders still living. It is equally true to say that they
cannot be grafted to the lineage at a point superior to that of
the tertiary segments, since this would involve recognition by a
number of tertiary groups whose members may know little or
nothing about them. When a person enters a new tribe, the only
way in which he can do so is to go to live in a camp, and it is the
concern of the people of that particular camp whether or not they
accept him, since it is they who have to decide whether their
resources are sufficient to support a newcomer. Once a man has
been accepted as a full member of a tertiary section, membership
of superior tribal sections is automatic, although to enter into
tribal membership he requires the permission of members of a
tertiary section only. To graft at a point superior to the tertiary
would be the same as giving a man superior structural status, but
without a camp in which to dwell. There is only one place for
his incorporation, and that is where the ambiguity in the genealogy
permits manipulation to include new lines. In this way the [597]
adoption of a person into a lineage does not offend the sense of
kinship of the receiving group since the point of inclusion is an
ancestor about whom little or nothing is known and whose authenticity
is frequently doubted by some. What has been referred
to as an area of ambiguity is, moreover, something of a jumble of
names, and it is not a difficult matter, if a new line has to be

619 attached somewhere along the line, to attach it to one of these
608 names. Bedouin welcome, as members of their camps, practically
613 anyone who wishes to join, even, in the case of one group, an
621 Italian. The limit to this acceptance of members is, of course, the
173 number of people who can be supported by the local resources.
If people are being admitted freely to membership of a particular
[182] camp, this means that there is a local surplus of land and water,
so that the number of grafts being supported by any particular
section is a useful index of the extent to which the resources are
being used. Conversely, as sometimes happens when grafted elements
become numerous, or when the water supply, for various
reasons, dwindles, it may be necessary to detach a grafted group.
[578] Such action is always the occasion of a violent dispute, usually
over watering rights, and not infrequently fights break out.
Whether or not the grafted group wins, from then onwards it will
be forced to exist as an independent group, and a new tertiary
section will have been born. No matter which of the processes
involving grafts is considered—incorporation or detachment—
both are contained within the framework of the tertiary section,
without any effect on the rest of the structure.

619 The position of the clients, in the context of this discussion, is
not unlike that of the grafts. Briefly, clients are men who are con-
[423] sidered to have originated from a country other than Cyrenaica,
and who for this reason cannot claim rights to land and water—
at least this is the theory, although in some circumstances they
are able to do so successfully. They are of various kinds, but they
are not included in the genealogies given by the free-born. Cli-
ents are found grouped in two main ways. There are some large
groups which constitute tribes in the sense that they display a
genealogical and territorial organization like those of the free-
born, and are usually to be found flanking the main tribes of the
country on their borders. Some of these are powerful groups and
enjoy considerable independence of action, but whatever their
characteristics they none the less speak of themselves as 'for' or
619 tied to the noble tribe whose territory includes theirs. Further,
571 the sections of these client tribes have their special ties with
621 tertiary sections of the noble tribes, which are not merely ties of
613 sentiment, but which take the form of valuable mutual help in a
number of situations. A whole client tribe, in the sense that it is

occupying territory which cannot be said to belong to any particular 619
section of their noble patron tribe, is tied to the patron 571
tribe as such. Yet it is through the small tertiary segments that 621
these ties are made effective. In this sense, a client tribe is a combination 613
of small groups of people each group having specific relationships with defined tertiary sections, and participating in the tribe of their patrons through these relationships.

Secondly, clients are found distributed in small groups, sometimes 619
no more than one or two men, but often in clusters large 621
enough to compose a small camp. Practically all tertiary sections 613
of the noble tribes have some clients either living with them or
sharing their resources. While clients continue to reside with a 619
particular tertiary section, it is the members of the latter who are 621
responsible for them and vice versa. If, for example, one of the 613
clients commits a homicide, the gathering of blood-money is the 672
responsibility of the noble tertiary section to which he is attached, [682]
and vengeance can be exacted on any member of the
noble section. In other circumstances, when the offender is a
nobleman, then the clients of his group are the first to be approached
for blood-money. Tied in this way to a particular 619
tertiary section, they are not, however, compelled to reside with 621
its members permanently. On the contrary, they may be forced 182
to move. If, for example, there is a pressure on local water supplies, 166
the first to feel it are the clients. Annually, they supplicate 613
for the use of water, and if their patrons decide that there is insufficient to meet all needs, the request is refused, albeit reluctantly. Clients constitute a socially mobile group; they are the pawns in the annual readjustment of men to their resources. Whenever they move, they pass on to another tertiary section, which may be a collateral section of the one they have left or structurally far removed from it, but as soon as they leave one, their duties and obligations cease and are taken up anew with another structurally like group. It is because their attachment is to a tertiary section, and not to one of superior order, that they can be as socially mobile as they are, which in turn facilitates a more efficient adjustment to the ecological situation from year to year.

Small groups of clients move frequently, groups of adopted people less frequently, and groups composed of the free-born

619 change their structural position only rarely. The latter change
621 sometimes does, however, occur, and there is evidence to show
that it does. For example, Agostini (1922–23, p. 323) in his tribal
182 survey, records a section named Barsha as one of the groups stem-
166 ming from Nasr.[12] In the genealogies I was given, the name did
613 not appear, and even after some questioning, what information
was known about it was concealed. Some time later the name
[578] cropped up accidentally in conversation, and I was then told that
at one time it had been one of the Nasr groups, but that after a
quarrel during a year of water shortage, the Barsha folk went
to live with people with whom they had maternal connexions,
and in whose territory there was ample water that year, and
never returned. The group, a tertiary one, was detached from the
tertiary point of segmentation in the genealogies, and tied on to
a tertiary group of another tribe in its new homeland.

To summarize briefly the argument thus far, the mechanical
178 devices of telescoping, fusion of names, the ejection of those
173 names which cease to be of any social consequence, and the
619 elision of names at or around the fifth ascending generation,
621 taken together point to the importance of the tertiary order of
613 segmentation in discussing the problem of maintaining the form
of the genealogy constant in face of its natural tendency to alter;
further, evidence of changes (adoption into a lineage, detachment from it, the inclusion and exclusion of clients) was presented, and this again led to the conclusion that the tertiary point
of segmentation is critical in this respect. This being so, the man-
[128] ner in which change actually occurs, still remains to be shown,
and this is best done, perhaps, by discussing the mode of proliferation of tertiary segments. In order to do this adequately, it is necessary to say something briefly about certain features of Bedouin marriage.

Among the Bedouin there exists a preferential form of marriage
582 between a man and his father's brother's daughter. Parallel
605 cousin marriage of this sort carries with it the exclusive right of
a man to this cousin. Without his consent no one else can marry her, and to attempt to do so would be to risk the marriage arrangements being nullified after negotiations had almost been

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[114] [12] Barsha's position is incorrectly given as a sub-group of Haiba; it should be shown as structurally equivalent to Haiba. See also note 11.

121 given to the feud, for this is one of the few societies in which it occurs.[1] What is
613 meant here by a state of feud is a set of relationships between two tribal groups which
578 are characterized by hostility whenever two or more of their members meet. These
591 hostilities are of a sort which cannot be terminated; feud is not a matter of a group
121 indulging in hostilities here at one moment and there the next, but a sequence of
619 hostilities which, as far as the contemporary Bedouin are concerned at least, know
578 no beginning and are insoluble. Feud and the other forms of relationships to be
[591] discussed presently are to be understood, in part, by reference to the ordered divisions
of the tribes. It is necessary at the outset, therefore, to give a brief statement about
the tribal organization; other details will be included as they become relevant.

619 There are nine noble tribes in Cyrenaica whose members are referred to as freemen.
621 These tribes see themselves as divided into three genealogical orders of sections:
primary, secondary, and tertiary. The tertiary tribal sections correspond to the camps
613 which cluster around the larger watering points during the drought season, May to
[132] November. Such camps consist of clusters of smaller camps in which the concentration of agnatically related males is over 80 per cent. Within the latter kinship links
are known, so that these agnates are consanguinely related as well as politically
[162] united. The populations of most tertiary groups vary from about 200 to 700 or so,
but a group ceases to be viable if the number of male adults drops much below fifty.
Political division is absent from these tertiary groups, regardless of their precise
size, for, whatever may be the condition of developing local lineages, the acceptance
of a common name carries with it full political responsibility incumbent equally on
[423] all their members. Each of these tertiary sections, moreover, has its own watering
point, ploughland, and pastures; each has its own *watan* or homeland. This statement
is true of all tribal sections of whatever order of segmentation. In other words, the
tribes and their sections correspond to an ordered division of the territory.

619 Names of tribal sections are the same as those given in the genealogies. Both tribe
613 and lineage are identically ordered. Lineages develop, and split at the tertiary order
of segmentation,[2] and, *a fortiori*, the process is the same for the tertiary tribal sections.
Split, in other words, occurs where relationships are most intense.

621 The summer community which constitutes a tertiary section, breaks up once the
221 rains begin in November or December. At this time of the year water is readily
available in the numerous small cisterns, there is pasture in plenty, and the animals
are giving milk. These combined reasons lead the larger summer camp to divide
into smaller camps of some five to ten tents. The latter are separated one from the
other by short distances—a mile or so—but together form a cluster in that they are
621 territorially distinguishable from a neighbouring and similar group of camps. Tertiary sections are discrete also in the sense that all the major necessities of daily living
311 are available within their several territories. Each controls its own natural resources,
and these resources are the same for all the camel-herding groups—in any given year
one may have more of a particular commodity than another, but the difference is in

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[171] [1] Evans-Pritchard, 1940. The feud might have been present among the Nuer. Exogamy and the other rules of marriage which obtain among them create a dispersion of ties, which superficially appears to militate against a condition of feud. But a dispersal of ties does not mean that they necessarily act as a pressure for peace. Moreover, the exogamous links may link limited numbers of groups only, leaving others with sufficient discreteness to pursue feuding relationships as they are described in this paper.

[2] See Peters, 1959.

degree and is ephemeral, so that the opportunity for the development of trade relations 621
is absent.[1] Save for straying animals, a section has no urgent need to seek 311
relationships with others, as long as the rainfall is sufficient to permit the exploitation [619]
of local resources.

The tertiary section is also regarded as the corporate group *par excellence*, in which 621
'the one word does for all'. Corporate identity is conceptualized as 'one bone' 613
or 'one body'. An offence against one of its members is held to be an offence
against all; if one of its members is killed 'we all lose blood'. When one of its members [682]
commits homicide the responsibility falls on all equally. Blood money, when
received, is shared by all save for a special portion reserved for the 'owner of the [672]
blood', the nearest agnate of the victim. In opposite circumstances, all adult males
accept the responsibility of contributing an equal share to the blood money. Rules
of membership, simple in their brevity, express graphically this corporate identity:
'You must strike with us and be struck with us; you must pay with us and receive
with us.' The group also bears a name, and there is never any doubt about the
affiliation of any tribesman. That group of men—known as the *'amarā dam*—who are
agreed on the obligation to exact vengeance, to pay blood money when necessary,
to engage in common defence, and to accept the possibility of death in vengeance,
is a fixed and clear-cut group, not one whose membership has to be calculated by
reference to degrees of kinship in regard to a specific situation, as appears to be the
case among other peoples.

Homicide within the *'amarā dam* brings about an impasse in relationships. A blood-money 621
payment is out of the question since the acceptance of blood money by one 613
part of a tertiary section from another of its parts is tantamount to a statement of 682
split. Only in conditions where relationships within the lineage have developed to the
point of political severance is it anticipated that a blood-money payment may be 627
demanded; but this problem is not the same as that at present under discussion.
Bedouin say that blood money cannot pass within the *'amarā dam* for those making
the payment would be the persons receiving it. This is spurious reasoning, since the [829]
'owner of the blood' is awarded more than any other members of the group as it is,
and arrangements could obviously be made to pay him separately. Blood money is
out of the question because it distinguishes relationships between people as belonging
to two distinct political communities, and not because of any difficulty of distribution.
In Bedouin thinking, an injury to 'the one body' is an injury to all its parts. Blood-money [829]
payments by members of a corporation to one or more of its members is a
contradiction in terms. In the same way vengeance is also excluded, for this merely
doubles the original loss. A reprisal exacted in hot blood is always a possibility, but
this is not referred to as *thār*, vengeance. Even if, at a later date, the closest kinsman
of the victim should slay the offender, the act would not be referred to as *thār* and any
connexion with earlier homicides would be denied.

Stultified in the field of political action, there is little else that can be done. Expulsion 682
is a possible course of action—and expulsion has occurred. Records show,
however, that exile is almost invariably voluntary.[2] Moreover, exile is terminated as

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[1] Many sections trade fleeces for dates with the folk of distant oases, but the sections do not trade among themselves.

[2] I recorded one case of a man who was expelled from his group and the tribes around were warned that the rules of sanctuary were not to apply to him. He is said to have died from grief and hunger. The reason given for such drastic action is that he killed [438]

621 hundred of their sheep are grazing in the neighbourhood. This is beside the point.
613 What is important is that the offender's group is showing a desire to remain on
628 friendly terms, and members of the victim's group are doing likewise by accepting
682 reduced amounts. Compared with what the payments should be, after four years they
are trivial and soon cease altogether. Blood money, if it is to achieve the purpose of
621 restoring peaceful relationships, must work in this way among the Bedouin, for, as
613 they view the matter, a single payment of the full amount would only terminate
628 relationships. There would be no further obligations to hold them together. The
682 payment of a debt in full means only one thing—hostility. Where there is no debt,
571 there are no relationships. Debt must be allowed to run between groups, for it is this
182 which creates obligations and perpetuates social relationships.[1] As the debt of blood
money mounts, the social relationships between the groups improve. The cessation
of payments and the absence of further demands is final earnest that the relationships
are again normal.

613 The second step in this exposition, therefore, is to attach to homicide between
628 tertiary sections the penalty of vengeance or the payment of blood money, both
621 achieving the same end of bringing about a restoration of peaceful relationships.

682 Between secondary sections, relationships are again different. Ecologically, the
619 areas are distinct. The topography may be dissimilar—sand dunes in one area and
613 low valleys in another; secondly, the soils may differ—sandy soil here and firm valley
[133] bottom soil there; thirdly, while the climatic régime of the two areas may be broadly
similar, since there is marked variability in the aggregate annual rainfall which is
[132] coupled with a high variability from place to place, each secondary section has its
own micro-climate, sufficiently well defined for one area to be well watered in any
given year while a neighbouring area suffers partial drought. These differences affect
[221] productive activities. Seasonal movements are also affected: some secondary sections
move annually over considerable distances and in fixed directions, while members of
a collateral section may move only a few miles and these short moves may vary in
direction from year to year. It is true that minor ecological differences exist between
collateral tertiary sections, but these do not affect the economy and the way of life in
the manner described for secondary sections. Partly because of their territorial extent,
partly because of the larger aggregate population, the secondary sections are more
self-contained, not only ecologically and economically but also in terms of social
relationship. More of the requirements of everyday living can be met within the
territory and span of a secondary section than within those of a tertiary section.
Secondary sections develop a kind of specialization to the extent that in any year
some of them will have more usable natural resources than others, but because these
differences are ephemeral they do not lead to the development of permanent trade
relations. Add to all this the fact that agnates are concentrated in camps on the territory
which belongs to their lineage, and the discreteness of secondary sections is
[582] immediately apparent. Marriage rules make this discreteness potentially, at least, even
more sharply defined, for unlike other 'lineage societies' where exogamy, coupled
with other marriage regulations, compels the dispersion of kin links among lineage

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[1] This point becomes clearer when considered in the general context of debt relationship among the Bedouin. Marriage payments, gift exchanges, hospitality, various forms of help, and so on are all aspects, with blood money, of an intricate and fascinating web of debt relationships.

619 segments, the Bedouin are free to marry within as close a range as the first cousin on
613 either side. Preferential marriage with the father's brother's daughter exists, not
582 merely as a sentiment, but with the legal force of permitting a man this choice against
all other men. Before a father arranges the marriage of his daughter he first must seek the permission of his brother's son. Moreover, if a first-parallel cousin is not available, a Bedouin is free to take as a wife any parallel cousin within the minimal lineage. Much weight has been given to the value of exogamy as a device for the definition of groups; parallel-cousin marriage is equally suitable for the purpose—indeed it is better for it has the effect of knitting the members of a local group together as cognates, thereby throwing the group into isolated relief.

613 Consequently, when a homicide occurs between two secondary sections, there is
628 no urgent necessity to make peace, the relationship between them being of a kind
682 that can be controlled and altered to suit the circumstances. It is between these groups
that the argument—if the argument is taken up at all—centres on the circumstances of the killing, every effort being made to show that insult was deliberately added to homicide, that one homicide is to be distinguished from another because a man of great renown was singled out as the avenger's victim, or that in a vengeance killing there was a breach of taboo as well. A debt is always left over, and it is an impelling obligation for the Bedouin to redeem it. They frequently speak of vengeance in this context as 'redeeming the debt'. Again, any homicide between two secondary sections is regarded as one in a series, whether the details or even the name of the victim of the previous homicide is known or not. I recall discussing a double homicide with a close kinsman of the slayer, and the only way he could account for it was by telling me that his kinsman had to kill because his victims were of such and such a group. The feud knows no beginning, and it has no end. It is a form of behaviour associated with a specific structural order, and it is as persistent as the structural order itself; in this sense it is eternal. It was most difficult to get the Bedouin to give accounts of homicides other than those which had occurred over the past fifty years or so, but they invariably claimed that the origin was earlier than this, although they were wholly unaware of the identity of the earlier victims. In any event, their only historical frame of reference is the genealogy; and history, as a chronological sequence of events, has no meaning beyond the founding ancestor of a minimal segment. When they refer events to points on the genealogy superior to this, they are no longer thinking in terms of the temporal order of events, but in terms of what they know to be the contemporary relationships between groups, for the names on the genealogy are names of groups and do not bear a relation to a time scale in any sense. Put in another way, for them a homicide which involves two secondary sections must be a feud, because this is the nature of the relationships between the groups, and there must have been previous killings, otherwise the people involved would not belong to two separate secondary groups.

The relationships which are referred to as feud are of a kind which requires at least a show of hostility whenever the parties happen to meet. Even if they do not actually meet, but are in the vicinity, some sort of demonstration is likely. Thus, several shots were fired at a man riding some distance away from a camp, and although positive identification was difficult at this range, the men of the camp argued it must have been a member of a group with which they were at feud otherwise the passer-by

would have dropped in on the camp. In another situation, two men entered a shop 613
in a market-place; inside sat two men of a feuding group who, instead of retreating 628
hastily, greeted those who had just entered, and the latter returned the greeting with 682
blows on the head from the butts of their rifles. Markets in Cyrenaica are recognized
to be places of peace. In their actions the two offenders not only injured two others [443]
but also broke a taboo in a public place. The victim's group now had to avenge not [683]
only the injury but the insult that the breach of taboo carried with it, as well. In
most feud relationships this is characteristic. It is never a matter of a simple homicide,
but of killing a man at the entrance to his tent, between the centre poles of his tent,
or taking the life of a minor, or an elder too old to carry arms and so on. Each successive killing ensures that the hostile relationships will be perpetuated.

The third step in this exposition, therefore, is the association of a state of feud with the secondary order of segmentation.

When the relationships between the structurally superior primary tribal sections 619
are examined, the arguments against the necessity for peace are stronger than in the
case of secondary sections. Relationships between them are few and irregular. Only
occasionally do members of these groups meet, and then often accidentally; very
many men of collateral primary sections are complete strangers one to the other.
If a homicide occurs between two primary sections it is unlikely that any attempt to 619
open negotiations will be made. The offender's camp may be raided by a *ghazi* 682
recruited from the victim's kinsmen. There would be no question of these primary [721]
sections going to war. On a raid firearms may be used, but the action is limited to a
strike-and-run affair. If the issue is joined and members of both sides are ranged [726]
against each other they fight with sticks to avoid large-scale slaughter: warfare must
not be allowed within the tribe. Wars belong to intertribal relationships. For one of 175
these wars, apart from hearsay evidence, some records exist. These tell of a war 619
which took place during the period 1860 to 1865, in which there were planned cam- 726
paigns, the organization of fighters into groups, and provisions for a labour force
in the home territory, large enough to produce sufficient food to maintain an army
in the field. During this war several hundred people were killed.

At this point, it is possible to summarize the stages in this exposition of the 619
Bedouin view in diagrammatic form.

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

682 To complete this general statement, two further circumstances are cited by the
602 Bedouin. If a man kills a related person who is not an agnate (it is expressed as killing
the mother's brother) the breach in relationships must be healed as quickly as possible.
The convention for dealing with this is that the offender, bound hand and foot,
mounted on a horse, is sent to the camp of ' the owner of the blood ', in the company
of a holy man, there to make an offer of his life, saying: ' Here is my knife, my life
is yours; here is my shroud, my life is yours.' No Bedouin would agree for a moment
to undertake this journey if he thought the offer might be accepted. In Bedouin
sentiments a life offered in this way cannot be taken. It is the convention which precedes
a peace meeting and blood money. Any other way of dealing with the confusion,
which spreads as a result of a homicide between cognates, is excluded.

Secondly, if a woman is killed, whatever the intersegmentary distance, the homicide
682 is said to be accidental, because a man never ' intends ' to kill a woman. Blood-
562 money arrangements are made as soon as possible, and the wealth—half that of a
613 man—passes to the deceased's father, not to her husband, for a woman's ' bone '
always belongs to her father. Obviously women cannot be allowed to enter into
[582] feud; since it is demographically compelling (apart from other reasons) for some of
[591] them to marry outside their natal groups, then they might well find themselves residents
in the enemy's camps, if they were to become involved in feuds.

121 This statement of the different means available for the regulation of homicide at
the several orders of tribal segmentation is the view the Bedouin themselves hold of
682 their relationships. An analysis of the facts presented thus far could bring out a
613 number of interesting points with regard to the relativity of morals, the typification
829 of acts by their social context, the significance of the orders of segmentation, and so
619 on. Rather than proceed along these lines, however, it is more urgently necessary
to reflect on the significance of the fact that the arrangement of the material in terms
of what is usually called the lineage structure coincides with the Bedouin ordering
of the same details. It is, of course, important to note that the account is not based
on mere hearsay evidence. Each statement made can be documented from known
homicides, and to this extent the model that has been used is consistent with reality.
The model, nevertheless, can only be a representation of what a particular people,
the Bedouin, conceive their social reality to be; it is a kind of ideology which enables
them, without making absurd demands on their credulity, to understand their field
of social relationships, and to give particular relationships their *raison d'être*. But, as
will be shown, it would be a serious error to mistake such a folk model for sociological
analysis. Such an error is difficult to avoid because the Bedouin, when defending their
view, are able to cite enough bits and pieces of reality to make their argument convincing.
121 The flaw in the reasoning is seen when it can be shown that its consequences
114 are absurd. As an example of what is meant, the statement that feud is attached to
groups at the secondary order of segmentation may be considered. If the statement
613 were true, if each and every secondary section were at feud one with the other (and
619 in a structural sense this ought to be so), then each tribe would be divided into small
829 mutually hostile groups, which completely lacked any possibility of movement, even
578 for pasturing purposes. Presented with this, the Bedouin would argue that this is not
in fact so, because secondary and primary sections are interlinked in many ways. That
is, they evoke what to them are contingencies to explain why they are at feud with one

121 part of a secondary section but not with another. Once contingencies are permitted
613 to enter in, the lineage model ceases to be of use, for what is implied is that at all
114 times some parts of sections structurally situated for feuding do not in fact feud.
[619] Other facts can be adduced to show that the structural view is inadequate but, before
[829] proceeding to examine these, some general objections to the lineage theory need to
[578] be raised. In the first instance, the corner stone in the theory of lineage systems is that
they consist of parts which are in balanced opposition. It is no accident that the idiom generally used in discussing the segmentation of a lineage system is that segments bifurcate. Indeed bifurcation is necessary if lineage theory is to make sense, because if at any order there are more than two segments, then combinations can occur which are not comprehended by the theory. In the Cyrenaican lineage the number of segments at the tertiary order is haphazard, in some cases as few as two but in others as many as a dozen or so. Where there are many segments at this order it is rather pointless to speak in terms of balanced opposition. Moreover, at the secondary order of segmentation the number of segments are fairly consistent throughout the tribes, but they number more than two in all of them. It is also a fact that combinations occur and, moreover, these may be between the tertiary segments of two ' opposed ' secondary segments.

121 Secondly, in lineage theory groups come together to constitute larger segments in
613 opposition to like segments. Yet in lineage societies there is a lack of instituted
authority, there are no chiefs distributed throughout the land as heads of segments
571 of the hierarchical orders. This being so, then it is not possible for all the sections of,
622 say, a secondary section to come together; there is no one to command the action.
114 In fact, sections combine in Cyrenaica, but not in the way they should according to the
lineage structure. In order to discuss this adequately, a lengthy diversion into analysis of the distribution of power would be necessary. The matter must rest here with the admittedly somewhat dogmatic assertion that there are men who wield power over groups of varying populations, and that the extent of their domains cannot be understood by reference to orders in the lineage. Perhaps it is for this reason—because, that is to say, lineage theory effectively blocks the exercise—that relatively little has been written about the problem of leadership in these societies.

121 Thirdly, all segments should be fairly equal in numbers of people and economic
613 resources, if the theory of lineage were to have substance in reality. In Cyrenaica
114 the population of one tertiary segment may be three times or more that of another.
[621] Both may be structurally equal in the sense that they are named groups segmenting
as a pair of brothers from a common father. As political groups, however, this equality has little meaning. Further, with regard to economic resources, some sections possess several wells and a territory of such extent that it straddles two or even more of what might be called micro-ecological areas. With marked preponderance in numbers and superiority of resources, some groups have grown into dominance, and the evidence points to the existence of this dominance in the past also. However, ' like ' sections may appear on a lineage chart, in political action there is conspicuous
[619] disparity. Each tribe possesses one tertiary section or more with a claim to be the
[621] owners of the ' Golden Stirrup '; these are large tertiary groups with relatively plentiful resources, with allies in other groups, and, in sum, with the power to terrorize other tribal groups.

The consequences of homicides in which secondary groups are concerned present 121 an even greater variety, for now the span has expanded to include many more groups, 613 with a total population of several thousand people. Groups of this order are spread 682 over a much wider territorial range; some structurally distant groups are neighbours by virtue of their propinquity, while some structurally proximate groups are far removed territorially. Some feuds lie dormant for long periods. Others erupt [578] frequently. Some homicides between these groups are followed by the 'laying down of the denial'—the feud situation with most acrimony built into it, for one denial, followed by a vengeance killing, is met by a second denial and so on, excluding thereby any chance of a settlement. In other circumstances the offender's group boast that they are responsible for a homicide, thus challenging the victim's group to a show of force. Only the more powerful tertiary groups would venture to do this, and it is only they who could meet a homicide against them with a spectacular show of force, compelling a weaker tertiary group (according to hearsay evidence) to break up and leave its homeland. The modes of killing in homicide differ in character. Some killings have been heinous and offensive in terms of general morality; their purpose is to sting the victim's kin to retaliate or to cause them to suffer general discredit and loss of status. While some parts of secondary segments are at feud, others are not. A homicide between affinally or matrilaterally linked groups, whether they are secondary or primary groups, is settled as quickly and as amicably as possible to prevent turmoil in their relationships. Feud concerns two tertiary sections, not the [578] opposed secondary sections of which they are parts. Blood money and vengeance is [628] not the responsibility of secondary sections, but of their respective tertiary sections.

At this point, a further statement concerning the external marriage links of tertiary 121 segments throws further light on the feud. Previously it was stated that the competition 613 between collateral tertiary groups for natural resources is indicated by a low 582 rate of marriage between them. Their external marriage links reinforce the separation. 578 One tertiary section, A, takes some of its spouses from section X of a collateral secondary section; A's collateral, B, takes some of its spouses from X's collateral, Y. A may be at feud with Y and B with X. The agnatic links between A and B, and X and Y do not mitigate the severity of the hostility in the two feuds, they exacerbate it. It would be erroneous to think of them as cross-cutting ties which promote peace. Stultified in the development of their hostilities by virtue of their territorial proximity and the sentiment associated with putatively close agnatic connexion, A and B are able to express hostilities indirectly through their linked groups X and Y respectively. During discussions of disputes, homicides, or rival claims to water, whether the disputants meet in the camps or in administrative offices in the villages, men from the matrilateral and affinal groups of the parties directly concerned are also present to do most of the shouting. In some cases I recorded a maternal relative was killed on behalf of an agnatic group to which he did not belong, although the latter accepted the responsibility. In the light of facts of this sort the lineage model obstructs analysis.

I now wish to make a few brief remarks about the relationships between collateral 121 primary sections and paired tribes. Homicide, it was asserted earlier, results in raids 619 and war between groups of these orders of segmentation respectively. Evidence 682 can be adduced to show that both consequences have followed. The case usually 726 cited to demonstrate that a single killing precipitates war between tribes is the

121 celebrated war between the 'Abaidat and the Bara 'asa tribes occupying a large part
619 of central and eastern Cyrenaica. This war took place a hundred years ago, so that the
682 evidence is mainly hearsay, but it is significant that when asked for details of the
726 groups taking part the Bedouin make it clear that the entire tribes were not at war—
[173] some sections on both sides are said to have remained on friendly terms. Yet when
121 wars are discussed in a general fashion, the Bedouin insist that tribes confront each
619 other as such. If it is pointed out to them that men might be ranged against their
maternal relatives the Bedouin mumble apologetically that they would not kill their
726 maternal relatives—a lame argument since in the heat of battle men cannot make this
602 kind of discrimination. Details of other wars also illustrate the point that only parts
of tribes face each other in strife, for though the stories of past events may be inaccurate there is genealogical evidence to substantiate their claims that certain groups were linked in the past, and in any case their statements assert that where these links exist they are not prepared to engage in hostilities. The several parts of each tribe,
121 like the parts of primary and secondary sections, have as many different sorts of
619 relationships as there are groups, and the general statement that tribes are warring
571 units merely obscures the interest there is in their relationships. Tribes, further, lack
the leadership to make war. I repeat that leadership does exist, but not even the
121 greatest leaders, past or present, can rightly be described as leaders of their tribes,
619 using the term in its structural connotation. Literature on the subject gives the
613 impression that there are tribal leaders, because successive administrations have used
554 the tribes and their divisions as a framework for attempting to rule the Bedouin, but
the details of the power domains of individual leaders make it clear that they have little to do with the ordered divisions of tribes. A leader within part of one tribe may carry with him tertiary sections of another tribe, and if major hostilities break out between parts of these tribes, the sections of both which are joined as allies and related as kinsfolk will not fight against each other, for sections so linked enjoy stronger connexions than the structurally linked tertiary sections of a very large
[682] secondary section. Consequently the statement that homicide results in tribal war
[114] when the offender and his victim are members of two separate tribes is not merely
incomplete, not merely a simplification, it is wrong.

121 A point which has been implicit throughout the second part of this paper needs
now to be made quite explicit: groups do not come together in their respective
613 structural genealogical orders. During my entire residence in Cyrenaica I did not
571 see a group of agnates larger than a tertiary tribal section assemble for any purpose.
[114] It is true that the occasions when large groups are required to assemble are infrequent.
[648] It is also true that although the British Administration was serving a caretaker role
only, it may have had an affect on the nature of tribal gatherings. Despite this qualification, there were several occasions when I expected tribal groups to assemble in lineage order if the fusion of sections in relation to like sections has any meaning in practice. Large groups of men did gather to dispute claims to wells, to argue about rights to ploughland, and to make peace. In every case that I recorded the agnatically closest groups of the main participants were absent, while members of genealogically more remote groups were present in strength. This statement applies to gather-
[628] ings in the camps and in the administrative centres. One of the biggest gatherings I
witnessed assembled in an administrative office in a village near the coast in the

121 sections constituting the combinations which makes the facts of feud intelligible.
613 Furthermore, several different types of power structures exist which serve the different
[571 interests of the people composing them, and these are interlinked in combinations
578] of superior span. But the formation of these structures and the modes in which they
combine are quite unlike the articulations in a lineage system. Characteristically, the
segments in a lineage system are conceived of as building up hierarchically to span
what is spoken of as a total society, the apex of the system affording a spectacular and
fixed definition of its boundaries. Had I been using this concept in this paper the
[173] founding ancestress of the nine Cyrenaican tribes, Sa'ada as named by the Bedouin,
would have served this purpose and would have been given inappropriate prominence.
121 The views presented here have the consequences of retreating from a concept
184 of a total society. The people to whom the facts given are related are the camel-herding
tribes only. Some of them have relations of many kinds with the cow-herding
233 folk who inhabit the northern plateau area, and these relations are also significant
619 for the analysis of a wide range of problems; genealogically both cow and camel
herders are seen as part of a single structure, but the differences between them with
regard to their economy, the size, composition, and distribution of their residential
units, their political and ritual life is so great that to conceive of them as a single social
121 structure is not useful. Moreover, the far western tribal sections have relationships
619 of such urgency with their neighbours in Tripolitania (who are excluded from Cyrenaican
genealogies) that to cut off these relationships as lying outside Cyrenaican society
would be quite unwarranted. The same can be said of the relationships of the tribal
sections in the eastern part of Cyrenaica with their genealogical cousins, the Aulad
'Ali of Egypt, who, although residing across a national border, are closely linked to
some of the Cyrenaican Bedouin. Some tribes also have to rely on the people of the
southern oases for an item of diet and an outlet for surplus wool, and the net of kinship
is spread out to include them. In these cases they come into contact with other
[177] ethnic groups such as Berbers and Tibu, and through the oases they extend their lines
of communication southwards to Wadai, Chad, and Bornu. As an indication of the
effectiveness of these links, it is only necessary to add that people inhabiting Cyrenaica
make periodic and regular visits to these far southern places, and that in 1948 a
shaikh, living near Ajdabiya in south-western Cyrenaica, collected blood-money
contributions from kinsmen in Wadai. A single structure cannot possibly include,
for analytical purposes, these sorts of relationships.

121 Finally, it must be stressed that the facts given here refer to the period 1948 to
114 1950. Since then oil has been discovered in large quantities near the territory of a
[315 tribe where I spent most of my time while resident in the country, and where there
] was one tin shack in 1950 there is now a modern port with roads extending southwards
from it into the wilderness. I see no reason to assume that social relations as
I observed them are present today or that they were the same at any time in the past
175 either. Before the advent of the Sanusi Order in the early eighteen-forties, it is known
795 that one lineage at least was dominantly powerful and that its leader tyrannized a
613 large part of Central Cyrenaica.[1] His descendants constituted a powerful group in

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[1] Smith and Porcher, 1864. These two archaeologists met this leader and continued their archaeological researches around Cirene only with his good-will, although the site is not on the territory of his tribe as I knew it in 1950. They also speak of him as inhabiting a castle which also lies outside the

would be impossible to satisfy all marriage expectations of men within the 621
universe of the minimal tribal section. For this reason alone external links 613
are inevitable and persistent. Also, the small territorial strip such a group 582
claims as a homeland produces an economy which, in this environment, 182
is unstable. Additional security is gained by making connections with other [423]
tribal sections, each with its specific ecological character. Men also marry [433]
into their client groups. The proportion of these for this camp was 9 per cent [619]
of the total. From these links they gain economic advantages, they can
claim services and a client-following is politically significant. Finally, 7
per cent of the total[18] are marriages with women of other tribes, which
again not only reduces the instability of the economy (in that a large tribal
area suffering near-famine conditions has access to areas of markedly different ecology), but also provides political connections for men whose power
ambitions have passed the point of leadership limited to their own tribes. In
one way or another all these interests are manifest in the small camp and
attention is now directed to the latter.

The disposition of people in the camp is represented diagrammatically 621
on the page following. 592

The nucleus of the camp is Tent A. Its owner (1) was a powerful *Shaikh,* [554]
the son of a famous father. His marriage represents a political link with a [619]
group of one of the primary sections of his own tribe. His father died only a [428]
few years before I recorded my census, and the large amount of moveable
property he left had still not been divided among the sons; the owner of the
tent, as eldest brother, still controlled the flocks and herds. Most of his time
he spent away from the camp engaging in political intrigue. His two younger
brothers lived in his tent, but the second (5) would not remain there long
because negotiations for his marriage had been started. His father (2) mar- [582]
ried a parallel cousin; she died and shortly afterwards he took her sister (3) [587]
in sororal union. When this occurred an amount of bride-wealth was
agreed, but instead of giving any of it to her father, the entire amount was [583]
"put in front of her" (that is, the animals were allowed to remain with her
husband's flock), and these animals she had marked with her brother's
tribal sign to distinguish them from those of her husband. It was widely [428]
known that she was going to leave these animals to her husband's second [562]
son, for although she could not transfer them to a male outside her husband's
corporate group, she could decide who, among his heirs, should inherit.

During my stay in this camp, her brother's son (4) came to it as a 621
temporary resident for a month. Since he was poor, the purpose of his visit 592
was to capture some of his aunt's wealth while she was still alive and the 579
possibility still existed. During his stay he was fed well but did no work. [604]
His kinsmen found his company tiresome, so, to cut short his stay, and after [431]
consulting her nominated heir (5), she gave him three grown goats. Also
when an occasion arose for an animal slaughter, she provided the sheep, and, [231]

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[18] The remainder is made up of marriages to the daughters of men incorporated into the lineages.

000 fiction, but it is interesting to read that, even in Ibn Khaldun's day, these Tuareg were known as "The Veiled Ones".

175 The first Arab expedition to North Africa began in 643, two years after the conquest of Egypt, when 'Amr ibn el-'Asi invaded Cyrenaica and received the submission of the Luwata Berbers, whom he found in occupation of that country. Forty years later the conquerors had reached the Atlantic, but these early Moslem invaders mostly settled in the towns and left the open country to the Berbers. Their influence on the nomadic population was therefore trifling, and to-day need not be taken into account.

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619 The eleventh century irruption from the east of the wild Bedouin tribes of Beni Hilal and Beni Suleim, who continued their nomadic existence after their conquest of the country, was one of the decisive factors in moulding the character of the present-day population; a religious upheaval among the Berbers of Senegal the other. The Beni Hilal have indeed disappeared, but to-day all the independent tribes of Western Egypt, the Sa'adi, claim descent from the Beni Suleim, while their vassals all have the same title, Murabitin, as the adherents of the religious movement referred to above. Some historical explanation now becomes necessary and, since the vassals probably represent the aboriginal population more closely, we will first consider the Murabitin.

In the early days of Islam, volunteers constantly thronged to all the fighting fronts where the faith was being spread by the sword among the heathen. These were nicknamed *El-Murabitin*, which meant "pickets", from the *ribat* or outposts (lit. "horse-lines") in which they lived.

But in the eleventh century a violent religious movement among the Messufa and Lamtuna sections of the Sanhaja Tuareg appropriated the name to its followers, just as eight hundred year later the fanatics of the Eastern Sudan were known as *the* Dervishes of their time. Both upheavals began with a prophet on an island, and both spread northwards with terrifying rapidity. Yet the *Murabitin* of the Senegal were far more successful than their rivals on the Nile, and their title reached the height of its fame when a line of their kings, whose name the Spaniards corrupted to "Almoravides", ruled over Andalusia till 1156.

Yet just as the original *Murabitin* were gaining their

first successes in Senegal, the Beni Hilal and the Beni Suleim 175
were being despatched by the Caliph Mustansir billah against 619
Muʿizz ibn Badis, his rebellious viceroy in Tripoli. They sang of their conquest : [539]

> " Great was the king, son of Badis, a mighty man of war !
> Yet we routed his thirty thousand men !
> We were but three thousand, yet the victory was ours, and ours the spoil !
> Their hearts were as water, not a man was in their ranks !
> We routed them and they fled far and wide ! "

These Beni Hilal, now extinct, are famous wherever Arabic is spoken for the exploits of their legendary hero Abu Zeid, while the Beni Suleim had helped the Prophet at the battle of Hunein, and are said by Hogarth to be the ancestors of the great modern tribe of Harb.[1]

The confusion of these two invasions caused the races of North Africa to become inextricably mixed. Both Arabs and Berbers spent their lives in the desert herding their flocks, and both were warlike. So it is natural that the intermarriages of a few generations should have made one people of them, and it is also natural that the conquered should claim relationship with the conquerors and not vice versa. But this aspiration of the Berbers has flooded their genealogies with so many lies that it is difficult to disentangle the truth.

The descendants of the original colonists, much mixed [792]
with Berber blood, still preserve their title of Murabitin, though no longer living in *ribat*, which soon lost their military character and were turned into *Zawia* " monasteries ", where the more peacefully inclined of the sect retired for religious teaching and contemplation. Later, when the *ribat* came to be deserted, the peaceful Murabitin, ill-fitted by their monastic habits for the resumption of an active nomadic life, sank into dependence on their warlike brethren the Saʿadi, and, among a primitive race, dependence means inferiority. Thus in Arabia any tribe that pays tribute to another [186]
is despised as Hiteim. And so the once proud title of " Murabitin " has simply come to mean " vassal " and nothing more.

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[1] *History of Arabia*, 38.

● 619 The independent Sa'adi tribes fall into four groups :

1. The Jawazi, Fawayid, and Rammah, all of common origin with the 'Awaqir of Cyrenaica.
2. The Harabi and Bar'asa, both of common origin with the 'Ibeidat of Cyrenaica.
3. The Hanadi, and
4. The Awlad 'Ali

[173] The original ancestor whom these Sa'adi all claim is one Abu Dib, said to be of Suleim descent.

175 554 619 This sheikh was a real personage and a contemporary of Ibn Khaldun (who died in A.D. 1406). He was sheikh of the Beni Ja'afir, and a man of great importance in Barka, the very place that the four tribes inhabited for centuries before they came to Egypt. Also the period of fifteen or sixteen generations, which the modern Bedouin assert to separate them from Abu Dib, agrees with this chronology well enough.[1]

619 [173] Some are found to assert that their title of Sa'adi "helping" is derived from an ancestress called Sa'ada, the wife of Abu Dib, or, according to a hostile account, of a Jew called Yana. But the real explanation of the term has already been given above.

619 651 At the present day a sort of feudal system prevails both in Egypt and Cyrenaica, by which families are *mrabit*,[2] or vassal families, not tribes to tribes ; thus the Qat'an tribe of Murabitin is divided, one part vassal to a family of Awlad 'Ali el-Ahmar, another to the Sinaqra, and a third to the Sinana. For a tribute called "alms", which by hereditary obligation each Mrabit family must pay, the Sa'adi family to which it is attached is bound to afford the Mrabit family protection in all minor difficulties of life, such as robbery by another family of Sa'adi, etc.

Thus a "Mrabit" family by paying tribute can herd its flocks in peace, calling upon the Sa'adi to see that justice is done them, but they are bound to join the Sa'adi to fight with them in any serious conflict with other tribes.

Among the "Mrabit" tribes of the present day are the Jumei'at, Qat'an, and Awlad Suleiman, all claiming as common ancestor one Ka'b, and feudal relations are

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[1] The pedigrees of which these Western Bedouin are so proud can only be trusted so far back as the individual whose name a subdivision has adopted, such as Kharûf in the Awlad Kharûf pedigree. Taking them separately, the pedigrees will be found to dovetail into each other up to that point, but beyond it things become problematical.

[2] Sing. of "Murabitin".

maintained to this day in the desert between the last two 619 651
and the Sa'adi, though they are relaxed in the cultivation.

The Jumei'at, who used to be "Murabitin" to the Beni 'Una, are now nominally so to the Awlad 'Ali, but are not required to pay tribute. Other tribes, such as the 619
Jawabis and 'Awarma, are in an intermediate stage between the Sa'adi and the Murabitin. The Awlad 'Abd es-Sallam, [778]
the Samalus ed-Diminat, and perhaps the Fawakhir, call themselves "Murabitin bil Baraka", a priestly caste which, in Tripoli, used to receive special privileges from the Turkish Government.

Though the Sa'adi tribes despise the Murabitin as serfs, [186]
they respect them for their piety and resort to them for the writing of charms.

While the Murabitin tribes generally may be suspected to contain more Libyan blood than the Sa'adi, there are other tribes such as the 'Amayim, the Jahama, and the Tarhuna, who have come to Egypt from further west than any of the above, and who seem to be quite definitely "Berber", though, of course, none of them will admit it. These are known euphemistically as 'Arab el-Gharb.

Even some of the Juheina, settled east of the Nile in Sharqiya, are scorned by Klippel as "d'origine berbère, se pretendant section d'une tribu d'Arabie".[1]

Awlad 'Ali.—This tribe, by far the most important of [131]
the Western Bedouin, occupies with its vassals the whole north coast of Egypt from Salum to Alexandria. Like the 619
others, they claim descent from the Beni Suleim, alleging 173
their ancestor 'Ali, son of 'Aqar, to be a grandson of that Dib, or Abu Dib, mentioned by Ibn Khaldun. Their enemies, however, allege that he was a Jew. "When the Arabs occupied the north coast of Africa, there was a notable, a Jew, who owned property at Saqiet el-Hamra in Morocco. This man welcomed and entertained the Arab sheikh Ez-Zanati. He became very popular with the sheikh, who gave him his daughter named Sa'ada, on condition that he embraced Islam before the marriage contract was made out."[2] Another version calls the Jew Yana, and says that he had two daughters. Of these Sa'ada was the

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[1] E. Klippel, "Etudes sur le folklore Bédouin de l'Egypte," *Bull. Soc. Khédiv. de Géogr.*, vii, 10, Cairo, 1911. [113]

[2] From information collected by Muhammad Bey Wasfi.

619 ancestress of the Awlad 'Ali and Hind of the Hanadi. (The
173 Hanadi call their ancestress Hind, the daughter of Sallam.)
These obvious fabrications only mean that their conventional genealogy is not believed outside the tribe. But the Awlad 'Ali themselves all agree that 'Ali was the son of 'Aqar bin Dib.

175 They are now a composite tribe made up of the descendants of 'Ali's three sons, and various fragments of broken tribes.
619 The Awlad 'Ali lived for a long time in the "Green Mountain" of Cyrenaica, and about 150 years ago began to drift eastwards, called into Egypt by the Jumei'at to aid them against the Hanadi, who, with their subtribes, were then in possession not only of the north coast but were also settled all over the Beheira.

175 After the departure of the French in 1801, a firman was
619 addressed to the sheikhs of the Hanadi, Afrad (a division
648 of the Awlad 'Ali), Jumei'at, Beni 'Una, and other Arabs
resident in Beheira, confirming them in their territories, but threatening them with expulsion and fine if they misbehaved themselves.[1]

By 1808, the Hanadi seem to have been quite driven out by the Awlad 'Ali, for in that year they bought their peace with Muhammad 'Ali and asked for the restitution of their lands in Beheira. The Pasha agreed to this and sent troops under Shahin Bey to chase the Awlad 'Ali out again. The Awlad 'Ali responded by offering 100,000 "tallaris" to be allowed to remain in the lands of the Hanadi—an offer which Muhammad 'Ali accepted. When they failed to pay up, troops were again sent to aid the Hanadi against them, but this combined force was completely defeated by the Awlad 'Ali near Hosh 'Isa.[2]

Of the events of 1810, Jabarti says :

> "During his stay at Alexandria, he (Muhammad Ali) gave safe conduct to the chiefs of the Bedouins of the tribe of Awlad Ali who lived in the province of Beheira, and by this ruse enticed them to him ; but hardly had they arrived than he had them arrested, claimed large sums from them, and sent his soldiers to carry off their cattle ; their wives and their children were dishonoured. He then gave them robes of honour."[3]

Finally he exiled the Hanadi to Sharqiya, then a desert, and gave the Awlad 'Ali their lands on the coast and in Beheira.

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[1] Jabarti, vii, 78–80.

[2] Jabarti, viii, 171 and 179–180.

[3] Jabarti, viii, 300.

Had the Senussi been successful in the last war, they 175
would no doubt have brought in the 'Ibeidat or the 'Awaqir 619
from Cyrenaica to replace the Awlad 'Ali in Egypt.

At the present day the Awlad 'Ali, especially the eastern 619
sections near the Nile Valley, have almost ceased to be nomadic, 178
and only the old men have memories of their former warlike
habits. They suffered considerably during the Great War,
but are again becoming prosperous. They now own large
comfortable tents, are beginning to build houses and clear
out cisterns, and are also said to be increasing in numbers.[1]
So civilized have they grown that my guides, one a Sinai
Arab and the other an 'Abadi, concurred in calling them
"green"—not real desert-worthy Bedouins.

Perhaps as a result of Libyan influence, or more probably 142
the better nurture and climate, they are taller, heavier, stronger,
and lighter-complexioned than the lightly built Arabs of
Sinai and Hijaz. Also they are much franker and more 157
straightforward than their shifty and suspicious eastern cousins, 181
and altogether more trustworthy. Their women only veil 562
themselves to strangers, and talk quite naturally and cheerfully 834
to the men of their own tribe. 609

They cultivate as much barley as they can, using a 243
primitive plough drawn by camels, in the clayey hollows [492]
scattered over their very stony limestone desert, but, as the [132]
rainfall is very uncertain, a good crop only occurs every five
or six years. After harvest, they exchange some of their [437]
barley for maize, which the women grind to make bread
as required, and some for dried dates. The seed for next [251]
year is buried in a hole lined with straw and covered with
clay, and a year's forage for the animals is set aside. The [432]
rest of the crop goes to market, and for a short time the [426]
Arab has money to buy clothes for himself and his family
and at utmost need to pay off some of the numerous debts he
has inherited from his forefathers. Soon he is reduced again
to the clothes he wears, the tent he sleeps in, and his animals
grazing in the desert.

They are great breeders of camels and sheep, and a busy 436
traffic in these goes on weekly in the markets of Hammam, 178 [438]
'Amriya, and the Beheira. So they have got into the habit [433] [233]

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[1] At the 1927 census, the Western Desert Arabs, Awlad 'Ali, Jawabis, etc., numbered 38,928 souls exclusive of those settled in Beheira. But Pacho, 100 years ago, estimated them at 38,000 souls. [161]

436 of thinking in money, and they reckon blood-money in cash
178 (£300) and not in camels, as Bedouin should.

484 The more adventurous make, annually, long and waterless journeys to the oases of Siwa and Bahariya to remove the date
245 crop, and, after their own wants are provided for, a good profit usually results from the sale of the remainder.

181 An Egyptian critic, who should know them only too well,[1] calls them "haughty, independent, and untrustworthy in character. They are dull and so abnormally lazy that they have no desire whatever to do more than they learnt (when young)". But he puts this down to the nature of the country; less generous critics ascribe the nature of the country to them!

173 Besides the descendants from 'Ali's three sons, 'Ali el-
619 Abyad, 'Ali el-Ahmar, and Sineina, a large section called Sinaqra reckons its descent from Sinqir, a mysterious white man who was wrecked and washed up on the coast near Salum some time in the seventeenth century.[2] These are the true Awlad 'Ali, whose sections live mingled together in the most intricate fashion. Among them live also the Jumei'at, who invited them into the country, and various families of other *murabitin*, such as Qat'an, Awlad Suleiman, Hawara, Habun, etc.
619 To distinguish themselves from their vassals, the Awlad 'Ali call themselves *hurr* free, and the *murabitin* are divided into various grades, according as they pay tribute or not.

The Awlad 'Ali are divided into three main divisions, with section (*badanat*) and subsections (*'eilat*) as follows. Some of these are so numerous that they practically constitute fresh tribes of their own.

I. Awlad Kharuf

[173] These are the descendants of 'Ali el-Abyad ("The White"), the eldest son of 'Ali bin 'Aqar bin Dib, and are subdivided again into:

	Section.	*Subsections.*
(1)	'Eilet Bu Hindi	'Eilet Bu Zayyana, 'Eilet Bahiya, 'Eilet Da'ud
(2)	'Eilet Bu Diya	'Eilet Ibrahim, 'Eilet Jereisat
(3)	Awlad Mansur	El-Afrad, El-Tawa'il, 'Eilet 'Abd Allah

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[1] Muhammad Bey Wasfi, for many years Inspector at Borg el-'Arab.

[2] Their sheikh told Hamilton in 1853, there were seven generations between him and Sinqir.

(Sinaqra)

The Sinaqra, or descendants of Sinqir, are also reckoned among the 619 descendants of Ali the White, " because Sinqir married his daughter 173 Khadija." They include :—

(4)	Afrad	Maghawra
(5)	Azayim	'Eilet el-Abdi, Muwamna
(6)	'Eilet Eleura	'Eilet Jeballa, 'Eilet Omar, 'Eilet Harun, 'Eilet Ajarma, 'Eilet Tahir.

II.

The descendants of 'Ali bin 'Aqar's second son, 'Ali el-Ahmar (" The Red ") are:—

(1)	'Esheibat	'Eilet ed-Dawi, 'Eilet el-Azraq, El-Wassafa, 'El-Lazumi
(2)	Kimeilat	'Eilet el-Hajj Muhammad, El-Maharsa, 'El-Khadayij
(3)	Jineishat[1]	'Eilet el-Majduba, Es-Samayil, Tabak

III. SINANA

The Sinana are the descendants of Sineina, the third son of Ali bin 'Aqar bin Dib. They include:—

(1)	Mahafid	'Eilet Etman, 'Eilet el-Hammama, 'Eilet esh-Shimla
(2)	Arawa	'Eilet ez-Zireiriya, 'Eilet el-Ghazulat
(3)	Qatifa	'Eilet Nasralla, 'Eilet-Omar, Esh-Shawalha.
(4)	Ijna	

Jawabis.—The nomadic Jawabis (sing. Jibusi) are for 619 the most part still settled in and around the Wadi Natrun, 175 where General Andreossy found them in Napoleon's time. [131] He calls them :

> " A hospitable tribe who lead a shepherd's life and encamp there every winter with their flocks. They are employed during this time carrying Natrun and prickly reeds ; they also have some traffic in dates, which they fetch in caravans from Sioua in the Ammonian Oasis ; it is a journey of twelve to fifteen days. These Arabs are *marabouths*, or peaceful people." [2]

He goes on to say they never make war, and only take up arms to defend themselves. In his time the tribe was com- [162] posed of about 2,000 men, and possessed 60 horses. A little [231] [162]

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[1] Kennett gives the three subdivisions of the Jineishat as Madi, Samayil, and Jabr.

[2] *Memoirs Relative to Egypt*, 288.

619 [175] later Wilkinson estimated them at about 400 men near El
[162] Terrana and the Wadi Natrun.

At the present day they are still reckoned *Murabitin*, but, like the Jumei'at, are sufficiently independent not to have to
[439] pay tribute. They share with the Awlad 'Ali in the date traffic with Bahariya Oasis, where the produce of the village of Mandisha is reserved for them, and that from Bawitti for the Awlad 'Ali.

619 Kennett notes (p. 54) that they demand £400 for blood-
682 money instead of £300, the usual price in the Western
181 Desert, and alludes (p. 67) to :

> "The free and easy way in which the Gawabees tribe near the Wadi Natrun pack up their summer tents and leave them in situ while they themselves trek off with their winter tents into the open desert for the winter grazing is indicative of this code of honesty prevailing among them."

142 On page 101, he calls them "nearly all very small men,
619 with strangely similar features and characteristics running through all the families of the tribe".

619 Bramly has collected three pedigrees of the tribe all going back to Sheikh 'Abd el-Jawad el-Kassar. They state
173 that they are an offshoot from the Qadadfa, and about 500 years ago left Saqiet el-Hamra in Morocco to settle in Egypt.

As a reward for "settling some affairs in the Wadi Natrun", Muhammad 'Ali Pasha granted them the usual Bedouin privilege of exemption from military service. There are small colonies of them elsewhere among the Awlad Ali, while others are settled in the cultivated provinces of Giza, Beheira, Menufiya, and Gharbiya.

Jumei'at.—This tribe, possibly a remnant of the original Libyan inhabitants of Mariut, is of quite respectable antiquity, for Ibn Khaldun includes the Jumei'at as a subtribe of "Beni 'Ali", themselves an offshoot from Beni Suleim. Whether his "Beni 'Ali" are the same as the modern Awlad 'Ali may be questioned, yet it is a reasonable assumption, for the exchange of the words "Beni" and "Awlad" in tribal names can be paralleled elsewhere.

The Jumei'at all agree that their remote ancestor, whom they share with the Awlad Suleiman and the Qat'an, was called Ka'b, and a Ka'b indeed appears in the pedigree ascribed

to Dib by Ibn Khaldun, who calls Dib a descendant of 619
Ka'b, the great-grandson of Suleim.[1] If this be true, the 173
Jumei'at must be an elder branch than any of the Sa'adi tribes, among whom the Awlad 'Ali are included. But in actual fact, the Awlad 'Ali do not consider the Jumei'at as of Sa'adi origin, that is, descendants of Abu Dib and his wife Sa'ada, but despise them as Murabitin or vassals, though they pay no tribute.

All this may be interpreted to mean that they are among the oldest inhabitants of Western Egypt. They have been in Egypt "seven hundred years" according to one of their sheikhs, Sa'ad Bey el-Masri, and a pedigree given me by another, Sheikh 'Ilwani Suleiman, who lives near Sidi 'Abd el-Rahman, runs :



The Jumei'at of Mariut are all descended from El-Ashtar, while the offspring of the other five sons are settled in Beheira, Gharbiya, and at Ramla near Alexandria.

It is, of course, possible that their eponymous ancestor, 619
Jumei'a, was an Arab of Beni Suleim descent, who returned to 173
Egypt from the "Green Mountain", soon after the Beni Suleim 174
invasion, and whose descendants became Murabitin by forming themselves into a religious community. But such religious fervour is not a Bedouin characteristic, but smacks rather of the fanaticism of the recently-converted, so I suspect the Jumei'at, in spite of their descent from Ka'b, to be mainly a remnant of the earlier Libyan population of the coast.

Prior to the arrival of the Awlad 'Ali, they were "Mrabit" 619
to the Beni 'Una, and engaged in constant conflict with the 175
Hanadi. Upon the rout and annihilation of the Beni 'Una, 726
the Jumei'at were stirred up to revolt against the Hanadi 792
by one of their holy men called Baqush. Outraged by their

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[1] The more ignorant Awlad Suleiman have forgotten Ka'b's paternity, and confused him with the famous Arab poet Ka'b ibn Zuheir. See p. 287 for their version. And yet another Jumei'i version gives as their ancestor the Saint Ka'b el Ahbar.

[2] The "Friends" of the Prophet.

• 619 oppression, he gathered his people and delivered a fiery
175 denunciation of his religion, during which he smashed his
726 rosary into pieces and mixed it with his horse's fodder;
792 Baqush then invited their kinsmen (?) the Awlad 'Ali, to
come over from the "Green Mountain" and help them.
To entice the Awlad 'Ali, he is said to have sent them samples
of salt desert water and Nile water sweetened with sugar to
illustrate the difference between the hardships of the desert
and the comforts of the Rif.[1]

619 As recounted earlier, the Awlad 'Ali completely routed the
175 Hanadi and their allies, and drove them from the desert.
726 In the division of the conquered territory, the Jumei'at
received a third, and, although they were still considered
Murabitin, were released from the payment of tribute. They
[131] now live intermingled with the free sections of the Awlad
'Ali, all along the north coast of Egypt, and are numerous in
Beheira, especially near Abu Hummus.

619 *Samalus.*—The Samalus are found scattered among the
[131] Awlad 'Ali on the northern coast and stranded among many
of the Egyptian provinces. They once possessed a head
sheikh Abu Sala at Minya, and colonies are recorded from
Faiyum, Beheira, Menufiya, Gharbiya, and Sharqiya. An
[175] old paper from the Recruiting Department gives from
[162] seventeen villages in the Faiyum 775 mounted Samalus
and 1,400 on foot, possessing 1,760 camels and 11,400
[231] sheep. Two important groups of wells, both called "Sawani
[312] es-Samalus" exist on the north coast, one about 50 kilometres east of Salum, and the other 20 kilometres south
of Dhab'a.

[173] They say they came to Egypt, 400 strong, about 200
years ago, from the Wadi Samalus in the Jebel Akhdar, and
their ancestor twelve generations ago was Nasr el-Hasani, of
course an "Arab from Beni Suleim".

[175] In the *Description de l'Egypte*, P. D. Martin relates how
[726] in 1800 the Samalus of Faiyum were raided by a party of
Ferjan, 200 strong, from Beheira.

619 *Shiheibat.*—These are a "Mrabit" tribe from the west with
186 an unenviable reputation, living near the Wadi Natrun.
Sayed Idris, the former Senussi leader, says of them: "Most

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[1] Dumreicher, 16. This is probably the "Sheik Abdall Gawyal Bagooshi" who wrote to Sir Sydney Smith in March, 1801, warning him of the approach of the French from Damanhur. Wilson, *History of the British Expedition in Egypt*, 371. (Rif = cultivated area.)

herds have a black goat or two—such are the Shiheibat." They are families of shepherds scattered amongst the Sa'adi families, and must not be confused with the 'Esheibat section of the Awlad 'Ali. 619 [186]

Dumreicher (pp. 52–7) gives a lively account of a quarrel between the Jawabis and the Shiheibat. [175] [598]